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REGALADO P. SAMARTINO v. LEONOR B. RAON

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

	GR No. 156759 2013-06-05	ALLEN A. MACASAET v. FRANCISCO R. CO BERSAMIN, J.
The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an action in personam cannot be overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant;and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him.[19] As to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void.[20] If the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.[21] As to the latter, the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of his defense.With the proper service of the summons being intended to afford to him the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him, he may also waive the process.[22] In other words, compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.[23]
	GR No. 171101 2012-04-24	HACIENDA LUISITA v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL VELASCO JR., J.
It bears stressing that "[o]wnership is defined as a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another."[18] The attributes of ownership are: jus utendi or the right to possess and enjoy, jus fruendi or the right to the fruits, jus abutendi or the right to abuse or consume, jus disponendi or the right to dispose or alienate, and jus vindicandi or the right to recover or vindicate.[19]
	GR No. 166216 2012-03-14	ROGELIO ABERCA v. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER MENDOZA, J.
On countless occasions, the Court ruled that, generally, judgments by default are looked upon with disfavor and are frowned upon as contrary to public policy. An example here would be the case of Regalado P. Samartino v. Leonor B. Raon,[22] where the Court stated: The trial court should not have been too rash in declaring petitioner in default, considering it had actual notice of valid reasons that prevented him from answering. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for default judgments are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.
	GR No. 173379 2010-12-01	ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL v. ROMEO CARLOS CARPIO, J.
Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of.[28] In Samartino v. Raon,[29] we said: We have long held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer's Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.[30]
	GR No. 178158 2009-12-04	STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED CARPIO, J.
Although it may be argued that the "right to designate the qualified assignee to the property" is an attribute of ownership, it does not necessarily follow that the presence of such right already means that the person holding the right has become the owner of the property. There is more to ownership than being able to designate an assignee for the property. The attributes of ownership are: jus utendi (right to possess and enjoy), jus fruendi (right to the fruits), jus abutendi (right to abuse or consume), jus disponendi (right to dispose or alienate), and jus vindicandi (right to recover or vindicate).[109] An owner of a thing or property may agree to transfer, assign, or limit the rights attributed to his ownership, but this does not mean that he loses his ownership over the thing. Accordingly, one may lease his property to others without affecting his title over it; or he may enter into a contract limiting his enjoyment or use of the property; or he may bind himself to first offer a thing for sale to a particular person before selling it to another; or he may agree to let another person designate an assignee to whom the property will be transferred or sold in consideration of an obligation. In any of such situations, there is no actual or legal transfer of ownership, for ownership still pertains, legally and for all intents and purposes, to the owner, not to the other person to whom an attribute of ownership has been transferred.
	GR NO. 183278 2009-04-24	IMELDA O. COJUANGCO v. SANDIGANBAYAN CARPIO MORALES, J.
It would be absurd to award the shares to the Republic as their owner and not include the dividends and interests accruing thereto. An owner who cannot exercise the "juses" or attributes of ownership -- the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate, and to the fruits - is a crippled owner.[10]
	GR No. 160846 2008-02-22	BENJAMIN B. GERONGA v. EDUARDO VARELA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Nowhere in the records of Administrative Case No. 96-04 does it appear that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct, or that he was held to answer for his alleged defamatory statements in his April 1, 1996 letter. Thus, the December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation of Del Pilar dismissing petitioner on that ground, and Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 of respondent approving said resolution/ recommendation were issued in utter contempt of the right of petitioner to due process. Both are void ab initio and should be treated as inexistent[64] -- it is as if no December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation was issued in Administrative Case No. 96-04, and therefore, Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 could not have approved and adopted a void resolution/recommendation. In effect, there was nothing for petitioner to appeal from in Administrative Case No. 96-04.