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AC. No. 10579

2014-12-10

PER CURIAM

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is "a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."[40] In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.[41] Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.[42]

GR No. 197307

2014-02-26

FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

VELASCO JR., J.

the basic complaint on August 20, 2003[31] when the ruling in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman[32] had still controlling sway. To petitioners, Tapiador enunciated the dictum that the Ombudsman's disciplinary power is only to recommend, the power to suspend and dismiss erring personnel being vested in the head of the office concerned. As a corollary point, petitioners also advance the argument that the legal situation changed only when Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals[33] and Ombudsman v. Samaniego[34] were decided in June 2006 and September 2008, respectively. We are not impressed.

GR No. 165132

2012-03-07

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. NELLIE R. APOLONIO

BRION, J.

Addressing the Court's obiter dictum[31] in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,[32] the Ombudsman argues that the case has become moot because it found Dr. Apolonio guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. To be sure, the Ombudsman likewise cited RA 6770 which gives it the authority to "assess and impose commensurate administrative penalt[ies.]"[33]

GR No. 180236

2012-01-17

GEMMA P. CABALIT v. COA-REGION VII

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

One final note. Cabalit contends that pursuant to the obiter in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, [51] the Office of the Ombudsman can only recommend administrative sanctions and not directly impose them. However, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[52] this Court has already settled the issue when we ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory. We held,

GR NOS. 170615-16

2009-07-09

REPUBLIC v. RUFINO V. MIJARES

QUISUMBING, J.

It bears stressing that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case; rather, it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[20] A thorough examination of the records of this case reveals that such quantum of proof was not met here.

GR No. 168039

2009-06-05

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. FERNANDO J. BELTRAN

PERALTA, J.

In granting the petition, the CA opined that the Ombudsman had no authority to directly dismiss Beltran from government service, as the Ombudsman could only "recommend" the removal of the public official or employee who was found to be at fault. It held that Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman[16] was on all fours with that of Beltran. It added that the evidence presented to prove Beltran's liability was insufficient to establish the allegations in the complaint. It found the Ombudsman's conclusions sweeping and bereft of satisfactory basis. The CA stressed that it did not conform to the Ombudsman's reliance on the affidavit of Navarro, considering that the same was uncorroborated and unauthenticated Moreover, the CA stated that the Ombudsman should have given credence to the second affidavit of Navarro categorically denying that he executed the first affidavit. The Ombudsman's Graft Investigation Officer should have summoned the affiant and inquired about the circumstances surrounding the first and second affidavits.[17]

GR No. 175201

2008-04-23

OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO v. LEOPOLDO F. BUNGUBUNG

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.[30] The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of,[31] even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.[32] While substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case,[33] or evidence beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal cases,[34] it should be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. There is none here.

GR No. 159883

2008-03-31

DR. PEDRO F. GOBENCIONG v. CA

VELASCO JR., J.

Invoked as part of the ratio decidendi of the CA Decision was Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,[20] which the appellate court viewed as declaring that the disciplinary power of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is limited only to recommending to the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out. In the concrete, as gleaned from the CA Decision, this means that the Ombudsman cannot compel the DOH to impose the penalty recommended in its underlying Decision of March 21, 2000.

GR NO. 161098

2007-09-13

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. CELSO SANTIAGO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Petitioner contends, inter alia, that the obiter dictum in the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman[5] to the effect that the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss an erring public official or employee from the government service[6] is not a controlling doctrine.

GR NO. 158672

2007-08-07

COA v. AGAPITO A. HINAMPAS

GARCIA, J.

[5] G.R. No. 129124, March 15, 2002, 379 SCRA 322.

GR NO. 169029

2006-08-22

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. ROGELIO Q. TONGSON

CALLEJO, SR., J.

For their part, respondents counter that the sworn statement and the subsequent joint supplemental complaint filed by Chan were hearsay, inadmissible in evidence, as the affiants were not presented to identify their statements. They cite the ruling of this Court in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman[49] to support their contentions. Respondents further insist that the integrity and the credibility of the complainants were highly questionable and tainted with hatred, malice and bad faith, motivated as they were by hatred for respondents for not having been given construction projects. They point out that Chan was also of questionable character, having been dismissed from the police service for grave misconduct (extortion).

GR NO. 159314

2006-06-26

EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA v. EDWARD F. RANADA

QUISUMBING, J.

In assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770, petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has only the powers enumerated under Section 13,[23] Article XI of the Constitution; and that such powers do not include the power to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure a government official. Its power is merely to recommend the action to the officer concerned. Moreover, petitioner, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,[24] insists that although the Constitution provides that the Ombudsman can promulgate its own rules of procedure and exercise other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law, Sections 15,[25] 21,[26] 22[27] and 25[28] of Rep. Act No. 6770 are inconsistent with Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution because the power of the Ombudsman is merely to recommend appropriate actions to the officer concerned.

GR NO. 151138

2005-02-16

FELIPE L. MELCHOR v. GERTY R. GIRONELLA

QUISUMBING, J.

Based on the record on hand, we are not inclined to give credit to the joint affidavit of Renerio Maligo, Sr. and Cristita Maligo-Prado. They were not presented as witnesses and were not subjected to cross-examination. Where the affiant did not appear, or was not presented during the administrative investigation to identify his sworn statement or affidavit, said statement or affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.[20]

	AC. No. 10579 2014-12-10	ERLINDA FOSTER v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG PER CURIAM
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is "a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."[40] In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.[41] Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.[42]
	GR No. 197307 2014-02-26	FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN VELASCO JR., J.
the basic complaint on August 20, 2003[31] when the ruling in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman[32] had still controlling sway. To petitioners, Tapiador enunciated the dictum that the Ombudsman's disciplinary power is only to recommend, the power to suspend and dismiss erring personnel being vested in the head of the office concerned. As a corollary point, petitioners also advance the argument that the legal situation changed only when Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals[33] and Ombudsman v. Samaniego[34] were decided in June 2006 and September 2008, respectively. We are not impressed.
	GR No. 165132 2012-03-07	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. NELLIE R. APOLONIO BRION, J.
Addressing the Court's obiter dictum[31] in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,[32] the Ombudsman argues that the case has become moot because it found Dr. Apolonio guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. To be sure, the Ombudsman likewise cited RA 6770 which gives it the authority to "assess and impose commensurate administrative penalt[ies.]"[33]
	GR No. 180236 2012-01-17	GEMMA P. CABALIT v. COA-REGION VII VILLARAMA, JR., J.
One final note. Cabalit contends that pursuant to the obiter in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, [51] the Office of the Ombudsman can only recommend administrative sanctions and not directly impose them. However, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[52] this Court has already settled the issue when we ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory. We held,
	GR NOS. 170615-16 2009-07-09	REPUBLIC v. RUFINO V. MIJARES QUISUMBING, J.
It bears stressing that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case; rather, it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[20] A thorough examination of the records of this case reveals that such quantum of proof was not met here.
	GR No. 168039 2009-06-05	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. FERNANDO J. BELTRAN PERALTA, J.
In granting the petition, the CA opined that the Ombudsman had no authority to directly dismiss Beltran from government service, as the Ombudsman could only "recommend" the removal of the public official or employee who was found to be at fault. It held that Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman[16] was on all fours with that of Beltran. It added that the evidence presented to prove Beltran's liability was insufficient to establish the allegations in the complaint. It found the Ombudsman's conclusions sweeping and bereft of satisfactory basis. The CA stressed that it did not conform to the Ombudsman's reliance on the affidavit of Navarro, considering that the same was uncorroborated and unauthenticated Moreover, the CA stated that the Ombudsman should have given credence to the second affidavit of Navarro categorically denying that he executed the first affidavit. The Ombudsman's Graft Investigation Officer should have summoned the affiant and inquired about the circumstances surrounding the first and second affidavits.[17]
	GR No. 175201 2008-04-23	OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO v. LEOPOLDO F. BUNGUBUNG CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.[30] The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of,[31] even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.[32] While substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case,[33] or evidence beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal cases,[34] it should be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. There is none here.
	GR No. 159883 2008-03-31	DR. PEDRO F. GOBENCIONG v. CA VELASCO JR., J.
Invoked as part of the ratio decidendi of the CA Decision was Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,[20] which the appellate court viewed as declaring that the disciplinary power of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is limited only to recommending to the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out. In the concrete, as gleaned from the CA Decision, this means that the Ombudsman cannot compel the DOH to impose the penalty recommended in its underlying Decision of March 21, 2000.
	GR NO. 161098 2007-09-13	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. CELSO SANTIAGO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Petitioner contends, inter alia, that the obiter dictum in the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman[5] to the effect that the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss an erring public official or employee from the government service[6] is not a controlling doctrine.
	GR NO. 158672 2007-08-07	COA v. AGAPITO A. HINAMPAS GARCIA, J.
[5] G.R. No. 129124, March 15, 2002, 379 SCRA 322.
	GR NO. 169029 2006-08-22	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. ROGELIO Q. TONGSON CALLEJO, SR., J.
For their part, respondents counter that the sworn statement and the subsequent joint supplemental complaint filed by Chan were hearsay, inadmissible in evidence, as the affiants were not presented to identify their statements. They cite the ruling of this Court in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman[49] to support their contentions. Respondents further insist that the integrity and the credibility of the complainants were highly questionable and tainted with hatred, malice and bad faith, motivated as they were by hatred for respondents for not having been given construction projects. They point out that Chan was also of questionable character, having been dismissed from the police service for grave misconduct (extortion).
	GR NO. 159314 2006-06-26	EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA v. EDWARD F. RANADA QUISUMBING, J.
In assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770, petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has only the powers enumerated under Section 13,[23] Article XI of the Constitution; and that such powers do not include the power to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure a government official. Its power is merely to recommend the action to the officer concerned. Moreover, petitioner, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,[24] insists that although the Constitution provides that the Ombudsman can promulgate its own rules of procedure and exercise other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law, Sections 15,[25] 21,[26] 22[27] and 25[28] of Rep. Act No. 6770 are inconsistent with Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution because the power of the Ombudsman is merely to recommend appropriate actions to the officer concerned.
	GR NO. 151138 2005-02-16	FELIPE L. MELCHOR v. GERTY R. GIRONELLA QUISUMBING, J.
Based on the record on hand, we are not inclined to give credit to the joint affidavit of Renerio Maligo, Sr. and Cristita Maligo-Prado. They were not presented as witnesses and were not subjected to cross-examination. Where the affiant did not appear, or was not presented during the administrative investigation to identify his sworn statement or affidavit, said statement or affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.[20]

RENATO A. TAPIADOR v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN