This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-12-07 |
REYES, J. |
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| Given the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies, as against the denial and alibi presented by the defense, there is no reason for the Court to reverse the conviction of Mercado. His denial and the alibi that he was at some other place at the time the shootings happened failed to sufficiently support his plea for an acquittal. Jurisprudence holds that for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses.[27] The defense failed in this regard, as only the testimony of Mercado's father was presented to substantiate his claim. More importantly, the Court has emphasized in a line of cases that the appreciation of a claim of alibi shall be guided by the following parameters:For the defense of alibi to prosper, "the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime" during its commission. "Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed."[28] (Citations omitted) | |||||
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2015-02-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them,[84] for each count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of prision mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance.[85] With that, the Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of rape committed.[86] However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,[87] which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child,[88] and provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:[89] | |||||
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2013-11-27 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Time and again, we have repeated the legal doctrine that for alibi to prosper, it must be proved that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.[28] Furthermore, we have also established in jurisprudence that, in order for a corroboration of an alibi to be considered credible, it must necessarily come from disinterested witnesses.[29] | |||||
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2013-10-01 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| As regards Perpenian's possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v. Jacinto[70] that the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This Court, however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that Perpenian's actual served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense. For such reason, she may be immediately released from detention. | |||||
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2013-01-30 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced.[74] It reads, thus: SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. | |||||
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2013-01-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Furthermore, this Court gives less probative weight to a defense of alibi when it is corroborated by friends and relatives. We have held that for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses.[36] In the instant case, the witnesses for the defense were the wife, friends, and relatives of appellant. It would have been more favorable for appellant if the corroborating witnesses to his alibi were composed of persons not intimately related to him. | |||||
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2011-06-08 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. [37] | |||||