This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-06-25 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the fact. Thus, courts both trial and appellate have generally viewed the defense of denial in criminal cases with considerable caution, if not with outright rejection. Such judicial attitude comes from the recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being an excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy of consideration at all, denial should be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative and self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[13] It is no different here. | |||||
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2013-07-31 |
REYES, J. |
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| Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the same Code, if the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the crime.[50] In the present case, no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. Thus, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper penalty which should be imposed upon the accused-appellant. | |||||
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2008-12-10 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| First, whether Robin's testimony is credible. As this Court has consistently said, where the culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of the credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the CA affirming those of the trial court, duly supported by sufficient and convincing evidence, must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court, and are not to be disturbed on appeal.[30] The only exception is when certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.[31] | |||||
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2004-06-29 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Lastly, the flight of co-accused Benigno Ambrocio, Jr., and Carlito Francisco from the moment this case was filed and up to the present is indicative of their guilt. Settled is the rule that flight of an accused, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.[62] | |||||
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2003-06-10 |
CORONA, J. |
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| 3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. In the present case, we can no longer consider treachery as an aggravating circumstance again, this time for the purpose of imposing the death penalty, because it was already used to qualify the killing to murder.[88] Other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, no proof of any other aggravating circumstance was presented during the trial or alleged before the court to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the proper penalty should only be reclusion perpetua. | |||||