This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-04-13 |
SERENO, J. |
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| In Criminal Case No. 5522-0, the alleged crime was committed in June 1996, or before the effectivity of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8353, otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997." Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659, which is applicable in this case, whenever a crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. [35] In the case at bar, the use of a deadly weapon, although alleged in the Complaint and proved at the trial, was not alleged in the Information as required by Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the use of a deadly weapon by accused-appellant cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance without violating his right to be informed of the charges against him. [36] Consequently, accused-appellant may only be held liable for simple rape. The penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua. | |||||
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2003-11-12 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659 or the Heinous Crimes Law, the penalty of death is imposed if rape is committed when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. However, the trial court was correct in not imposing the death penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 97-159184 and 97-159187 because the qualifying circumstances of age and relationship of the victim to the appellant were not alleged in the information.[29] Thus, appellant can only be convicted of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in Criminal Case Nos. 97-159185 and 97-159186, the appellant can be convicted of statutory rape also punishable by reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code inasmuch as the age of Jessica was alleged in the information[30] and duly proven during the trial by the presentation of her birth certificate.[31] | |||||
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2003-10-08 |
PER CURIAM |
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| In the earlier case of People v. Mendoza,[21] the accused was acquitted by virtue of the victim's plain statement that she was "raped" on 11 August 1995 without offering further details on how the alleged incident was carried out. This Court declared therein that "(w)hether or not he raped her is the fact in issue which the court must determine based on the evidence offered. Testimony to that effect is not evidence, but simply a conclusion, the proof of which is the very purpose of the trial x x x x It is not competent for a witness [in this case Michelle] to express an opinion, conclusion or judgment thereon." That being so, we cannot sustain appellant's conviction in Crim. Case No. 10246. | |||||
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2003-07-17 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Appellant's obvious pretense cannot prevail over the testimony of private complainant which the trial court found to be "categorical, straightforward, detailed and consistent." When the offended party is a young and immature girl, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, not only because of their relative vulnerability but also because of the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which they testified were not true.[7] More so when, as here, the private complainant was appellant's own daughter. Generally, no young woman will accuse her own father of so grave a crime as rape unless she has truly been aggrieved.[8] Besides, we note that private complainant could not hold back her emotions and cried profusely at a certain point during the trial.[9] It is a matter of judicial cognizance that the spontaneous crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence that speaks well of her credibility.[10] | |||||