This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2010-06-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| We also agree with the RTC that appellant voluntarily surrendered. The appellant's conduct was spontaneous when he gave himself up to the authorities, thus saving the State the trouble and the expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture.[14] | |||||
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2009-10-13 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Article 2206[16] of the Civil Code authorizes the award of civil indemnity for death caused by a crime. Current jurisprudence[17] sets the award at P50,000.00. | |||||
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2006-11-29 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| Alberto Garong admitted that he had a gun which he used to fire during New Year and which he surrendered during the last election.[23] For self-defense to prosper, there must be: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[24] The burden of proving the elements of self-defense shifts to the accused. In this case, the prosecution presented the following compelling evidence, among others: 1) positive identification by the complainant; 2) physical evidence of blood drops found by the police officer; 3) the admission of petitioner that he had a gun at the time of the incident; and 4) the point of entry of the gunshot in the complainant's left buttock. The foregoing circumstantial and pieces of physical evidence disprove the claim of self-defense. While petitioner harps on the alleged complainant's unlawful aggression, the trial court found that there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt against the complainant. Hence, Gerson Morta was acquitted in Criminal Case No. C-3402. Assuming arguendo that Gerson Morta was the aggressor, petitioner must prove the existence of the two (2) other elements of self-defense: the aforecited second (2nd) and third (3rd) elements. A mere allegation of self-defense will not exempt Garong from criminal liability. Petitioner should squarely meet the circumstantial and physical evidence presented by the prosecution. Unfortunately, there was no sufficient or satisfactory explanation for the aforementioned evidence against the petitioner. | |||||
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2004-05-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We likewise find no adequate physical evidence to support appellant's claim of self-defense. Dr. Relano testified that the single shot fired at the victim by appellant was fatal. Four (4) vital organs, the heart, lungs, stomach, and pancreas were struck by shotgun pellets.[47] The nature and location of the victim's gunshot injuries are eloquent physical evidence to show a determined effort on appellant's part to kill the victim, and not just to defend his own self. In sum, appellant's uncorroborated plea of self-defense cannot be entertained, especially when it is, in itself, extremely doubtful.[48] | |||||
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2003-11-04 |
TINGA, J. |
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| On the matter of appellant's civil liability ex delicto, it has been the ruling of the Court to outrightly award P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim.[50] Thus, we uphold the trial court's award of P50,000.00 as damages. Moreover, as ruled in People vs. De Los Santos,[51] an additional award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages is justified in the absence of proof for the award of actual damages, and a further P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, in accordance with our ruling in People v. Nicolas.[52] | |||||
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2003-10-23 |
PUNO, J. |
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| We now come to the award of damages. The trial court awarded the heirs of the victim the following: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P20,000.00 as actual damages. We reduce the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00 in line with existing jurisprudence.[33] We disallow the award of actual damages as not a single receipt was presented to support the expenses allegedly incurred by the heirs of the victim. In lieu thereof, we award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.[34] Similarly, we delete the award of moral damages for lack of evidence. | |||||
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2003-05-09 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Likewise, the trial court was correct in awarding civil indemnity to the legal heirs of the victim, Joey Tegas, in the amount of P50,000.00, consistent with the Court's current policy.[18] In addition, however, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded to compensate the victim's heirs for injuries to their feelings, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[19] | |||||
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2002-09-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| surrender was proven, the appropriate imposable penalty is still the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. We affirm the awards of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim, the same being in line with prevailing jurisprudence,[23] and of P15,000.00, representing compensatory damages for burial expenses which were duly substantiated by | |||||
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2002-08-14 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[21] In the absence of proof of the events immediately preceding the killing, the decision and determination to kill the victim cannot be established. Thus, the crime committed by accused-appellant is Homicide, penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion temporal. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period, pursuant to | |||||
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2002-08-06 |
PER CURIAM |
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| the killing to murder, treachery was considered only a generic aggravating circumstance, hence, we said that the crime committed in Gario Alba was homicide and not murder."[4] (Emphasis supplied) However, the Court has repeatedly held,[5] even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, that qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as "qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify an offense. | |||||