This case has been cited 12 times or more.
|
2012-11-27 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| It is doctrined that opinions of handwriting experts, like signature analyses of the PNP, are not conclusive upon courts or tribunals on the issue of authenticity of signatures.[93] The seminal case of Gamido v. Court of Appeals[94] reminds Us that the authenticity or forgery of signatures "is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature," and thus "[t]he opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling x x x than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue." Hence, in resolving the question of whether or not forgery exists, courts or tribunals are neither limited to, nor bound by, the opinions of handwriting experts. Far from it, courts or tribunals may even disregard such opinions entirely in favor of either their own independent examination of the contested handwritings or on the basis of any other relevant, if not more direct, evidence of the character of the questioned signatures.[95] | |||||
|
2012-11-27 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| It is doctrined that opinions of handwriting experts, like signature analyses of the PNP, are not conclusive upon courts or tribunals on the issue of authenticity of signatures.[93] The seminal case of Gamido v. Court of Appeals[94] reminds Us that the authenticity or forgery of signatures "is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature," and thus "[t]he opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling x x x than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue." Hence, in resolving the question of whether or not forgery exists, courts or tribunals are neither limited to, nor bound by, the opinions of handwriting experts. Far from it, courts or tribunals may even disregard such opinions entirely in favor of either their own independent examination of the contested handwritings or on the basis of any other relevant, if not more direct, evidence of the character of the questioned signatures.[95] | |||||
|
2008-07-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| In a long line of cases,[31] this Court reiterated that the fact of prior physical possession is an indispensable element in forcible entry cases. The plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises long before he was deprived thereof by the defendant.[32] It must be stressed that plaintiff cannot succeed where it appears that, as between himself and the defendant, the latter had possession antedating his own. To ascertain this, it is proper to look at the situation as it existed long before the first act of spoliation occurred in order to intelligibly determine whose position is more in accord with the surrounding circumstances of the case and the applicable legal principles. Such determination in this case requires a review of factual evidence, generally proscribed in a petition like this. However, where the factual findings of the courts a quo are contrary to each other, this Court may intervene to resolve the conflict and settle the factual issues raised by the parties.[33] | |||||
|
2008-06-17 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
||||
| The Court of Appeals held that the NBI handwriting expert's opinion is merely persuasive and not conclusive, citing Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations,[19] where we held that resort to handwriting experts, although helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them, is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or comparison of handwriting, and a finding of forgery does not entirely depend upon the testimony of these experts. | |||||
|
2008-06-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| This Court will not disturb the findings of the MCTC, which had the opportunity to physically inspect the subject property, and personally hear the witnesses and examine their demeanor in the course of the hearing. It is worthy to note that the appellate court should only delve into a recalibration of the evidence on appeal if the findings of the trial court are not anchored on the witnesses' credibility and testimonies, but on the assessment of the documents that are available to appellate magistrates and subject to their scrunity.[20] Regrettably, the instant case does not fall under this exception. | |||||
|
2007-08-28 |
CORONA, J. |
||||
| A finding of forgery does not depend exclusively on the testimonies of expert witnesses as judges can and must use their own judgment, through an independent examination of the questioned signature, in determining the authenticity of the handwriting.[19] This is what the RTC and the CA did. Both courts not only considered the expert testimonies presented but also based their findings and conclusions on their evaluation of the questioned document itself. | |||||
|
2007-01-22 |
GARCIA, J. |
||||
| In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the USA,[17] the Court identified and explained the factors involved in the examination and comparison of handwritings:xxx [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signatures and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of the questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one. And to determine forgery, the Court in Cesar v. Sandiganbayan[18] (quoting Osborn, The Problem of Proof) wrote: | |||||
|
2006-11-22 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| Moreover, as correctly noted by the CA, the opinions of handwriting experts, although helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in the analysis, are not binding upon the courts.[31] As such, resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.[32] No less than Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge." Indeed, the authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology, or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue.[33] | |||||
|
2004-12-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Such reliance is misplaced. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, it was only proper for the trial court "to make its own independent assessment and determination of the authenticity of the signatures on the documents in question."[22] This is precisely in keeping with the holding of this Court that when what is involved is the authenticity of handwriting, a court is bound to make its own independent assessment of the evidence submitted before it.[23] In the case of Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the USA,[24] we had the opportunity to explain the rule relative to the materiality of testimonies of handwriting experts, to wit | |||||
|
2004-08-11 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
||||
| In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America,[18] we held that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration, such as the position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and paper used. These play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between a questioned handwriting and an authentic one. | |||||
|
2003-08-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION ON THE BASIS OF CONJECTURES AND SURMISES AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHICH URGENTLY CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE COURT'S SUPERVISION.[16] When the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent factual assessments in their respective decisions and the basis thereof refers to documents made available to the scrutiny of both courts, the well settled rule that factual findings of trial courts deserve respect and even finality will not apply.[17] In the case at bar, the differing factual assessments revolved around the authenticity of the signature of the late Amado Celestial on the questioned Deed of Sale dated October 10, 1975 conveying the 466 square meter lot in favor of Editha, his sister-in-law. There is therefore a need to review the evidence on record to arrive at the correct findings. | |||||
|
2003-08-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| The Court can see that the signatures "AMADO CELESTIAL" in the Deed of Absolute Sale marked as Exhibits "L" and "L-2", compared to the signatures "AMADO CELESTIAL" marked as Exhibit "M-1" on Exhibit "M"; Exh. "M-2-A" on exh. "M-2"; Exh. "M-3-A" on Exh. "M-3"; Exh. "M-4-A" on Exh. "M-4"; Exh. "M-5-A" on Exh. "M-5"; Exh. "M-6-A" on Exh. "M-6"; Exh. "M-7-A" on Exh. "M-7"; and on Exh. "N", could not be the signatures of the real Amado Celestial who was the husband of plaintiff Florencia Celestial. To the mind of the Court, even an ordinary layman can see that there are significant differences between the questioned signatures "AMADO CELESTIAL" on the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale marked as Exhs. "L" and "L-2" and the eight (8) standard signatures "AMADO CELESTIAL". Mrs. Rhoda B. Flores, the NBI Document Senior Examiner, was right when she said that "xxx I think this Honorable Court would agree with me that even a layman can see that there are significant differences even in the pictorial appearance." The court has examined the standard signatures of Amado Celestial in the several instruments submitted to the NBI to serve as basis for scientific comparative analysis with the questioned signatures, and the Court is inclined to believe the findings of the handwriting expert Mrs. Rhoda Flores, as contained in the Questioned Document Report No. 108-293 x x x which was "APPROVED" by Arcadio Ramos, Chief, Questioned Document Division of the NBI, and "NOTED" by Manuel Roura, Deputy director, Technical Services of the NBI, and as testified to by her in court. The questioned Document Report No. 108-293 (Exhs. "P" and "P-1"), which NBI Director Epimaco A. Velasco forwarded to this Court per letter of transmittal dated March 1, 1993, (Exh. "O"), and the testimony of NBI Senior Document Examiner Rhoda B. Flores have guided this Court in arriving at a judicious conclusion that the signatures of "AMADO CELESTIAL" on the Deed of Absolute Sale marked as Exhibits "L" and "L-2" are forgeries - that the signatures thereon were not the signatures of Amado Celestial (Emphasis supplied).[19] The fact that the trial court relied on the testimony of a single witness is of no moment. The trial court has the peculiar advantage to determine the credibility of a witness because of its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of the witness while testifying.[20] Settled is the rule that it is the quality, not the number of witnesses that will tilt the scale of evidence. Although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance does not necessarily lie in the greatest number.[21] Accordingly, absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on an appellate tribunal.[22] In the case at bar, there appears no cogent reason to set aside the trial court's reliance on the credibility of the prosecution witness and its appreciation of the circumstantial evidence inasmuch as the evidence on record amply supports its conclusion. | |||||