This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2014-04-21 |
REYES, J. |
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| Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind[141] or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.[142] | |||||
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2013-07-17 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Manalangsang unequivocally identified the petitioner as the gunman. Manalangsang was able to identify the petitioner because the latter revealed his face when he pulled down the bonnet he was wearing, thereby exposing his eyes, nose, mouth, and chin.[16] Moreover, the certainty of Manalangsang in identifying the petitioner as the one who shot Hispano is bolstered by the fact that he and petitioner were neighbors for five years in Baseco.[17] The RTC cites the following statement by Manalangsang as an added indication of his certainty "Si Avelino, kahit ubod ng layo, kahit naglalakad lang, kilala ko na. Dahil unang-una, matagal ko na siyang kilala, dahil ako hindi niya ako gaanong kilala, pero sila kilala ko, kahit nakatagili[d], kilala ko siya."[18] It cannot be denied that once a person gains familiarity of another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance.[19] | |||||
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2006-10-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As compared to the evidence presented by the prosecution, the bare denial and alibi offered by the appellant as a defense cannot hold water. It is well-settled that denial is an intrinsically weak defense, which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[28] A mere denial, like alibi, constitutes self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. [29] For alibi to succeed as a defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.[30] | |||||