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EULOGIO O. YUTINGCO v. CA

This case has been cited 12 times or more.

2012-07-04
PEREZ, J.
x x x The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court.  The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case.[35]
2009-07-27
CORONA, J.
Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.[8] As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[9]
2007-11-23
NACHURA, J.
Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65 petition to question the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss. It is a well-established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus. The appropriate recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to trial, and, in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course.[44] While there are recognized exceptions to this rule,[45] petitioners' case does not fall among them.
2007-06-19
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The procedural issue raised by Micronesia, et al. deserves short shrift. It is axiomatic that the CA has discretion to grant a motion for extension provided that it be interposed within the original filing period.[11] Cantomayor had until April 9, 2002 (April 8, 2002 being a holiday) to file a petition for certiorari but on said date he filed a Motion for Extension[12] of thirty (30) days or until May 9, 2002 to file his petition. He actually filed said petition on April 30, 2002. The timeliness of said petition was never questioned by Micronesia, et al. before the CA, not even in their Motion for Reconsideration from the September 13, 2002 CA Decision. The petition was therefore properly given due course by the CA.
2006-12-06
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
[6] G.R. No. 137264, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA 85.
2006-05-05
TINGA, J.
Certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe the rule laid down by law.[7] The New Rules on Civil Procedure, in Section 4, Rule 65 thereof, prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a petition for certiorari. The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over and prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. For these reasons, the 60-day period ought to be considered inextendible.[8]
2006-04-26
CORONA, J.
Section 4 of Rule 65 prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a petition for certiorari. The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case.[22]
2005-12-13
SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.
No extension of time shall be granted except for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days. In Yutingco v. Court of Appeals,[4] we held that the period of 60 days to file a petition for certiorari is reasonable and sufficient. It provides for ample time for a party to mull over and prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court, tribunal, board, or officer, It was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. Hence, the 60-day period must be considered non-extendible, except where a good and sufficient reason can be shown to warrant an extension.
2005-11-29
CORONA, J.
Even assuming that ordinary appeal is the proper remedy, we have in certain instances allowed a writ of certiorari where the order of the court is a patent nullity.[11] In these exceptional cases, we entertained a petition for certiorari despite the availability of the remedy of appeal.[12]
2005-08-08
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
However, Rule 65, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended, prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a special civil action for certiorari.  The 60-day period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.[31] Such right to a speedy disposition of the case pertains not only to a private complainant in a criminal case,[32] but to an accused as well.[33] While the periods set by law are technical rules of procedure, these are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice.  These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.[34] Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.  The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions.[35]
2005-07-08
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
However, Rule 65, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended, prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a special civil action for certiorari.  The 60-day period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.[31] Such right to a speedy disposition of the case pertains not only to a private complainant in a criminal case,[32] but to an accused as well.[33] While the periods set by law are technical rules of procedure, these are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.[34] Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.  The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions.[35]
2004-11-11
PANGANIBAN, J.
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has in fact relaxed the period for perfecting an appeal, especially on grounds of substantial justice,[15] or when there are other special and meritorious circumstances and issues.[16] Verily, this Court has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to exempt a case from their rigid operation when warranted by compelling reasons and the requirements of justice.[17]