This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-11-23 |
REYES, J. |
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| Time and again, this Court have ruled that "[i]n determining the nature of a contract, courts are not bound by the title or name given by the parties. The decisive factor in evaluating an agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown, not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately alter executing the agreement."[14] | |||||
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2013-08-14 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In determining the nature of a contract, courts are not bound by the title or name given by the parties. The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after executing the agreement. As such, therefore, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove such intention.[13] | |||||
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2009-10-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| On several occasions, we have decreed that in determining the nature of a contract, courts are not bound by the title or name given by the parties. The decisive factor in evaluating an agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown, not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but, by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after executing the agreement.[7] Thus, to ascertain the intention of the parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts should be considered. Once the intention of the parties is duly ascertained, that intent is deemed as integral to the contract as its originally expressed unequivocal terms.[8] | |||||
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2007-07-03 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| The law requires the presence of any one and not the concurrence of all of the circumstances enumerated under Article 1602, supra, to conclude that the transaction is one of equitable mortgage. So it is that in Socorro Taopo Banga v. Sps. Jose and Emeline Bello,[14] this Court, citing Aguirre v. CA,[15] unequivocally ruled:The presence of even one of the circumstances in Article 1602 is sufficient basis to declare a contract as one of equitable mortgage. The explicit provision of Article 1602 that any of those circumstances would suffice to construe a contract of sale to be one of equitable mortgage is in consonance with the rule that law favors the least transmission of property rights. To stress, the existence of any one of the conditions under Article 1602, not a concurrence, nor an overwhelming number of such circumstances, suffices to give rise to the presumption that the contract is an equitable mortgage. (Emphasis ours) | |||||
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2006-09-08 |
TINGA, J. |
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| 6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. (Emphasis supplied.) Art. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale. For the presumption of equitable mortgage to arise, two requisites must be satisfied, namely: that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale and that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. Under Article 1604 of the Civil Code, a contract purporting to be an absolute sale shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage should any of the conditions in Article 1602 be present.[26] To stress, the existence of any one of the conditions under Article 1602, not a concurrence, or an overwhelming number of such circumstances, suffices to give rise to the presumption that the contract is an equitable mortgage.[27] It must be emphasized too, however, that there is no conclusive test to determine whether a deed absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage. In fact, it is often a question difficult to resolve and is frequently made to depend on the surrounding circumstances of each case. When in doubt, courts are generally inclined to construe a transaction purporting to be a sale as an equitable mortgage, which involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests over the property in controversy.[28] | |||||
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2006-08-10 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The presumption in Article 1602 that an alleged contract of sale is, in reality, an equitable mortgage jibes with the rule that the law favors the least transmission of property rights. It is the existence of any of the conditions under Article 1602, not a concurrence nor an overwhelming number, which creates the presumption that the contract is an equitable mortgage.[14] | |||||
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2005-04-26 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| It is settled that the clarity of contract terms and the name given to it do not bar the Court from ascertaining the true interest of the parties. In Aguirre v. Court of Appeals,[29] the Court declared: In determining the nature of a contract, courts are not bound by the title or name given by the parties. The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after executing the agreement. As such, therefore, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove such intention.[30] In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court emphasized that: In determining whether a deed absolute in form is a mortgage, the court is not limited to the writing memorials of the transaction. The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at that time, the attitude, acts, conduct, declarations of the parties, the negotiations between them leading to the deed, and generally, all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding. As such, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove the intention of the parties. | |||||