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PEOPLE v. FLORENCIO FRANCISCO Y ALEJO

This case has been cited 13 times or more.

2006-10-30
TINGA, J.
The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned from "reclusion perpetua to death" differs from that based on the exclusive penalty of death. For example, it has been held that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.[66] In contrast, the Court has likewise held that for qualified rape in the attempted stage, "the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged  x x x is reclusion temporal."[67] In People v. Tolentino,[68] we ruled that the accused, who had been sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)-year old stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted rape. In explaining that "reclusion temporal" was the proper penalty, the Court, through then Chief Justice Davide, explained: Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for the rape if it had been consummated would have been death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since [RT[69]] was eight years old and TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of [RT's] mother. The last paragraph thereof provides: The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x x
2006-03-10
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Likewise, in People v. Francisco,[32] the Court convicted the appellant of attempted rape after failing to discern from the victim's testimony that appellant attained some degree of penile penetration necessary to consummate the rape.[33]
2004-06-14
PUNO, J.
Consequently, the case of the prosecution has been reduced to nothing but mere suspicions and speculations. It is hornbook doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never be the basis of conviction in a criminal case.[85] Courts must ensure that the conviction of the accused rests firmly on sufficient and competent evidence, and not the results of passion and prejudice.[86] If the alleged inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence is not adequate to support conviction.[87] The court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is therefore insufficient to support a judgment of conviction.[88] Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of the accused.[89] The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[90] It is thus apropos to repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to discharge its burden. Accordingly, we have to acquit.
2003-12-11
VITUG, J.
Except in Criminal Cases No. 8176 and No. 8177, the trial court correctly found appellant guilty of the crimes with which he was charged. In Criminal Case No. 8176, the crime of rape was not committed. In People v. Arce, Jr.,[12] the victim asserted that the man had touched her or "idinidikit yung ari niya;" there, the Court refused to hold, in the absence of convincing proof that the penis had slid into the female organ, that rape was committed. In People v. Francisco,[13] the Court also declined to convict an accused of consummated rape when it had failed to discern from the testimony of the complainant that some degree of penile penetration was attained even when he made pumping motions. Marife, in the case at bar, merely stated that she was carried around the sala with appellant's penis "touching" her vagina. With this bare statement, it would not be right to conclude that the act of the penis "touching" the vagina was an entry or penetration, even slightly, of the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum. In Criminal Case No. 8177, the first incident of insertion of appellant's finger into the victim's vagina during the second week of October 1997 could only render appellant guilty of an act of lasciviousness. The second incident of the insertion of appellant's middle finger, however, during the first week of November 1997, constituted consummated rape through sexual assault under Republic Act No. 8353 or "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997,"[14] which took effect on 22 October 1997; this law, in part provides:"Art. 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. Rape is committed.
2002-05-28
BELLOSILLO, J.
Even if we have to assume that Lenie's statement,  "[the accused-appellant] had his penis placed between my legs," meant that the penis was  "placed in her private part"  as the prosecution inappropriately sought to introduce, the statement would still be speculative as to whether the penis of accused-appellant in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape was committed.  The ambiguity in the case at bar would in fact be even more uncertain than those we have come across and declared unanimously as insufficient to prove carnal knowledge.  In People v. Francisco[67] we found the testimony of the victim that  "(h)indi po sa butas pero sa aking pepe lang"  to be inconclusive as it was  "shrouded in ambiguity,"  and further declared -
2002-04-17
PER CURIAM
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY FOR THE COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSES WHEN THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED TENDS TO PROVE OTHERWISE."[19] At the outset, we find that we cannot, for lack of jurisdiction, entertain the appeals in Criminal Cases Nos. 116860-H and 116861 where the trial court sentenced appellant to reclusion temporal in each of these cases. Appellant merely relied on the automatic appeal of Criminal Case No. 116859 wherein the death penalty was imposed. However, this Court has held that an automatic review of the death penalty imposed by the trial court includes an appeal of the less serious crimes (not punished by death) only if the lesser crimes are committed on the same occasion or arise out of the same occurrence as that which gives rise to the more serious offense.[20] Section 17 (1) of R.A. 296, as amended (The Judiciary Act of 1948), provides that-
2002-02-15
BELLOSILLO, J.
The prosecution has failed to present evidence that the penis of the accused was erect when he sexually assaulted Marilou.  It bears emphasizing that when he forced himself on his daughters he was extremely inebriated, which could have balked an erection.   Neither could we infer an erect penis from the pain which Marilou felt when she was pinned to the bed by her father.  The victim's pain cannot be exclusively attributed to the attempted sexual intercourse since she too was "fingered" by the accused although it was not known where.  In light of the multiple attempts to intrude into her private part, we cannot be certain as to which act truly caused the pain, the bony finger, the penis, or mere pressure from any source.  At any rate, we have held in People v. Francisco[30] that the testimony of the victim to the effect that the accused repeatedly poked her vagina and that she felt pain as a consequence thereof does not automatically warrant the conclusion that consummated rape was indeed committed - more circumstances had to be presented.
2002-01-15
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The fact that Leonardo Jocson failed to help the victim while the latter was being stabbed is of no consequence. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a frightful, strange and startling experience. Behavioral Psychology teaches that different people react to similar situations dissimilarly.[12]
2001-12-19
PER CURIAM
It is true that in People vs. Francisco[40] and People vs. Mariano,[41] the Court found the accused liable for attempted rape only notwithstanding the complainant's testimony that accused-appellant kept pushing his sex organ against her genitalia causing her much pain. In none of these cases, however, was the complainant ever made to demonstrate, with the use of an illustration of the female genitalia, the exact spot penetrated by the accused's sex organ. Indeed, the ruling in Mariano was based, in large part, upon the victim's admission that there was no penile penetration of her vagina, but only "fingering." Similarly, the complainant in Francisco testified that the accused merely poked his penis at her genitalia, nudging instead her anus in the process. At the very least, therefore, it was doubtful whether there was penetration of either the labia.
2001-12-19
PER CURIAM
The defense presented in evidence the medical certificate (Exh. "1") issued by Dr. Joselyn Baeyens of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital, the authenticity of which was admitted by the prosecution.[17] The certificate stated that Lorlyn was examined on March 23, 1998 and that no laceration or abrasion was found in her hymen and that she tested negative for spermatozoa.[18]
2001-12-19
PER CURIAM
Accused-appellant, 43, testified in his behalf. He denied the allegations against him. A part-time motorcycle driver plying the Calangan-San Fernando route, he claimed that at around 6:00 in the morning of March 17, 1998, he left his house in Cayaga, San Fernando, Bukidnon and drove his motorcycle towards Calangan, two kilometers away, to pick up passengers bound for poblacion San Fernando. On that day, he said he twice plied his route, stopping only for lunch at San Fernando and going home to Cayaga at 4:00 in the afternoon. According to him, at no time on that day did he ever see Lorlyn.[13]
2001-11-14
PARDO, J.
"But in the absence of any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness."[43]
2001-10-02
PER CURIAM
What is applicable is the doctrine enunciated in the recent case of People vs. Florencio Francisco y Alejo,[7] where we ruled that the automatic review of the death penalty in the rape case did not include the conviction for acts of lasciviousness which should have been the subject of a separate appeal filed before the Court of Appeals, considering that the acts of lasciviousness case did not arise out of the same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion as that of the more serious crime of rape. Thus: "In the instant case, however, it cannot be said that the acts of lasciviousness case "arose out of the same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion" as that of the more serious crime of rape.  The two (2) cases involved distinct offenses committed at an interval of two (2) months in point of time.  The evidence reveals that the first crime was committed sometime in April 1997 while the second was perpetrated on 27 June 1997.  In both cases, accused-appellant was animated by a separate criminal intent, although incidentally, both crimes were directed against the same victim. Moreover, the evidence presented by the prosecution in the rape case was not the same evidence they offered to prove the acts of lasciviousness case.