This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2008-10-17 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The Court subsribes to the view of the CA. The report and testimony of a medico-legal officer that there are hymenal lacerations found on the vagina of a complainant is the best evidence that an object, such as an erect penis, has been inserted into it.[58] Such medical report and testimony, when weighed along with the positive testimony of the complainant that her assailant, armed with a gun, inserted his penis into her vagina, sufficiently establish the essential element of rape which is carnal knowledge against her will.[59] Thus, the RTC and the CA had basis to conclude that the element of carnal knowledge in rape was duly established based on the testimony of AAA that on October 15, 1999, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina and on the medical report and testimony of Dr. Dave that there are hymenal lacerations on the vagina of AAA which had already healed for more than seven days.[60] | |||||
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2004-05-19 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.[13] Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.[14] Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge's assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court's highest respect.[15] Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.[16] | |||||
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2003-09-12 |
PER CURIAM |
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| These discrepancies pointed out by appellant refer to trivial matters. They are inconsequential as they have nothing to do with the essential fact in the crime of rape which is carnal knowledge.[34] Discrepancies between sworn statements and testimonies given in open court do not necessarily discredit a witness especially when they refer to minor matters that have no substantial effect on the nature of the offense.[35] | |||||
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2003-04-04 |
CORONA, J. |
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| It should be emphasized that no member of a rape victim's family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor to the family unless the crime was in fact committed, more so in this case where the victim and the offender belong to the same family.[15] We find it highly unbelievable, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, for Dalisay Dueñas to be so morally bankrupt as to subject her granddaughter to the embarrassment and stigma of a rape trial if the charges were not true. | |||||
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2002-08-06 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The Court has repeatedly qualified cases of rape[6] where the twin circumstances of minority and relationship have been specifically alleged in the Information even without the use of the descriptive words "qualifying" or "qualified by." In the recent case of People v. Lab-eo,[7] the appellant there questioned the decision of the lower court raising the killing to murder. The appellant there argued that he could only be convicted of homicide since the Information merely stated | |||||
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2000-05-12 |
PARDO, J. |
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| 4. On the same day, respondent was informed of the Batuigas article with the President's marginal note on it and S/Supt. Romeo Acop ordered him to explain through affidavit.[5] | |||||
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2000-05-12 |
PARDO, J. |
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| 7. On April 23, 1993, by command of the Police Deputy Director General, respondent was suspended from the police service for a period of ninety (90) days effective April 23, 1993.[8] Subsequently, he was given notice of complaint/charge and order to answer within five days from receipt of the complaint.[9] | |||||
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2000-05-12 |
PARDO, J. |
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| 13. On August 30, 1993, respondent appealed to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board.[15] | |||||