This case has been cited 8 times or more.
2011-12-07 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
In finding that appellant is guilty of homicide, instead of murder, the CA ruled that there was an absence of the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[23] For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.[24] On the other hand, to appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.[25] The CA, therefore, did not err when it ruled that the killing of the victim was neither attended by evident premeditation nor treachery, thus: The element of evident premeditation is manifested by the careful planning and preparation undertaken by the offender prior to the commission of the crime. A perusal of the evidence on record shows that the altercation between appellant Duavis and Dante Largado, Sr. took place at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 2, 2003, and the hacking incident took place at around 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day. To the mind of the Court, the lapse of time between the decision and the execution is not sufficient to allow appellant to fully reflect upon the consequences of his act and to effectively and efficiently prepare and plan his actions prior to the commission of the crime. Although it may be argued that there was some kind of premeditation on the part of appellant Duavis, it was not proved to be evident. | |||||
2009-09-17 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
It is elementary that not all inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimony affect their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimonies. Thus, although there may be inconsistencies on the testimonies of witnesses on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants.[18] | |||||
2007-12-04 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
||||
The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in the ponencia of now Chief Justice Reynato Puno in People v. Ave:[42] | |||||
2004-05-27 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
Settled is the rule that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not overturn the findings of trial courts. The latter are in a best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior in court.[39] We see no reason to deviate from this rule. | |||||
2003-12-10 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
There being no indication that Felipe and Benjamin were actuated by any improper motive to falsely testify against appellant, their relationship with the victim notwithstanding, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of their testimonies. Relationship could in fact even strengthen the witnesses' credibility, it being unnatural for aggrieved relatives to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit, for their natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating any other. [61] | |||||
2003-06-26 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
Appellant implores us to give credence to the testimonies of the defense witnesses. We are not swayed. It is a well-settled principle that when it comes to the matter of credibility, the appellate courts generally do not overturn the findings of the trial courts. The latter are in a best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior in court.[42] We see no reason to deviate from this principle. | |||||
2003-05-09 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
The first assigned error involves a determination of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Settled is the rule that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not overturn the findings of trial courts. The latter are in a best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior in court.[24] | |||||
2003-01-28 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was proven during the trial, there is no allegation in the Information that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to possess the firearm. Lack of license to possess a firearm is an essential element of the crime of violation of PD1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder.[76] Neither can dwelling, although proven, aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court.[77] Although this rule took effect on December 1, 2000, after the commission of the offense in this case, nonetheless it had been given retroactive effect considering that the rule is favorable to the accused.[78] |