This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-03-12 |
REYES, J. |
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| We emphasize that for purposes of determining the liability of a health care provider to its members, jurisprudence holds that a health care agreement is in the nature of non-life insurance, which is primarily a contract of indemnity. Once the member incurs hospital, medical or any other expense arising from sickness, injury or other stipulated contingent, the health care provider must pay for the same to the extent agreed upon under the contract.[18] | |||||
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2013-06-17 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Moreover, since the subject CBA provision is an insurance contract, the rights and obligations of the parties must be determined in accordance with the general principles of insurance law.[52] Being in the nature of a non-life insurance contract and essentially a contract of indemnity, the CBA provision obligates MMPC to indemnify the covered employees' medical expenses incurred by their dependents but only up to the extent of the expenses actually incurred.[53] This is consistent with the principle of indemnity which proscribes the insured from recovering greater than the loss.[54] Indeed, to profit from a loss will lead to unjust enrichment and therefore should not be countenanced. As aptly ruled by the CA, to grant the claims of MMPSEU will permit possible abuse by employees. | |||||
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2008-04-09 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| When the terms of insurance contract contain limitations on liability, courts should construe them in such a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with his obligation. Being a contract of adhesion, the terms of an insurance contract are to be construed strictly against the party which prepared the contract, the insurer. By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms and phraseology of the insurance contract, ambiguity must be strictly interpreted against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, especially to avoid forfeiture.[20] | |||||
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2005-04-12 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Petitioner's final plea for liberality in applying the rules on venue must be rejected. As earlier discussed, the PN was a contract of adhesion. Ambiguities therein are to be construed against the party that prepared the contract.[33] On the same principle, petitioner can no longer disavow the stipulation on venue, considering that it drafted the Surety Agreement. Besides, this alleged technicality caused no miscarriage of substantial justice, as petitioner may refile the case.[34] The inconveniences brought about by its failure to observe the rules on venue sprang from its own acts. Hence, it cannot blame the courts or anyone else for the resulting delay in the adjudication of the merits of its cause. | |||||