This case has been cited 22 times or more.
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2004-06-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As to the second issue, the appellant asserts that the ages and relationships of the victims were stated in the informations but were not alleged with specificity as qualifying circumstances. He invokes Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[78] and People v. Alba[79] and People v. Manlansing,[80] to support his stance that the two circumstances cannot be treated as qualifying circumstances but merely generic aggravating circumstances. The appellant submits that assuming he is found to be the perpetrator of the felonies, he should be found guilty of two counts of simple rape, not qualified rape.[81] | |||||
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2004-05-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| However, counsel for appellant submits that even granting arguendo that he is guilty of a crime, the crime he committed was only homicide and not murder. He calls attention to People v. Alba,[32] and the more recent case of People v. Manlansing,[33] which opined that:…the information should state not only the designation of the offense and the acts and omissions constituting it but shall also specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Guided by the established rule that when a penal statute, whether substantive or remedial and procedural, is favorable to the accused, the courts shall give it a retroactive application. Thus, we held that since the information in this case failed to specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing to murder, under the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, treachery has to be considered a generic aggravating circumstance only. | |||||
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2004-05-20 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Neither could nocturnity be considered as an aggravating circumstance considering that it was not shown that the darkness of the night was purposely sought by appellant to facilitate the commission of the crime nor to ensure its execution.[39] | |||||
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2004-03-17 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
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| v. Belaong, G.R. No. 138615, 18 September 2002, 389 SCRA 337. [72] People v. Manlansing, G. R. Nos. 131736-37, 11 March 2002, 378 SCRA 685. | |||||
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2004-01-21 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In his reply brief, appellant cited People v. Alba[18] and People v. Manlansing[19] as bases for the non-imposition of the death penalty. According to appellant, although the Information alleged treachery and evident premeditation, the Information did not state these circumstances with specificity as qualifying the crime to murder. Appellant quoted from People v. Alba the following:We note however, that treachery, though stated in the information, was not alleged with specificity as qualifying the killing to murder. Sections 8 and 9 [of Rule 110] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000, provide: | |||||
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2003-11-18 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Appellant next argues that if he were to be held criminally liable, it should only be for homicide. According to him, treachery was not alleged in the Information with specificity as to qualify the killing to murder. He cites as bases for his argument the cases of People v. Alba[19] and People v. Manlansing,[20] wherein the Court disregarded the qualifying circumstance of treachery for the reason that it failed to specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing to murder. In said cases, treachery was considered only a generic aggravating circumstance; thus, the crime committed was only homicide and not murder. | |||||
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2003-09-30 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict if the following requisites are met: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[102] In our mind, the following pieces of circumstantial evidence show with moral certainty that appellant was responsible for the death of Nemesio: Appellant had the motive to kill Nemesio Lopate for having an affair with his wife, and appellant had openly expressed his desire and intention to do so; | |||||
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2003-06-26 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity ex delicto.[55] As regards the actual damages, it appears that out of the P88,000.00 awarded by the trial court, only P36,000.00[56] was actually supported by receipts. The rest was based solely on a list prepared by the victim's mother. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party.[57] We therefore find it appropriate to reduce the award of actual damages to P36,000.00. The moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed, there being evidence that because of the victim's death, his heirs suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury.[58] Considering that a qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery is present here, exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000.00 are likewise awarded to the victim's heirs.[59] | |||||
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2003-06-18 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| A modification on the award of damages is likewise in order. Although the trial court awarded the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity, we are constrained, considering the circumstances of this case and under prevailing jurisprudence, to add another P50,000 by way of moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the victim on account of his untimely and senseless demise.[31] Further, we find that despite the lack of showing of any actual monetary loss on account of the victim's wrongful death, some pecuniary loss has been suffered.[32] Hence, we award by way of temperate damages the amount of P15,000,[33] which is reasonable under the circumstances. | |||||
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2003-06-12 |
CORONA, J. |
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| We sustain the award by the trial court of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P50,000 each, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[21] | |||||
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2003-06-10 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Moral damages are automatically given for the reason stated above and are pegged at P50,000 based on current jurisprudence.[89] Actual damages, on the other hand, need to be supported by receipts or some other documentary evidence as required by Article 2199 of the Civil Code.[90] | |||||
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2003-06-10 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Finally, since the penalty was downgraded to reclusion perpetua, the award of civil indemnity by the trial court in the amount of P75,000 should also be reduced to P50,000 in line with recent jurisprudence.[91] Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.[92] | |||||
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2003-05-09 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of Flores are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity ex delicto.[43] As regards the actual damages, it appears that out of the P55,070.00 awarded by the trial court, only P19,170.00[44] was actually supported by receipts. The other amounts were based solely on a list prepared by Romeo Flores. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party.[45] In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present receipts for the other expenses incurred. Thus, in light of the recent case of People vs. Abrazaldo,[46] we grant the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages inasmuch as the proven actual damages is less than P25,000.00. The moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed, there being proofs that because of Flores' death, his heirs suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury.[47] However, we reduce to P25,000.00 only the trial court's award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.[48] | |||||
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2003-05-09 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| There is no doubt therefore that he sustained the injuries found by Dr. Romulo Robles. Hacking a person with a bolo would have caused more serious injuries than that found by Dr. Romulo Robles. Assessing the medical findings of Dr. Romulo Robles, it can be safely said that the injuries on the person of Ernesto Muñez were minor injuries which were inflicted more than a week before he was examined by Dr. Romulo Robles. Such physical evidence does not support Ernesto Muñez' declarations. The defense therefore was unable to prove its self-defense posture.[14] Appellant further contends that the trial court erred in appreciating treachery to qualify the killing to murder considering that the information did not specifically allege this as a qualifying circumstance. Thus, he argues that the same should only be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance, as held in People v. Alba[15] and People v. Manlansing.[16] These cases, however, have already been abandoned and superseded in the case of People v. Aquino,[17] where we held that qualifying circumstances need not be expressly stated as such to qualify the offense. It is enough that the same is stated in the information, whether it be as qualifying or generic aggravating. | |||||
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2003-04-09 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The trial court's award of damages likewise needs to be modified. The heirs of Nicanor Solis are entitled to civil or death indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as a matter of law.[73] The heirs of Nicanor Solis should also be awarded moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for the mental anguish, wounded feelings and moral shock they suffered as a result of Nicanor's death.[74] However, the award of actual damages must be deleted for failure of the prosecution to present receipts to substantiate the same.[75] Instead, the heirs of the victim should be awarded temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, considering that they incurred hospital and funeral expenses as a result of the victim's death.[76] | |||||
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2003-03-06 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| In keeping with prevailing jurisprudence, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity ex delicto.[48] As regards the actual damages, it appears that the amount of P119,700.00 was based solely on the personal list prepared by Feria's mother.[49] To be entitled to such damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party.[50] In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present any receipt to prove the claim for expenses incurred.[51] Nevertheless, in light of the recent case of People vs. Abrazaldo,[52] we grant the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages. The moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed, there being proofs that because of Feria's death, his heirs suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury.[53] Finally, we likewise affirm the trial court's award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.[54] | |||||
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2003-02-07 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| On the trial court's award of actual damages in the amount of P27,000.00, we find the same to be unsubstantiated. To be entitled to such damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party.[47] In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present any receipt to prove the claim for expenses incurred.[48] Gregorio Guban, the father of the victim, who shouldered the expenses for the wake and burial failed to submit receipts to show the amount of such expenses.[49] However, as the heirs of Guban did actually incur funeral expenses, we are justified in awarding P25,000.00, not for purposes of indemnification, but by way of temperate damages.[50] | |||||
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2003-01-13 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Hereby sustained are the amounts of P50,000 for proven moral damages, and P50,000 for indemnity ex delicto awarded by the RTC. However, the award of P130,000 as actual and compensatory damages is hereby deleted in line with the rule that only actual damages supported by evidence on record shall be allowed.[42] Elmadona presented, not funeral and burial expense receipts, but merely order slips[43] and a Deed of Absolute Sale[44] for a burial plot. This Deed, however, did not indicate as the buyer Elmadona or any of the victim's heirs, but a certain Dionisio de Guzman whose relationship to the heirs remains unknown. We likewise delete the award for temperate damages for lack of basis. | |||||
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2002-09-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| best available evidence.[24] In the case at bar, only the amount of P20,350.00 was duly substantiated by receipts, representing funeral charges of P20,000.00[25] and hospital expenses of P350.00.[26] Finally, the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery warrants a further award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Only recently, we laid down the rule that such damages are recoverable if there is present a qualifying or ordinary aggravating | |||||
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2002-09-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family.[31] Nevertheless, moral damages are not meant to enrich an injured party. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award should be reduced to P50,000.00.[32] Likewise, the P120,000.00 civil indemnity for the death of the victim should be reduced to P50,000.00 per current case law.[33] The award of P30,000.00 representing hospitalization and funeral expenses should also be reduced to P13,500.00,[34] considering that only said amount is supported by receipts or which appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, | |||||
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2002-08-22 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary.[44] For the circumstances of voluntary surrender, it is sufficient that it be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing him.[45] In the case at bar, accused-appellant fled after the commission of the crime, taking with him the victim's gun, although the Dagupan City Police Station was just a few meters away from the locus criminis. His supposed fear for the victim's influence in the community has no | |||||