Lawyerly

GR No. 180681

2013-03-18

SERENO, C.J.

Since the imputation of bias to the Office of the Ombudsman is without support, this Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, fails. And because the first petition holds no water, his Supplemental Petition and Second Supplemental Petition have no basis to rely upon. In any event, the OSG correctly argues that a Rule 65 petition is an inappropriate remedy to question the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to quash an information and, its imposition of suspension pendente lite. The remedy still available to petitioners is not the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, but the continuance of the case in due course.[28]

GR No. 199082

2012-09-18

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

PERALTA, J.

It is well settled that the absence [or irregularity] of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it impair the validity of the criminal information or render it defective. Dismissal is not the remedy.[139] Neither is it a ground to quash the information or nullify the order of arrest issued against the accused or justify the release of the accused from detention.[140] The proper course of action that should be taken is to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon such information and to remand the case for the conduct of preliminary investigation.[141]

GR No. 169042

2011-10-05

ERDITO QUARTO v. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO

BRION, J.

In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary prosecutor in determining who must be charged.[40] He also enjoys the same latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause (that must be established for the filing of an information in court)[41] and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion,[42] i.e., when his action amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.[43]

GR Nos. 168578-79

2008-09-30

NIETO A. RACHO v. PRIMO C. MIRO

QUISUMBING, J.

Indeed, the determination of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.[36] It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. The trial of a case is conducted precisely for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[37] A finding of probable cause merely binds the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.[38]

GR NO. 167910

2007-07-17

MUSTAPHA M. GANDAROSA v. EVARISTO FLORES

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The special civil action of certiorari or prohibition is not the proper remedy against interlocutory orders such as those assailed in these proceedings; i.e., an order denying a motion to quash the information, and one declaring the accused to have waived his right to present evidence and considering the case submitted for decision. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (citing Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 [1990], and Acharon v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309; People v. Madaluyo, 1 SCRA 990), the established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. It is only where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal that the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may exceptionally be allowed. The Court has been cited to no such special circumstances in the cases at bar.[62]

GR NO. 143044

2005-08-14

WILLIAM MADARANG v. CA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Second. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.[23] Only when the court issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order.[24] No such special circumstances are present in the case at bar.

GR No. 143044

2005-07-14

WILLIAM MADARANG v. CA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Second. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.[23] Only when the court issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order.[24] No such special circumstances are present in the case at bar.

GR NO. 143193

2005-06-29

MELBAROSE R. SASOT v. PEOPLE

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.[20] The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[21] Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterate the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances[22] in the present case such that immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari should be permitted. Clearly, the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.

GR Nos. 146368-69

2004-10-18

MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG v. SANDIGANBAYAN

QUISUMBING, J.

In this case, the Graft Investigation Officer released his resolution finding probable cause against petitioner on August 16, 1995, less than six months from the time petitioner and her co-accused submitted their counter-affidavits. On October 30, 1995, only two and a half months later, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had reviewed the case and had approved the resolution. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the lapse of only ten months from the filing of the complaint on December 13, 1994, to the approval of the resolution on October 30, 1995, is by no means oppressive. "Speedy disposition of cases" is consistent with reasonable delays.[8] The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the nature of the Office of the Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for efficient government service to lodge freely their complaints against alleged wrongdoing of government personnel.[9] A steady stream of cases reaching the Ombudsman inevitably results.[10] Naturally, disposition of those cases would take some time. Moreover, petitioner herself had contributed to the alleged delay when she asked for extension of time to file her counter-affidavit.

GR No. 149069

2004-09-20

ENRICO P. QUIAMBAO v. ANIANO DESIERTO

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[17] We find that the Ombudsman did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for and sanctioning the filing of an Information against petitioner and his co-accused on charges of violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[18] The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.[19]

GR Nos. 150353-54

2004-07-27

ANTONIO BALAY MATURAN v. PEOPLE

QUISUMBING, J.

Petitioner's argument, that he could not be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of Rep. Act No. 3019 because he acted in good faith when he approved the purchase and installation of the radio antenna, is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, which could have been raised in a full-blown trial on the merits. Petitioner's case ought to have taken its regular course, and when an unfavorable verdict was handed down, he could have appealed in the manner authorized by law.[20]

GR No. 148030

2003-03-10

EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER RICARDO N. OLAIREZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN

VITUG, J.

The other issues raised in the petition touch on the question of whether or not there appears to be a probable cause against respondent Olairez. Almost invariably, the Court has respected the assessment of the Ombudsman on the determination of the existence or absence of probable cause.[10] It is basically within his sound judgment to evaluate whether, given the facts and circumstances before him, a criminal case should or should not be filed.[11] Thus, it has been consistently held that it is not for this Court to review the Ombudsman's paramount discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before his office.[12] In Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman,[13] the Court has ratiocinated:"The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant."[14]

	GR No. 180681 2013-03-18	ROLANDO Z. TIGAS v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN SERENO, C.J.
Since the imputation of bias to the Office of the Ombudsman is without support, this Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, fails. And because the first petition holds no water, his Supplemental Petition and Second Supplemental Petition have no basis to rely upon. In any event, the OSG correctly argues that a Rule 65 petition is an inappropriate remedy to question the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to quash an information and, its imposition of suspension pendente lite. The remedy still available to petitioners is not the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, but the continuance of the case in due course.[28]
	GR No. 199082 2012-09-18	JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERALTA, J.
It is well settled that the absence [or irregularity] of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it impair the validity of the criminal information or render it defective. Dismissal is not the remedy.[139] Neither is it a ground to quash the information or nullify the order of arrest issued against the accused or justify the release of the accused from detention.[140] The proper course of action that should be taken is to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon such information and to remand the case for the conduct of preliminary investigation.[141]
	GR No. 169042 2011-10-05	ERDITO QUARTO v. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO BRION, J.
In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary prosecutor in determining who must be charged.[40] He also enjoys the same latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause (that must be established for the filing of an information in court)[41] and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion,[42] i.e., when his action amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.[43]
	GR Nos. 168578-79 2008-09-30	NIETO A. RACHO v. PRIMO C. MIRO QUISUMBING, J.
Indeed, the determination of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.[36] It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. The trial of a case is conducted precisely for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[37] A finding of probable cause merely binds the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.[38]
	GR NO. 167910 2007-07-17	MUSTAPHA M. GANDAROSA v. EVARISTO FLORES CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The special civil action of certiorari or prohibition is not the proper remedy against interlocutory orders such as those assailed in these proceedings; i.e., an order denying a motion to quash the information, and one declaring the accused to have waived his right to present evidence and considering the case submitted for decision. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (citing Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 [1990], and Acharon v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309; People v. Madaluyo, 1 SCRA 990), the established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. It is only where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal that the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may exceptionally be allowed. The Court has been cited to no such special circumstances in the cases at bar.[62]
	GR NO. 143044 2005-08-14	WILLIAM MADARANG v. CA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Second. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.[23] Only when the court issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order.[24] No such special circumstances are present in the case at bar.
	GR No. 143044 2005-07-14	WILLIAM MADARANG v. CA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Second. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.[23] Only when the court issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order.[24] No such special circumstances are present in the case at bar.
	GR NO. 143193 2005-06-29	MELBAROSE R. SASOT v. PEOPLE AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.[20] The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[21] Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterate the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances[22] in the present case such that immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari should be permitted. Clearly, the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.
	GR Nos. 146368-69 2004-10-18	MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG v. SANDIGANBAYAN QUISUMBING, J.
In this case, the Graft Investigation Officer released his resolution finding probable cause against petitioner on August 16, 1995, less than six months from the time petitioner and her co-accused submitted their counter-affidavits. On October 30, 1995, only two and a half months later, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had reviewed the case and had approved the resolution. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the lapse of only ten months from the filing of the complaint on December 13, 1994, to the approval of the resolution on October 30, 1995, is by no means oppressive. "Speedy disposition of cases" is consistent with reasonable delays.[8] The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the nature of the Office of the Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for efficient government service to lodge freely their complaints against alleged wrongdoing of government personnel.[9] A steady stream of cases reaching the Ombudsman inevitably results.[10] Naturally, disposition of those cases would take some time. Moreover, petitioner herself had contributed to the alleged delay when she asked for extension of time to file her counter-affidavit.
	GR No. 149069 2004-09-20	ENRICO P. QUIAMBAO v. ANIANO DESIERTO YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[17] We find that the Ombudsman did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for and sanctioning the filing of an Information against petitioner and his co-accused on charges of violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[18] The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.[19]
	GR Nos. 150353-54 2004-07-27	ANTONIO BALAY MATURAN v. PEOPLE QUISUMBING, J.
Petitioner's argument, that he could not be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of Rep. Act No. 3019 because he acted in good faith when he approved the purchase and installation of the radio antenna, is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, which could have been raised in a full-blown trial on the merits. Petitioner's case ought to have taken its regular course, and when an unfavorable verdict was handed down, he could have appealed in the manner authorized by law.[20]
	GR No. 148030 2003-03-10	EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER RICARDO N. OLAIREZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN VITUG, J.
The other issues raised in the petition touch on the question of whether or not there appears to be a probable cause against respondent Olairez. Almost invariably, the Court has respected the assessment of the Ombudsman on the determination of the existence or absence of probable cause.[10] It is basically within his sound judgment to evaluate whether, given the facts and circumstances before him, a criminal case should or should not be filed.[11] Thus, it has been consistently held that it is not for this Court to review the Ombudsman's paramount discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before his office.[12] In Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman,[13] the Court has ratiocinated:"The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant."[14]

OSCAR G. RARO v. SANDIGANBAYAN