This case has been cited 7 times or more.
|
2008-12-04 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
||||
| (a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another manufacturer or dealer; (b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2) wrapping of their packages, or in the (3) device or words therein, or in (4) any other feature of their appearance; (c) That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance or opportunity to do the same with a like purpose; and (d) That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor.[64] All these elements must be proven.[65] In finding that probable cause for unfair competition does not exist, the investigating prosecutor and Secretaries Guingona and Cuevas arrived at the same conclusion that there is insufficient evidence to prove all the elements of the crime that would allow them to secure a conviction. | |||||
|
2008-08-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| And while it is this Court's general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause,[43] we have nonetheless made some exceptions to the general rule, such as when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority,[44] resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause, since the same must be decided inthe light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge (public prosecutor) or run counter to the clear dictates of reason.[45] | |||||
|
2008-03-14 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable, absent a clear showing that he was motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.[21] "Bad faith" does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent, or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.[22] Petitioners utterly failed to show that private respondents' actions fit such description. | |||||
|
2007-10-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Criminal intent must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification. In this case, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present.[28] The Ombudsman assails the first set of documents with dates of appointment earlier than December 12, 2001. Clearly, the first set of CSC Form No. 33 was prepared earlier as shown by the serial numbers.[29] The first set has serial numbers 168207, 168210, 168213, 168214, 168215, 168216, 168217, 168287 and 168288; while the second set has serial numbers 168292, 168293, 168294, 168295, 168297, 168298, 168299, 168301 and 168304. The Ombudsman also admits this fact.[30] Indeed, petitioner admits having signed two sets of appointment papers but nothing in said documents constitutes an absolutely false narration of facts. The first set was prepared and signed on the basis of the inter-office memoranda issued by the members of the Board appointing their respective confidential staff conformably with the DBM approval. There was no untruthful statement made on said appointment papers as the concerned personnel were in fact appointed earlier than December 12, 2001. In fact, the DBM also clarified that the authority to hire confidential personnel may be implemented retroactive to the date of actual service of the employee concerned.[31] In any case, Jamora authorized the issuance of the second set of appointment papers.[32] Following the CSC Rules, the second set of appointment papers should mean that the first set was ineffective and that the appointing authority, in this case, the members of the Board, shall be liable for the salaries of the appointee whose appointment became ineffective.[33] There was nothing willful or felonious in petitioner's act warranting his prosecution for falsification. The evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case and it is evident that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the petitioner's guilt.[34] | |||||
|
2007-08-14 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| Well-settled is the rule that good faith is always presumed and the Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith which springs from the fountain of good conscience.[31] Specifically, a public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of his duties. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.[32] "Bad faith" does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.[33] | |||||
|
2005-11-11 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| In his comment on the petition, the Special Prosecutor alleged that the petitioner failed to establish that the Ombusman and the Deputy Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. Citing the ruling of this Court in Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[33] and Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman,[34] the Special Prosecutor asserts that proof of the existence of the injury sustained by the private respondent is not required. | |||||
|
2004-12-09 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Kuizon and the subsequent case of Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)[14] drove home the point that the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals.[15] In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of lack of probable cause, as in this case, there is likewise the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals following our ruling in Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman.[16] | |||||