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ROBERTO G. ROSALES v. CA

This case has been cited 10 times or more.

2007-09-21
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is basic that when there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter.[21]  An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the Decision.[22]  This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.[23]
2005-08-29
CARPIO, J.
More pertinent are Tax Declarations No. 15812[38] and No. 15813,[39] both issued in 1967, presented by petitioners.  These tax declarations placed the assessed value of both Properties at P16,160.  Compared to this, the price of P16,000 cannot be considered grossly inadequate, much less so shocking to the conscience[40] as to justify the setting aside of the Deed of Sale.
2005-07-29
CARPIO, J.
More pertinent are Tax Declarations No. 15812[38] and No. 15813,[39] both issued in 1967, presented by petitioners. These tax declarations placed the assessed value of both Properties at P16,160. Compared to this, the price of P16,000 cannot be considered grossly inadequate, much less so shocking to the conscience[40] as to justify the setting aside of the Deed of Sale.
2003-10-15
BELLOSILLO, J.
While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation." Verily, these meaningful statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer "in operation." This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis-à-vis the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between the State and their former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and, (b) the foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic part of the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in accord with the findings as contained in the body thereof.[31]
2002-01-16
MENDOZA, J.
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations.  It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Courts will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.[37]
2001-11-22
PANGANIBAN, J.
The only exception when the body of a decision prevails over the fallo is when the inevitable conclusion from the former is that there was a glaring error in the latter, in which case the body of the decision will prevail.[29] In this instance, there was no clear declaration in the body of the January 31, 1984 Decision to warrant a conclusion that there was an error in the fallo. Nowhere in the former can we find a definite declaration of the trial court that, indeed, respondent's liability was solidary. If petitioner had doubted this point, it should have filed a motion for reconsideration before the finality of the Decision of the trial court.