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GR No. 166859

2011-04-12

BERSAMIN, J.

Firstly, as earlier pointed out, the Republic adduced no evidence on the significant particulars of the supposed loan, like the amount, the actual borrower, the approving official, etc. It did not also establish whether or not the loans were DOSRI[126] or issued in violation of the Single Borrower's Limit. Secondly, the Republic could not outrightly assume that President Marcos had issued LOI 926 for the purpose of allowing the loans by the UCPB in favor of Cojuangco. There must be competent evidence to that effect. And, finally, the loans, assuming that they were of a DOSRI nature or without the benefit of the required approvals or in excess of the Single Borrower's Limit, would not be void for that reason. Instead, the bank or the officers responsible for the approval and grant of the DOSRI loan would be subject only to sanctions under the law.[127]

GR No. 190462

2010-11-17

STEEL CORPORATION OF PHILIPPINES v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK

VELASCO JR., J.

It is a time-honored principle that when two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved.[13] In other words, consolidation is proper wherever the subject matter involved and relief demanded in the different suits make it expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights of the parties by hearing the suits together.[14]

GR Nos. 154211-12

2009-06-22

SPS. ERNESTO F. CURATA AND LOURDES M. CURATA v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY

VELASCO JR., J.

A well-settled exception to the rule on prospectivity is when the law in question is remedial in nature. The rationale underpinning the exception is that no person can claim any vested right in any particular remedy or mode of procedure for the enforcement of a right.[107]

GR NO. 158328

2007-02-23

FRANCO ESGUERRA v. ALFONSO MANANTAN

QUISUMBING, J.

Note that it was petitioner who filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents before the RTC. It was actually the respondents who moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied it since the allegations of the complaint showed that it was in fact one for recovery of possession of real property.[10] When respondents filed a complaint for annulment of title, petitioner moved to dismiss it, citing the pendency of the ejectment case, and not lack of jurisdiction, as ground. But it was denied by the RTC. Thereafter, both parties moved for joint trial of the cases. Considering that these cases involved the same question of fact, the trial court was correct to jointly try and decide them. Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related subject matters must be ordered consolidated and jointly tried in court, where the earlier case was filed.[11]

GR NOS. 138701-02

2006-10-17

SPS. ROQUE YU v. BASILIO G. MAGNO CONSTRUCTION

GARCIA, J.

Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of both parties in the two civil cases will best be served and the issues involved therein expeditiously settled. After all, there is no question on the propriety of the venue in the Iloilo case.[25] (Emphasis supplied) Consolidation of cases, when proper, results in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial. It is a desirable end to be achieved, within the context of the present state of affairs where court dockets are full and individual and state finances are limited. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Another compelling argument that weighs heavily in favor of consolidation is the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more cases which would otherwise require a single judgment.[26]

GR NO. 144024

2006-07-27

PEDRO TAGABI v. MARGARITO TANQUE

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

On technical grounds, Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that personal service of petitions and other pleadings is the general rule, while a resort to other modes of service and filing is the exception.[12] Where recourse is made to the exception, a written explanation why the service and the filing were not done personally is indispensable, even when such explanation by its nature is acceptable and manifest.[13] Where no explanation is offered to justify the resort to other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the pleading becomes mandatory.[14] Thus, the CA did not err when it granted respondent's Motion to Dismiss and ordered that petitioners' brief be expunged from the records in view of the latter's failure to present a written explanation why they did not personally file their appeal brief with the CA.

GR NO. 147478

2006-07-17

METRO DRUG DISTRIBUTION v. .

CORONA, J.

In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc.,[20] we held that the requirement for petitioner to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applied even to corporations, considering that the mandatory directives of the Rules of Court made no distinction between natural and juridical persons.

GR NO. 150865

2006-06-30

ART FUENTEBELLA v. DARLICA CASTRO

AZCUNA, J.

This requirement is intended to apply to both natural and juridical persons as Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court do not make a distinction between natural and juridical persons.[15] Where the petitioner is a corporation, the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized director or representative.[16] This was enunciated in Eslaban, Jr. v. Vda. de Onorio,[17] where the Court held that if the real party-in-interest is a corporate body, an officer of the corporation can sign the certification against forum shopping so long as he has been duly authorized by a resolution of its board of directors.

GR NO. 161957

2005-02-28

JORGE GONZALES v. CLIMAX MINING LTD.

TINGA, J.

Under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, a petitioner is required to submit, together with the petition, a sworn certification of non-forum shopping, and failure to comply with this requirement is sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition. The requirement that petitioner should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to corporations, the Rules of Court making no distinction between natural and juridical persons. The signatory in the case of the corporation should be "a duly authorized director or officer of the corporation" who has knowledge of the matter being certified.[15] If, as in this case, the petitioner is a corporation, a board resolution authorizing a corporate officer to execute the certification against forum-shopping is necessary. A certification not signed by a duly authorized person renders the petition subject to dismissal.[16]

GR No. 130087

2003-09-24

DIANA M. BARCELONA v. CA

CARPIO, J.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied) Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[16] The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that "expert opinion need not be alleged" in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.

	GR No. 166859 2011-04-12	REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN BERSAMIN, J.
Firstly, as earlier pointed out, the Republic adduced no evidence on the significant particulars of the supposed loan, like the amount, the actual borrower, the approving official, etc. It did not also establish whether or not the loans were DOSRI[126] or issued in violation of the Single Borrower's Limit. Secondly, the Republic could not outrightly assume that President Marcos had issued LOI 926 for the purpose of allowing the loans by the UCPB in favor of Cojuangco. There must be competent evidence to that effect. And, finally, the loans, assuming that they were of a DOSRI nature or without the benefit of the required approvals or in excess of the Single Borrower's Limit, would not be void for that reason. Instead, the bank or the officers responsible for the approval and grant of the DOSRI loan would be subject only to sanctions under the law.[127]
	GR No. 190462 2010-11-17	STEEL CORPORATION OF PHILIPPINES v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK VELASCO JR., J.
It is a time-honored principle that when two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved.[13] In other words, consolidation is proper wherever the subject matter involved and relief demanded in the different suits make it expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights of the parties by hearing the suits together.[14]
	GR Nos. 154211-12 2009-06-22	SPS. ERNESTO F. CURATA AND LOURDES M. CURATA v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VELASCO JR., J.
A well-settled exception to the rule on prospectivity is when the law in question is remedial in nature. The rationale underpinning the exception is that no person can claim any vested right in any particular remedy or mode of procedure for the enforcement of a right.[107]
	GR NO. 158328 2007-02-23	FRANCO ESGUERRA v. ALFONSO MANANTAN QUISUMBING, J.
Note that it was petitioner who filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents before the RTC. It was actually the respondents who moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied it since the allegations of the complaint showed that it was in fact one for recovery of possession of real property.[10] When respondents filed a complaint for annulment of title, petitioner moved to dismiss it, citing the pendency of the ejectment case, and not lack of jurisdiction, as ground. But it was denied by the RTC. Thereafter, both parties moved for joint trial of the cases. Considering that these cases involved the same question of fact, the trial court was correct to jointly try and decide them. Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related subject matters must be ordered consolidated and jointly tried in court, where the earlier case was filed.[11]
	GR NOS. 138701-02 2006-10-17	SPS. ROQUE YU v. BASILIO G. MAGNO CONSTRUCTION GARCIA, J.
Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of both parties in the two civil cases will best be served and the issues involved therein expeditiously settled. After all, there is no question on the propriety of the venue in the Iloilo case.[25] (Emphasis supplied) Consolidation of cases, when proper, results in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial. It is a desirable end to be achieved, within the context of the present state of affairs where court dockets are full and individual and state finances are limited. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Another compelling argument that weighs heavily in favor of consolidation is the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more cases which would otherwise require a single judgment.[26]
	GR NO. 144024 2006-07-27	PEDRO TAGABI v. MARGARITO TANQUE AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
On technical grounds, Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that personal service of petitions and other pleadings is the general rule, while a resort to other modes of service and filing is the exception.[12] Where recourse is made to the exception, a written explanation why the service and the filing were not done personally is indispensable, even when such explanation by its nature is acceptable and manifest.[13] Where no explanation is offered to justify the resort to other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the pleading becomes mandatory.[14] Thus, the CA did not err when it granted respondent's Motion to Dismiss and ordered that petitioners' brief be expunged from the records in view of the latter's failure to present a written explanation why they did not personally file their appeal brief with the CA.
	GR NO. 147478 2006-07-17	METRO DRUG DISTRIBUTION v. . CORONA, J.
In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc.,[20] we held that the requirement for petitioner to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applied even to corporations, considering that the mandatory directives of the Rules of Court made no distinction between natural and juridical persons.
	GR NO. 150865 2006-06-30	ART FUENTEBELLA v. DARLICA CASTRO AZCUNA, J.
This requirement is intended to apply to both natural and juridical persons as Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court do not make a distinction between natural and juridical persons.[15] Where the petitioner is a corporation, the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized director or representative.[16] This was enunciated in Eslaban, Jr. v. Vda. de Onorio,[17] where the Court held that if the real party-in-interest is a corporate body, an officer of the corporation can sign the certification against forum shopping so long as he has been duly authorized by a resolution of its board of directors.
	GR NO. 161957 2005-02-28	JORGE GONZALES v. CLIMAX MINING LTD. TINGA, J.
Under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, a petitioner is required to submit, together with the petition, a sworn certification of non-forum shopping, and failure to comply with this requirement is sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition. The requirement that petitioner should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to corporations, the Rules of Court making no distinction between natural and juridical persons. The signatory in the case of the corporation should be "a duly authorized director or officer of the corporation" who has knowledge of the matter being certified.[15] If, as in this case, the petitioner is a corporation, a board resolution authorizing a corporate officer to execute the certification against forum-shopping is necessary. A certification not signed by a duly authorized person renders the petition subject to dismissal.[16]
	GR No. 130087 2003-09-24	DIANA M. BARCELONA v. CA CARPIO, J.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied) Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[16] The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that "expert opinion need not be alleged" in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.

PERLA S. ZULUETA v. ASIA BREWERY