Lawyerly

GR Nos. 178382-83

2015-09-23

JARDELEZA, J.

The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court was settled in our decision in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC.[60] The general rule is that certiorari does not lie to review errors of judgment of the trial court, as well as that of a quasi-judicial tribunal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh their probative value.[61] However, this rule admits of exceptions. In Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores,[62] we stated:In the review of an NLRC decision through a special civil action for certiorari, resolution is confined only to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. Hence, the Court refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and agencies exercising adjudicative functions, such as the NLRC. Occasionally, however, the Court is constrained to delve into factual matters where, as in the instant case, the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter.

GR No. 166790

2014-11-19

JUAN P. CABRERA v. HENRY YSAAC

LEONEN, J.

This court "is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case."[62] We can consider errors not raised by the parties, more so if these errors were raised by respondent.

GR No. 171101

2012-04-24

HACIENDA LUISITA v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL

VELASCO JR., J.

As aforequoted, there is collective ownership as long as there is a concerted group work by the farmers on the land, regardless of whether the landowner is a cooperative, association or corporation composed of farmers. However, this definition of collective ownership should be read in light of the clear policy of the law on agrarian reform, which is to emancipate the tiller from the bondage of the soil and empower the common people. Worth noting too is its noble goal of rectifying "the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people."[25] Accordingly, HLI's insistent view that control need not be in the hands of the farmers translates to allowing it to run roughshod against the very reason for the enactment of agrarian reform laws and leave the farmers in their shackles with sheer lip service to look forward to.

GR No. 174208

2012-01-25

JONATHAN V. MORALES v. HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL

PEREZ, J.

Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because "continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay"[30] and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not,[31] constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.[32] In cases of a transfer of an employee, the rule is settled that the employer is charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity[33] and that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the employee's transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.[34]

GR No. 173631

2010-09-08

PASIG CYLINDER MFG. v. DANILO ROLLO

CARPIO, J.

We find no error in the labor arbiter's ruling on the question of petitioners' liability for constructive dismissal. It seems petitioners rested their case on the defense of respondents' abandonment of work.[23] For this cause to prosper, petitioners should have proved (1) that the failure to report for work was without justifiable reason, and (2) respondents' intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as shown by some overt acts.[24] Petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proof. On respondents' non-reporting for work, petitioners failed to rebut respondents' claim that they were denied entry to their work area and the records substantially support the arbiter's finding that respondents were placed on shifts "not by weeks but almost by month."[25] Further, petitioners fail to bring to our attention any overt acts of respondents showing clear intention to sever their employment relationship with petitioners. On the contrary, respondents' act of filing complaints before the NLRC for illegal dismissal shows intent to continue their employment and hold petitioners liable for their constructive dismissal and for non-compliance with labor laws on payment of benefits. We have consistently treated this fact as belying intent to abandon work.[26]

GR No. 159730

2008-02-11

NORKIS TRADING CO. v. MELVIN GNILO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

There is constructive dismissal when an employee's functions, which were originally supervisory in nature, were reduced; and such reduction is not grounded on valid grounds such as genuine business necessity.[25]

GR NO. 154532

2006-10-27

PETRON CORPORATION v. NLRC

GARCIA, J.

In the review of NLRC decisions through the special civil action of certiorari, resolution is confined only to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. The Court refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and agencies exercising adjudicative functions, such as the NLRC. [19]

GR NOS. 146653-54

2006-02-20

WESTMONT PHARMACEUTICALS v. RICARDO C. SAMANIEGO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer of an employee is for just and valid grounds, such as genuine business necessity. The employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee. It must not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of salary and other benefits. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the employee's transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.[6]

GR NO. 167968

2006-01-23

VICENTE FLORENTINO v. RIVERA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

More to the point is another well-recognized doctrine, that the final judgment of the court as rendered in the judgment of the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So, ... there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of course, be distinguished from the judgment." (1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 6). At the root of the doctrine that the premises must yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing finis to litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday experience of those who study judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from which the results purport to flow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51). It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions, lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision. Succinctly stated, "where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision." [22] While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations. [23]

GR NO. 155279

2005-10-11

MICRO SALES OPERATION NETWORK v. NLRC

QUISUMBING, J.

De Castro was likewise unlawfully terminated. Contrary to petitioner's claim, records show that de Castro was not merely suspended. He was dismissed for alleged abandonment of work.[19] To constitute abandonment as a just cause for dismissal, there must be: (a) absence without justifiable reason; and (b) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever the employer-employee relationship.[20]

GR NO. 156893

2005-06-21

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. v. GOMERSENDO P. DANIEL

PANGANIBAN, J.

At the outset, petitioners must be reminded that, having been filed before the CA under Rule 65, the Petition should be grounded on issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.[12] Settled is the rule that a petition for certiorari does not normally include an inquiry into the correctness of the NLRC's evaluation of the evidence, from which the labor tribunal bases its findings and conclusions.[13] Thus, the appellate court was limited to determining whether the tribunal had gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the evidence was insufficient to prove a just or authorized cause for dismissal.

GR NO. 149974

2005-06-15

PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AGENCY CORPORATION v. PERCIVAL AGUINALDO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer and demotion of an employee are for just and valid grounds, such as genuine business necessity.[24] The employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of salary and other benefits. Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employee's transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.[25]

GR No. 138379

2004-11-25

PLACIDO O. URBANES v. CA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

As we explained in Globe Telecom, Inc. vs. Florendo-Flores,[28]

GR No. 154689

2004-11-25

UNICORN SAFETY GLASS v. RODRIGO BASARTE

YNARES-SATIAGO, J.

However, petitioners' charge of abandonment of work by respondents does not hold water when taken in light of the complaint for constructive dismissal. We have held that a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for constructive dismissal and with reason.[22] Respondents cannot be said to have abandoned their jobs when precisely, the root cause of their protest is their demand to maintain their regular work hours. What is more, respondents even prayed for reinstatement and backwages. Clearly, these are incompatible with the proposition that respondents sought to abandon their work.

	GR Nos. 178382-83 2015-09-23	CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA v. JOSEPH BASSO JARDELEZA, J.
The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court was settled in our decision in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC.[60] The general rule is that certiorari does not lie to review errors of judgment of the trial court, as well as that of a quasi-judicial tribunal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh their probative value.[61] However, this rule admits of exceptions. In Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores,[62] we stated:In the review of an NLRC decision through a special civil action for certiorari, resolution is confined only to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. Hence, the Court refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and agencies exercising adjudicative functions, such as the NLRC. Occasionally, however, the Court is constrained to delve into factual matters where, as in the instant case, the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter.
	GR No. 166790 2014-11-19	JUAN P. CABRERA v. HENRY YSAAC LEONEN, J.
This court "is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case."[62] We can consider errors not raised by the parties, more so if these errors were raised by respondent.
	GR No. 171101 2012-04-24	HACIENDA LUISITA v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL VELASCO JR., J.
As aforequoted, there is collective ownership as long as there is a concerted group work by the farmers on the land, regardless of whether the landowner is a cooperative, association or corporation composed of farmers. However, this definition of collective ownership should be read in light of the clear policy of the law on agrarian reform, which is to emancipate the tiller from the bondage of the soil and empower the common people. Worth noting too is its noble goal of rectifying "the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people."[25] Accordingly, HLI's insistent view that control need not be in the hands of the farmers translates to allowing it to run roughshod against the very reason for the enactment of agrarian reform laws and leave the farmers in their shackles with sheer lip service to look forward to.
	GR No. 174208 2012-01-25	JONATHAN V. MORALES v. HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL PEREZ, J.
Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because "continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay"[30] and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not,[31] constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.[32] In cases of a transfer of an employee, the rule is settled that the employer is charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity[33] and that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the employee's transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.[34]
	GR No. 173631 2010-09-08	PASIG CYLINDER MFG. v. DANILO ROLLO CARPIO, J.
We find no error in the labor arbiter's ruling on the question of petitioners' liability for constructive dismissal. It seems petitioners rested their case on the defense of respondents' abandonment of work.[23] For this cause to prosper, petitioners should have proved (1) that the failure to report for work was without justifiable reason, and (2) respondents' intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as shown by some overt acts.[24] Petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proof. On respondents' non-reporting for work, petitioners failed to rebut respondents' claim that they were denied entry to their work area and the records substantially support the arbiter's finding that respondents were placed on shifts "not by weeks but almost by month."[25] Further, petitioners fail to bring to our attention any overt acts of respondents showing clear intention to sever their employment relationship with petitioners. On the contrary, respondents' act of filing complaints before the NLRC for illegal dismissal shows intent to continue their employment and hold petitioners liable for their constructive dismissal and for non-compliance with labor laws on payment of benefits. We have consistently treated this fact as belying intent to abandon work.[26]
	GR No. 159730 2008-02-11	NORKIS TRADING CO. v. MELVIN GNILO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
There is constructive dismissal when an employee's functions, which were originally supervisory in nature, were reduced; and such reduction is not grounded on valid grounds such as genuine business necessity.[25]
	GR NO. 154532 2006-10-27	PETRON CORPORATION v. NLRC GARCIA, J.
In the review of NLRC decisions through the special civil action of certiorari, resolution is confined only to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. The Court refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and agencies exercising adjudicative functions, such as the NLRC. [19]
	GR NOS. 146653-54 2006-02-20	WESTMONT PHARMACEUTICALS v. RICARDO C. SAMANIEGO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer of an employee is for just and valid grounds, such as genuine business necessity. The employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee. It must not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of salary and other benefits. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the employee's transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.[6]
	GR NO. 167968 2006-01-23	VICENTE FLORENTINO v. RIVERA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
More to the point is another well-recognized doctrine, that the final judgment of the court as rendered in the judgment of the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So, ... there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of course, be distinguished from the judgment." (1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 6). At the root of the doctrine that the premises must yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing finis to litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday experience of those who study judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from which the results purport to flow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51). It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions, lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision. Succinctly stated, "where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision." [22] While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations. [23]
	GR NO. 155279 2005-10-11	MICRO SALES OPERATION NETWORK v. NLRC QUISUMBING, J.
De Castro was likewise unlawfully terminated. Contrary to petitioner's claim, records show that de Castro was not merely suspended. He was dismissed for alleged abandonment of work.[19] To constitute abandonment as a just cause for dismissal, there must be: (a) absence without justifiable reason; and (b) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever the employer-employee relationship.[20]
	GR NO. 156893 2005-06-21	COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. v. GOMERSENDO P. DANIEL PANGANIBAN, J.
At the outset, petitioners must be reminded that, having been filed before the CA under Rule 65, the Petition should be grounded on issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.[12] Settled is the rule that a petition for certiorari does not normally include an inquiry into the correctness of the NLRC's evaluation of the evidence, from which the labor tribunal bases its findings and conclusions.[13] Thus, the appellate court was limited to determining whether the tribunal had gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the evidence was insufficient to prove a just or authorized cause for dismissal.
	GR NO. 149974 2005-06-15	PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AGENCY CORPORATION v. PERCIVAL AGUINALDO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer and demotion of an employee are for just and valid grounds, such as genuine business necessity.[24] The employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of salary and other benefits. Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employee's transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.[25]
	GR No. 138379 2004-11-25	PLACIDO O. URBANES v. CA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
As we explained in Globe Telecom, Inc. vs. Florendo-Flores,[28]
	GR No. 154689 2004-11-25	UNICORN SAFETY GLASS v. RODRIGO BASARTE YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
However, petitioners' charge of abandonment of work by respondents does not hold water when taken in light of the complaint for constructive dismissal. We have held that a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for constructive dismissal and with reason.[22] Respondents cannot be said to have abandoned their jobs when precisely, the root cause of their protest is their demand to maintain their regular work hours. What is more, respondents even prayed for reinstatement and backwages. Clearly, these are incompatible with the proposition that respondents sought to abandon their work.

GLOBE TELECOM v. JOAN FLORENDO-FLORES