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PEOPLE v. CASIMIRO JOSE Y GAYOL

This case has been cited 11 times or more.

2004-02-05
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
In the case at bar, the quoted ruling of the appellate court were culled from the records of the case.  Lourdes Basilan's positive identification of the petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime, not only during the trial proper but also, during the clarificatory hearing, when upon seeing the petitioner, she exclaimed, "Iyan, iyan na nga! (That's him)!", coupled with her testimony which was replete with details. The positive identification of the accused, where categorical and consistent without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial[26] which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[27]
2003-09-30
QUISUMBING, J.
A: None, sir.[26] In the absence of any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witness to impute so grave a wrong against the appellant, the defense of denial hardly deserves probative value.[27] Like alibi, a denial is inherently weak.  It crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who positively testify that the accused was at the scene of the incident and was the victim's assailant.[28]  Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, is a negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[29]
2002-11-27
BELLOSILLO, J.
eyewitness on the matter, prevails over these defenses which are then reduced to mere negative, self-serving defenses devoid of any weight in law.[14] The accused now laments the misplaced reliance by the court a quo on complainant's bare assertion that she was undressed, kissed and then violated when he inserted his penis into her vagina. His conviction therefore, according to him, is not warranted in view of what
2001-10-25
PANGANIBAN, J.
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by the offended party. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellant's defense of denial and alibi.  In this case, since there was no showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of the crime, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[47] Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.[48]
2001-09-27
PANGANIBAN, J.
In any event, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.[45] Furthermore, alibi cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by complainant.  Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellant's defense of denial and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.[46]
2001-08-09
DE LEON, JR., J.
This ruling was subsequently affirmed in People v. Payot,[16] People v. Floro,[17] People v. Jose,[18] and People v. Gallego.[19] Even a distance of one-and-a-half kilometers, as in the present case, was not deemed insuperable.[20] It bears noting that accused-appellant had a tricycle which he could have used to go to Barangay San Roque II.  Failing that, he could have hailed any of the numerous tricycles plying that route.[21]
2001-03-05
QUISUMBING, J.
In finding the killing aggravated by evident premeditation, the trial court characterized the method of attack as deliberately and consciously adopted by the three attackers. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[21] In the instant case, however, there is no showing of the time when appellant and his confederates decided to commit the crime. Neither is there proof to show how appellant and the other two assailants planned the killing of the victim. Nor is there any evidence showing how much time elapsed before the plan was executed. Absent all these, the conclusion by the trial court that evident premeditation qualified the killing of Delara is devoid of any factual mooring.
2001-01-24
PARDO, J.
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court should have credited his alibi. However, for alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[15] The distance from the house of Gregorio Sacolles to the scene of the crime is only 200 meters. Such distance does not preclude the accused-appellant from being at the place of the crime at the time of its commission. Moreover, accused-appellant's own alibi placed him at the scene of the crime on the date in question precisely around the time of the killing, for he admitted at he was at the crossing of Sto. Domingo, Urdaneta, Pangasinan approximately an hour before the victim's death.
2001-01-24
QUISUMBING, J.
Furthermore, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by private complainant as her rapist. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellant's defense of denial and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.[24]
2000-09-13
PUNO, J.
Anent the damages awarded for the death of Teresita Navarro, we find that the award of P50,000.00 is in accord with settled jurisprudence. The appellee cites People v. Esteban Victor[62] in claiming that the award should be raised to P75,000.00. This contention is without merit. As we held in People v. Jose,[63] the Victor case increased the award of indemnity in rape cases that are effectively qualified by any of the circumstances which calls for the death penalty and has no application to a prosecution for murder or, as in the instant case, homicide.[64] The amount of P29,000.00 cannot be awarded as actual damages as only P10,130.00 finds support from the evidence on record.
2000-08-15
PUNO, J.
alibi.[49] Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission.[50] This, the accused failed to do. As borne out by the testimonies of the defense witnesses, Lorio Gallego's house (where Raul. Gallego supposedly was at the time Wilfredo Lamata was stabbed) was only about three to four kilometers away from the scene of the crime - a distance which by motorcycle could be negotiated in ten minutes. As we have previously ruled in People v. Jose:[51] "Extant in our jurisprudence are cases where the distance between the scene of the crime and the alleged whereabouts of the accused is only two (2) kilometers (People v. Lumantas, 28 SCRA 764 [1969] ), or three (3) kilometers , People v. Binsol,