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PEOPLE v. BENITO LACHICA Y LLAMAS

This case has been cited 17 times or more.

2008-04-09
REYES, R.T., J.
We sustain the trial court and the CA's rejection of appellant's defense founded on denial and alibi.  Denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended parties and their witnesses.  As this Court has reiterated often enough, denial and alibi cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses.[51]  The positive, consistent and straightforward testimonies of the victims and the other witnesses for the People sufficiently established appellant's culpability.
2004-02-11
CARPIO, J.
In the present case, the Information did not specifically allege the relationship between appellant and Mysan although the prosecution proved during the trial the relationship with the testimonies of Mysan, Mysan's mother, and appellant's own admission.[37]  Hence, even if the relationship cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, it can nonetheless be the basis of a civil award of P25,000 in exemplary damages.[38]
2004-02-05
PANGANIBAN, J.
As a result of these guiding principles in a prosecution for rape, credibility becomes the single most important issue.[16]  In the case before us, we are once again confronted with a situation in which a child of tender years accuses a good family friend of the brutish act of rape.
2003-12-11
QUISUMBING, J.
On the amount of damages awarded, however, modifications are in order.  While we find the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity to be proper, moral damages in the amount of P50,000 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 should also be imposed.  Moral damages are automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.[111] The use of a deadly weapon having attended the commission of the crime,[112] exemplary damages ought also to be awarded in favor of private complainant.
2003-08-14
QUISUMBING, J.
Testimony of child-victims of rape is given full weight and credence.[18] Our courts usually give great weight to the testimony of the victim of sexual assault, especially where the victim, is a minor. Here, the victim vividly recalled details that a child her age, only 9 at the time of the trial, could not have possibly concocted. The victim positively identified appellant in court as the one who raped her.[19] It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is untrue.
2003-04-30
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
We find no reason to disturb the trial court findings that the victim's testimony was credible, candid and straightforward. The defense's imputation of ill-motive was likewise correctly disregarded for lack of evidence to support it. It is highly inconceivable that a young barrio lass, inexperienced with the ways of the world, would fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject herself to public trial, and tarnish her family's honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a potent desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.[9] We reiterate the truism that when a woman more so if she is a minor says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed.[10]
2003-04-30
PANGANIBAN, J.
The court need only establish the credibility of the testimony of the victim. Thereafter, when she says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed.[23] As long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.[24] Founded on reason and experience,[25] this is a basic rule that becomes even more apparent when the victim is a minor.[26] In fact, the application of this doctrine also becomes more compelling when the culprit is her close relative.[27]
2003-02-17
QUISUMBING, J.
Equally unmeritorious is appellant Besmonte's alibi that he could not have raped Melanie because he was in Sorsogon, Sorsogon from May 1994 to January 1995. For alibi to prosper, appellant must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must also convincingly demonstrate the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.[62] In Besmonte's case, it was not physically impossible for Besmonte to have been at the crime scene at the time the rape was committed, in view of the trial court's observation that:It is of judicial notice that the poblacion of Magallanes can be reached thru a jeep, which is the means of transportation from the town of Sorsogon for about one (1) hour only. Accused did not even present the person he resides with while in Sorsogon. [63] That Besmonte's wife corroborated his alibi is no moment. No other witness unrelated to appellant Besmonte was presented to corroborate his claim. Alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons.[64] This is because alibi is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.[65]
2003-01-20
PUNO, J.
In a catena of cases, we have ruled that the allegation that the accused is the "uncle" of the victim and the latter is his "niece" is not specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship under Art. 266-B, supra. In People v. Lachica,[44] we held:"If the offender is merely a relation not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common law spouse of the mother of the victim it must be alleged in the Information that he is 'a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as the case may be] within the third civil degree.'" (People v. Libo-on, GR No. 136737, May 23, 2001, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.; People v. Banihit, 339 SCRA 86, 96, August 25, 2000, per Ynares-Santiago, J. both citing People v. Ferolino, 329 SCRA 719, 735, April 5, 2000, per Davide, CJ.) Moreover, even if the relationship by consanguinity or affinity is alleged in the Information, it is still necessary to allege further that such relationship is within the third civil degree. . ."[45] (emphasis supplied)
2003-01-14
PER CURIAM
As a defense, denial is indeed insipid and weak, being easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.[27] Mere denial of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party.[28]
2003-01-13
PANGANIBAN, J.
Appellant insinuates that Elmadona was ill-motivated in accusing him of killing her husband. Appellant's allegation, however, is unsubstantiated. As the widow of the victim, she was the most aggrieved party. Her motive -- to put his killers behind bars -- cannot be considered improper.[27] We have held that it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative who earnestly seeks justice to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit.[28] Thus, since no improper motive on her part has been shown, the sound conclusion is that no such motive existed. Her testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[29]
2002-11-13
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
of stenographic notes. Hence, the trial court's findings carry great weight and substance.[11] It is settled jurisprudence that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.[12] A woman would think twice before she concocts a story of rape unless she is motivated by a
2002-10-28
QUISUMBING, J.
"fn">[54] of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, such qualifying or aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged in the information. Otherwise, even if these were subsequently proven, they cannot be appreciated in determining the proper penalty.[55] As held in People vs. Lachica,[56] a court is precluded from considering the attendance of qualifying or aggravating circumstances if they are not alleged in the complaint or information, because under the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, must be so stated in the complaint or information. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in applying Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, by sentencing appellant to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. [57] The trial court also properly ordered each of the accused in this case to pay the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity. This is in accord with prevailing jurisprudence.[58]  However, we note that the trial court failed to award moral damages.
2002-09-27
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.[47] In the case at bar, the trial court gave credence to complainant's testimony and found that she had no motive to contrive or concoct falsehood against the accused-appellants if it were not for her desire to avenge the wrong committed against her.
2002-09-19
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
indubitable showing of its commission.[18] With respect to the moral damages, the amount of P20,000.00 should be increased to P50,000.00. Moral damages are automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.[19] It has been the policy of the Court to award outrightly an amount not exceeding P50,000 to victims of rape upon an indubitable showing of its commission; this is categorized as civil indemnity ex delicto. In response to the rising incidence of heinous crimes against
2002-08-22
QUISUMBING, J.
current jurisprudence.[52] WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 259, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant ERNESTO NICOLAS is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
2002-08-14
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
known accused-appellant for a reasonable length of time and can even trace his relations to some persons belonging to their community. One of the accused, Noel Murial, admitted that Juana Olaco was present when the killing took place. Hence, accused-appellant's defense of alibi must fail. The trial court was correct in stating that the positive identification of the accused-appellant by the prosecution witnesses cannot simply be overcome by the defense of alibi.[12] Moreover, the