This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2009-06-05 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The categorical conclusion of the CA, confirmatory of that of the trial court, was that Anguac raped AAA on March 28, 1998 and five (5) more times thereafter. Both the trial and appellate courts found AAA to be categorical and unfaltering in her testimony on those unforgettable occasions. Both courts' assessments of AAA's credibility, particularly those of the trial court which had the advantage of observing her demeanor while in the witness box, carry great weight. Unless it is shown that the trial court overlooked, misapplied, or misunderstood some fact or circumstance of substance that would otherwise affect the result of the case, its findings will remain undisturbed on appeal.[11] After carefully reading the records of the case, we find no compelling reason now to depart from the rule. | |||||
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2003-09-18 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the award of indemnity ex delicto, where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, should be in the amount of P50,000.00[37] while the award for moral damages should be in the amount of P50,000.00.[38] Moral damages are awarded in rape cases without need of showing that the victim suffered from mental, physical, and psychological trauma as these are too obvious to require recital by the victim during the trial.[39] Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be awarded to the victim due to the presence of the qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon[40] and to deter the commission by others of similar dastardly act.[41] | |||||
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2003-04-01 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Clearly, the above cited improbabilities hinge on the credibility of the complaining witness, whom the trial court found to have no improper motive to falsely testify against appellant.[12] The trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the victim's statements is accorded great weight because it had the unique opportunity of hearing her testify and observing her deportment and manner of testifying. The trial judge is indisputably in the best position to determine the truthfulness of the complainant's testimony.[13] There is no reason to depart from this rule in the case at bar. | |||||
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2003-02-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In ruling upon Melanie's credibility, the trial court found her testimony to be "forthright, clear, and free from serious contradictions."[49] The trial court's assessment of complainant's credibility, considering that it had the advantage of observing her demeanor as she testified, is not easily discarded. The trial court judge is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of the complainant's testimony. Unless it is shown that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight or substance that would otherwise affect the result of the case, its findings will not be disturbed on appeal.[50] We find no compelling reason now to depart from said rule. We have carefully read the victim's testimony and find that the discrepancy harped upon by appellants focused more on her account of events immediately preceding the rape by Apuyan. They did not zero in on her narration of the crime itself. Complainant's testimony may not be flawless, but its substance, veracity, and weight were unaffected by the triviality of the alleged inconsistency. | |||||
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2002-12-27 |
CARPIO-MORALES, J. |
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| Sexual abuse includes 1) the employment, use, persuasion, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or 2) the molestation, 3) prostitution, or 4) incest with children. (Underscoring supplied) From this broad, non-exclusive definition, this Court finds that the phrase "sexually abuse" in the criminal complaints at bar does not comply with the requirement that the complaint must contain a specific averment of every fact necessary to constitute the crime. Notably, the phrase "sexual abuse" is not used under R.A. No. 7610 as an elemental fact but as an altogether separate offense. Above-quoted Section 5 thereof enumerates the punishable acts that must be alleged in the complaint or information to hold an accused liable, none of which is reflected in the complaints at bar charging accused-appellant. The case of People v. Cruz[41] is instructive. There the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R read: | |||||