This case has been cited 3 times or more.
|
2015-09-02 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| Pushing the point, petitioner calls attention to the medical certificate adduced as evidence which was negative of any finding of the presence of contusion, bruises, scratches, hematoma, or any injury on AAA's arms and the back portion of her upper body.[15] Petitioner would also express disbelief how AAA's shorts and underwear could have remained intact and undamaged if he indeed forcibly stripped her of these dress items.[16] Petitioner would also argue, citing the cases of People v. Lamarroza[17] and People v. Gavina,[18] that he should be acquitted, lacking as here of any showing of the element of total absence of voluntariness on the part of the party assaulted. In Gavina , the Court held: "In rape committed by force or intimidation, it is imperative that the prosecution should establish that voluntariness on the part of the offended party was absolutely lacking."[19] | |||||
|
2003-10-16 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
||||
| Under similar facts in People v. Gavina[23] and People v. Peligro,[24] the Court held that the absence of a weapon or anything that could produce sufficient fear in a woman as to render helpless one who would otherwise be deemed strong or worldly enough to put up a fight, or the failure to show the disparity in strength between the complainant and the accused sufficient to overpower a complainant into acceding to the sexual act is deemed a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond peradventure of doubt."[25] | |||||
|
2003-08-15 |
AZCUNA, J. |
||||
| As the prosecution failed to present evidence to substantiate the charge of rape through force, threat and intimidation, we are duty-bound to uphold appellant's innocence. It is an elementary rule in criminal procedure that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.[36] If the prosecution in this case sought to convict appellant by proving that complainant was violated while in a state of unconsciousness, as provided under the 2nd paragraph of Article 355, the information should have stated so. We find, however, that the element of unconsciousness was not alleged much less specified in the information, which charged appellant for rape under the first circumstance. Hence, it cannot be made the basis of conviction without violating appellant's right to due process, in particular to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.[37] We have ruled that this right is accorded by the Constitution so that the accused can prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded.[38] | |||||