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GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH v. CA

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR No. 156078 2008-03-14	MARASIGAN v. MARASIGAN CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Hence, it is totally unnecessary for this Court to address the issue raised by petitioners concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 5, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court for having been issued beyond the constitutional limitation on the rule-making power of this Court. Basic is the principle that a constitutional issue may only be passed upon if essential to the decision of a case or controversy.[54] A purported constitutional issue raised by petitioners may only be resolved if essential to the decision of a case and controversy. Even if all the requisites for judicial review are present, this Court will not entertain a constitutional question unless it is the very lis mota[55] of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of a statute or general law. The present problem of partition by co-heirs/co-owners can be resolved without elevating their case to one of constitutionality.
	GR NO. 154128 2007-02-08	DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ v. WILFREDO R. CRUZ SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, [6] we ruled that where the creditor had collected more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks, charging the debtor with a criminal offense under the Bouncing Checks Law, two years after the collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable consideration.
	GR NO. 160328 2005-02-04	TERESITA ALCANTARA VERGARA v. PEOPLE YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Similarly, in Griffith v. Court of Appeals,[29] the conviction of the accused for violation of BP 22 was found to be unjustified because the case was filed 2 years after private complainant had collected more than the value of the dishonored check. In acquitting the accused, we held that there exists no more reason to penalize him for the offense charged, thus:While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtor's criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.
	GR No. 148557 2003-08-07	FELICITO ABARQUEZ v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
In Griffith v. Court of Appeals,[18] we held that:While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtor's criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations. In Criminal Case No. D-8137, Check No. 2956662 dated July 1, 1986 with a face value of P52,200.00 was dishonored for being drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD) and not for being drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). According to petitioner, B.P. 22 punishes the drawer of a check if it is drawn against insufficient funds but not when it is drawn against uncollected deposit. He ratiocinated that at the time the check was presented for payment on July 8, 1986, the balance as shown in the ledger of petitioner's account was more than the face value of the subject check. Even then, he claims that he is not liable since he paid the value of the check within five (5) banking days from knowledge of dishonor.