This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2009-02-18 |
BRION, J. |
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| Canares mainly interposed the defense of denial, an inherently weak defense that must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[71] As negative evidence, it pales in comparison with a positive testimony that asserts the commission of a crime and the identification of the accused as its culprit. We find that the facts in this case do not present any exceptional circumstance warranting a deviation from these established rules. | |||||
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2008-11-14 |
BRION, J. |
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| Lastly, the defenses of denial and alibi of Diocado cannot prevail as against the positive, straightforward and consistent testimony of AAA that both the RTC and the CA found credible. The established dictum is that denial is an intrinsically weak defense that must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[40] In the same manner, for the defense of alibi to prosper, not only must the accused-appellant prove that he was in another place at the time of the commission of the crime; he must also show that it was impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the appointed time.[41] In the present case, the evidence on record shows that it was not physically impossible for Diocado to have committed the rape as the distance of his house to his place of work is only one kilometer. This distance can be negotiated in 10 minutes when riding a bicycle and in less than 5 minutes when riding a tricycle.[42] Rather than disturb the appreciation by the RTC and the CA of the testimonies of the defense witnesses, we quote with approval the following CA findings:In contrast, appellant's defense of alibi is far from convincing. His testimony and those of his witnesses collided with each other. Tessie Diocado declared that, at the time of the incident, she was at their house with her children including the private complainant; that private complainant went out but returned around 8:00 p.m.; and that the private complainant left the house on February 9, 1998. But Maria Manlapaz, their supposed visitor, affirmed that Tessie was all alone in the house, when she visited their house. On the other hand, the appellant testified that, when he arrived at the house, the private complainant was not there and she came home only on February 9, 1998; and he never mentioned having met Manlapaz that evening. Notably, Tessie Diocado stated that they had a lady visitor on the date and time of the incident but she does not know the name of said visitor. However, Maria Manlapaz, who was the visitor that Tessie was referring to, said that Tessie bought some goods from her that was why she went to Tessie's house to collect payment. Furthermore, appellant's co-employee, Joey Cantojos, testified that, on the day of the incident, he was the one who gave the salary of the appellant. Yet, appellant claimed that it was the manager who released their wages. Such discordant and irreconcilable testimonies indicated a tendency to prevaricate and to twist the facts. | |||||
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2006-03-10 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Findings of facts of the trial courts carry great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless shown to be contrary to facts or circumstances of weight and substance in the record. For, generally, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by trial courts, because of their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-examination.[21] | |||||
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2003-02-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Under Sections 8[70] and 9[71] Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a qualifying or aggravating circumstance must first be specifically alleged in the information and then duly proved during the trial. Otherwise, even if proved, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in determining the proper penalty.[72] | |||||
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2002-10-28 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| "fn">[54] of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, such qualifying or aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged in the information. Otherwise, even if these were subsequently proven, they cannot be appreciated in determining the proper penalty.[55] As held in People vs. Lachica,[56] a court is precluded from considering the attendance of qualifying or aggravating circumstances if they are not alleged in the complaint or information, because under the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, must be so stated in the complaint or information. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in applying Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, by sentencing appellant to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. [57] The trial court also properly ordered each of the accused in this case to pay the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity. This is in accord with prevailing jurisprudence.[58] However, we note that the trial court failed to award moral damages. | |||||