This case has been cited 3 times or more.
|
2012-06-26 |
ABAD, J. |
||||
| In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the discovery of such loans. The reason for this is that the government, as aggrieved party, could not have known that those loans existed when they were made. Both parties to such loans supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against the government. They could only have been discovered after the 1986 EDSA Revolution when the people ousted President Marcos from office. And, prior to that date, no person would have dared question the legality or propriety of the loans.[20] | |||||
|
2007-01-22 |
GARCIA, J. |
||||
| With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court finds it unnecessary to delve on the procedural concerns raised by respondents Cojuangco, Jr. and Lobregat, one of which, relating to the exclusion of the Solicitor General from this petition, has been appropriately addressed in Republic v. Desierto.[76] Notwithstanding the OSG's absence during PCGG's commencement of this certiorari proceedings, the underlying petition ought to be entertained. This disposition is prompted partly by the OSG's timely participation in later proceedings, a participation which is tantamount to a ratification of PCGG's act. As the Court explained in the same Desierto case:The preliminary issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petition should be entertained even though it was filed by the PCGG without the intervention of the … (OSG). | |||||
|
2005-08-31 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Similarly in the present case, contrary to the Ombudsman's belief, LOI No. 926 and P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 cannot protect private respondents from criminal prosecution as they are being charged with commission of acts tantamount to violations of R.A. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code.[7] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||