This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2013-06-25 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.[12] | |||||
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2012-04-24 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio. Attention is drawn in this regard to the Court's disposition in Matibag v. Benipayo.[28] | |||||
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2009-11-20 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Taking into consideration the foregoing requisites of judicial review, it is readily clear that the third requisite is absent. The general rule is that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if it is not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial; and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.[35] | |||||
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2009-03-24 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that the requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the pleadings before a competent court, such that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings before that competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.[52] Records disclose that the issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause was first raised, not in petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration with said labor tribunal,[53] and reiterated in his Petition for Certiorari before the CA.[54] Nonetheless, the issue is deemed seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the CA which has the competence to resolve the constitutional issue. The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial function - its function in the present case is limited to determining questions of fact to which the legislative policy of R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and to resolving such questions in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself;[55] thus, its foremost function is to administer and enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not to inquire into the validity of its provisions. The CA, on the other hand, is vested with the power of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such as the subject clause.[56] Petitioner's interposition of the constitutional issue before the CA was undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was therefore remiss in failing to take up the issue in its decision. | |||||
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2006-06-26 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| For our purpose, only the third requisite is in question. Unequivocally, the law requires that the question of constitutionality of a statute must be raised at the earliest opportunity. In Matibag v. Benipayo,[20] we held that the earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it was not raised in the pleadings before a competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. | |||||
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2005-03-16 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| (4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[80] (Emphasis supplied) Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below,[81] in this case, the DAR Secretary. It must be pointed out that all controversies on the implementation of the CARP fall under the jurisdiction of the DAR, even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature.[82] The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, "if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal."[83] Records show that SRRDC raised such constitutional challenge only before this Court despite the fact that it had the opportunity to do so before the DAR Secretary. The DARAB correctly refused to deal on this issue as it is the DAR Secretary who, under the law, has the authority to determine the beneficiaries of the CARP. This Court will not entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued[84] in the DAR. | |||||
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2002-08-29 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place, or as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated …'" [23] Petitioner maintains that we apply the ruling in Palmera v. Civil Service Commission, 235 SCRA 87 1994, instead of Achacoso v. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235 1991.[24] This, however, is not possible. | |||||