This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2004-01-16 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The trial court, in convicting appellant of murder, ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the person of the victim, without the slightest provocation on the part of the latter.[43] In this case, when Ricardo Felipe was shot, he did not have the faintest idea that he was going to be attacked. Also, before appellant attacked him, appellant was hiding behind the lamppost and waiting for the trisikad to pass by. This indicates that appellant devised a way to effectively execute the attack without risk to himself. Hence, the killing was attended by treachery, qualifying the offense to murder. | |||||
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2003-11-28 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Appellants were likewise positively identified by prosecution witnesses as among those armed men who attacked the Cejar residence on the night of March 29, 1997. It is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactors should be accepted.[10] In the case at bar, Evelyn Cejar clearly was able to identified identify the assailants as there were then two lighted kerosene lamps at in the living room of her house at that time. Further, Moniva saw the faces of the armed men because they were illuminated by the motorcycle's headlights. Clearly, these circumstances erased whatever doubt there is was as to the appellants' identityidentities. | |||||
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2002-11-13 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| police was sufficiently explained. He was afraid.[27] It has been time and again held that fear of reprisal and death threats are accepted as adequate explanations for the delay in reporting crimes.[28] The further allegation of accused-appellant that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Esmar Dato-on, Larry Anota and Jonel Daprinal are biased because they are related to the victim and to each other is likewise unpersuasive. As we pointed out in People v. | |||||