This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-06-04 |
REYES, J. |
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| The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal.[15] In this case, the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime has been adequately established by the prosecution, more particularly by the testimony of Dagangon. The Court cannot sustain the accused-appellant's argument that it was impossible for Dagangon to see the assailant considering that there was no evidence to show that the place where the crime occurred was lighted. As found by the CA, Dagangon was only three meters away from the accused-appellant and Jerome and had a good view of them. Moreover, there was no distraction that could have disrupted Dagangon's attention. He even immediately identified the accused-appellant and Jerome during police investigation, and there is no showing that Dagangon was informed by the police beforehand that the accused-appellant was one of the suspects.[16] Positive identification by a prosecution witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight than alibi and denial.[17] Such positive identification gains further ground in the absence of any ill motive on the part of a witness to falsely testify against an accused.[18] | |||||
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2014-06-02 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| For the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove the following: (1) the offender killed the victim, and (2) the killing was done through treachery, or by any of the five other qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the Information. [29] There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense that the offended party might make. The mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning and is done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim with no chance to resist or escape. Thus, even frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.[30] | |||||
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2014-01-22 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| With regard to appellants' assertion that the negative result of the paraffin tests that were conducted on their persons should be considered as sufficient ground for acquittal, we can only declare that such a statement is misguided considering that it has been established in jurisprudence that a paraffin test is not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun.[16] It should also be noted that, according to the prosecution, only Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi held firearms which were used in the fatal shooting of Pionio Yacapin while Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao purportedly held bolos. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the latter two tested negative for powder burns because they were never accused of having fired any gun. Nevertheless, the evidence on record has established that all four accused shared a community of criminal design. By their concerted action, it is evident that they conspired with one another to murder Pionio Yacapin and should each suffer the same criminal liability attached to the aforementioned criminal act regardless of who fired the weapon which delivered the fatal wounds that ended the life of the victim. | |||||
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2011-11-28 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| We agree with the CA that Edgar could be held liable only for the crime of homicide and not murder. "For alevosia to qualify the crime to murder, it must be shown that: (1) the malefactor employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the said means, method and manner of execution were deliberately adopted. Moreover, for treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack."[122] | |||||