Lawyerly

You're currently signed in as:
User

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 160684 2015-09-02	CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. HI-GRADE FEEDS CORPORATION PEREZ, J.
Although we are cognizant of the exception that the Court may wield its power to suspend its own rules and procedure in lieu of substantial justice and for compelling reasons,[21] the attendant circumstances are not availing in the present case.
	GR No. 167290 2014-11-26	HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD BERSAMIN, J.
Nonetheless, the petitioner properly argued that the PNCC, being a private business entity, was not immune from suit. The PNCC was incorporated in 1966 under its original name of Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) for a term of fifty years pursuant to the Corporation Code.[17] In 1983, the CDCP changed its corporate name to the PNCC to reflect the extent of the Government's equity investment in the company, a situation that came about after the government financial institutions converted their loans into equity following the CDCP's inability to pay the loans.[18] Hence, the Government owned 90.3% of the equity of the PNCC, and only 9.70% of the PNCC's voting equity remained under private ownership.[19] Although the majority or controlling shares of the PNCC belonged to the Government, the PNCC was essentially a private corporation due to its having been created in accordance with the Corporation Code, the general corporation statute.[20] More specifically, the PNCC was an acquired asset corporation under Administrative Order No. 59, and was subject to the regulation and jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.[21] Consequently, the doctrine of sovereign immunity had no application to the PNCC.
	GR No. 179334 2013-07-01	SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS v. SPS. HERACLEO AND RAMONA TECSON PERALTA, J.
Even if we squarely deal with the issues of laches and prescription, the same must still fail. Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice.[27] This doctrine finds no application in this case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving due course to respondents' claim. Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property is taken for public use.[28] Neither shall prescription bar respondents' claim following the long-standing rule "that where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner's action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe."[29]
	GR No. 166471 2011-03-22	TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT CARPIO, J.
In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited,[53] the Court held that, "This Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution."[54] In Bengzon,[55] the Court held that, "The Constitution expressly confers on the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees."[56] In Mutuc,[57] the Court held that: The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.[58]
	GR No. 166910 2010-10-19	ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD VELASCO JR., J.
While it may be, as held in Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited,[47] that PNCC's P.D. 1113 franchise had already expired effective May 1, 2007, this fact of expiration did not, however, carry with it the cancellation of PNCC's authority and that of its JV partners granted under P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 1 of P.D. 1894 to construct, operate and maintain "any and all such extensions, linkages or stretches, together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto, from any part of the North Luzon Expressway, South Luzon Expressway and/or Metro Manila Expressway and/or to divert the original route and change the original end-points of the [NLEX]and/or [SLEX] as may be approved by the [TRB]. And to highlight the point, the succeeding Section 2 of P.D. 1894 specifically provides that the franchise for the extension and toll road projects constructed after the approval of P.D. 1894 shall be thirty years, counted from project completion. Indeed, prior to the expiration of PNCC's original franchise in May 2007, the TRB, in the exercise of its special powers under P.D. 1112, signed supplemental TOAs with PNCC and its JV partners. These STOAs covered the expansion and rehabilitation of NLEX and SLEX, as the case may be, and/or the construction, operation and maintenance of toll road projects contemplated in P.D.1894. And there can be no denying that the corresponding toll operation permits have been issued.
	GR No. 171872 2010-06-28	FAUSTO R. PREYSLER v. MANILA SOUTHCOAST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION CARPIO, J.
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority.[10] Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.[11]