This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2008-08-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As can be gleaned from the records, respondent's possession of the subject property started only in the year 1979 when her mother executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same in her favor. There was also no showing that her predecessors-in-interest had already been in possession or had already exercised acts of ownership over the subject property since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, as her predecessors-in-interest declared the subject property for taxation purposes only in the year 1948. What was clearly established by the respondent was possession of the subject property by her predecessors-in-interest beginning 1948, which was short of three years from 12 June 1945. What is more telling is that the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982. Prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1982, any occupation or possession thereof could not be considered in the counting of the 30-year possession requirement.[38] The period of possession by the respondent of the subject property cannot be considered to have started in 1979, when the same was conveyed to her by her mother. Neither can her possession of the subject property be tacked to that of her predecessors-in-interest, even if they had occupied and were in possession of the same since 1948, because during those periods, the subject property had not yet been classified as alienable and disposable land capable of private appropriation. Possession of the subject property could only start to ripen into ownership on 15 March 1982, when the same became alienable and disposable. Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject lot was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and, unless the land has been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.[39] The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition.[40] Possession of the land by the respondent under the circumstances, whether spanning decades or centuries, can never ripen into ownership.[41] | |||||
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2003-07-01 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her application is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution,[14] all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.[15] All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[16] Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.[17] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[18] | |||||