This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2003-04-03 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| When the crime was committed in 1984, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The appellant testified that he was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. In his sworn statement to the police authorities, he also claimed that he was 17 years old.[22] The prosecution did not adduce any evidence to disprove the evidence of the appellant. Hence, the appellant is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.[23] Considering that the appellant was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the felony, the imposable penalty should be reduced by one degree. Hence, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period with a range of from ten years and one day to seventeen years and four months. Although the crime was committed at nighttime, there is no evidence that the appellant and his companions took advantage of nighttime or that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime. Hence, nighttime is not aggravating in the commission of the crime.[24] The crime was committed by a band. However, band was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[25] Although the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000 long after the crime was committed, the same shall be applied retroactively being favorable to the appellant.[26] Taking into account the indeterminate sentence law, the appellant should be meted an indeterminate penalty of seven years and one day of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum, to twelve years, five months and eleven days of prision mayor in its medium period as maximum. | |||||
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2003-04-02 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The use by appellant Ronald of an unlicensed firearm to shoot Diosdado on the thigh is not an aggravating circumstance because (1) there is no allegation in the information that said appellant had no license to possess the firearm. That appellant lacked the license to possess the firearm is an essential element of the crime and must be alleged in the information.[65] Although the crime was committed before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2002, the rule should, however, be applied retroactively as it is favorable to the appellants.[66] | |||||
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2003-01-28 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was proven during the trial, there is no allegation in the Information that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to possess the firearm. Lack of license to possess a firearm is an essential element of the crime of violation of PD1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder.[76] Neither can dwelling, although proven, aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court.[77] Although this rule took effect on December 1, 2000, after the commission of the offense in this case, nonetheless it had been given retroactive effect considering that the rule is favorable to the accused.[78] | |||||