Lawyerly

GR No. 158877

2009-06-16

NACHURA, J.

Respondent might have been confused with the rule that, when a judgment is amended, the date of the amendment should be considered the date of the decision in the computation of the period for perfecting the appeal. For all intents and purposes, the lower court rendered a new judgment from which the time to appeal must be reckoned.[27] However, this rule presupposes that the amendment consists of a material alteration of such substance and proportion that would, in effect, give rise to an entirely new judgment.[28] But when the amendment merely consists of the correction of a clerical error, no new judgment arises. In such case, the period for filing the appeal should still be counted from the receipt of the original judgment.

GR No. 169536

2007-09-21

REMIGIA GRAGEDA v. NIMFA C. GOMEZ

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

It is basic that when there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter.[21] An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the Decision.[22] This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.[23]

GR NO. 150097

2007-02-26

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ALEJANDRO

CORONA, J.

I am very much interested in repurchasing back these properties because they are the only properties which my family have and because our house is located inside this property and for this matter I am willing to pay [for] these properties in cash which I already told the bank when I went there.[32] Besides, we have already ruled that an offer to repurchase should not be construed as a waiver of the right to question the sale.[33] Instead, it must be taken as an intention to avoid further litigation and thus is in the nature of an offer to compromise.[34] By offering to redeem the properties, respondents can attain their ultimate objective: to pay off their debt and regain ownership of their lands.[35]

GR NO. 159806

2006-01-20

BANGKOK BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED v. THELMA U. LEE

QUISUMBING, J.

Clearly, the assailed Order of the trial court, which granted the motion for execution pending appeal, fell short of the requirements of Section 2, Rule 39. Where the order of execution is not in conformity with the rules, the same is null and void.[22] Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring the said Order nullified.

GR NO. 152658

2005-08-29

LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO v. EDWARD P. BRAVO

CARPIO, J.

More pertinent are Tax Declarations No. 15812[38] and No. 15813,[39] both issued in 1967, presented by petitioners. These tax declarations placed the assessed value of both Properties at P16,160. Compared to this, the price of P16,000 cannot be considered grossly inadequate, much less so shocking to the conscience[40] as to justify the setting aside of the Deed of Sale.

GR No. 152658

2005-07-29

LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO v. EDWARD P. BRAVO

CARPIO, J.

More pertinent are Tax Declarations No. 15812[38] and No. 15813,[39] both issued in 1967, presented by petitioners. These tax declarations placed the assessed value of both Properties at P16,160. Compared to this, the price of P16,000 cannot be considered grossly inadequate, much less so shocking to the conscience[40] as to justify the setting aside of the Deed of Sale.

GR No. 130876

2003-12-05

FRANCISCO ALONSO v. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Finally, petitioners' right of action is barred neither by prescription nor by laches. This action seeks a declaration of nullity of private respondent's reconstituted title on the ground, among others, of lack of jurisdiction. Such action does not prescribe.[21] As for laches, we must not lose sight of the basic postulate that it is a doctrine of equity which should never be used as a shield for fraud or wrongdoing by the very party responsible therefor.[22] The private respondent, operating under its previous name, was an active participant in the wrongful use and subsequent disappearance of the source document used in the reconstitution. Under such circumstances, private respondent cannot invoke laches to defeat petitioners' right to assail the validity of the reconstituted title because laches cannot be applied when manifest wrong or injustice will result.[23]

GR No. 156273

2003-10-15

HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO v. MACTAN - CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY

BELLOSILLO, J.

While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation." Verily, these meaningful statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer "in operation." This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis-à-vis the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between the State and their former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and, (b) the foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic part of the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in accord with the findings as contained in the body thereof.[31]

GR No. 148582

2002-01-16

FAR EAST BANK v. ESTRELLA O. QUERIMIT

MENDOZA, J.

There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Courts will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.[37]

GR No. 109648

2001-11-22

PH CREDIT CORPORATION v. CA

PANGANIBAN, J.

The only exception when the body of a decision prevails over the fallo is when the inevitable conclusion from the former is that there was a glaring error in the latter, in which case the body of the decision will prevail.[29] In this instance, there was no clear declaration in the body of the January 31, 1984 Decision to warrant a conclusion that there was an error in the fallo. Nowhere in the former can we find a definite declaration of the trial court that, indeed, respondent's liability was solidary. If petitioner had doubted this point, it should have filed a motion for reconsideration before the finality of the Decision of the trial court.

	GR No. 158877 2009-06-16	JOVEN DE GRANO v. GREGORIO LACABA NACHURA, J.
Respondent might have been confused with the rule that, when a judgment is amended, the date of the amendment should be considered the date of the decision in the computation of the period for perfecting the appeal. For all intents and purposes, the lower court rendered a new judgment from which the time to appeal must be reckoned.[27] However, this rule presupposes that the amendment consists of a material alteration of such substance and proportion that would, in effect, give rise to an entirely new judgment.[28] But when the amendment merely consists of the correction of a clerical error, no new judgment arises. In such case, the period for filing the appeal should still be counted from the receipt of the original judgment.
	GR No. 169536 2007-09-21	REMIGIA GRAGEDA v. NIMFA C. GOMEZ CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is basic that when there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter.[21] An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the Decision.[22] This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.[23]
	GR NO. 150097 2007-02-26	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ALEJANDRO CORONA, J.
I am very much interested in repurchasing back these properties because they are the only properties which my family have and because our house is located inside this property and for this matter I am willing to pay [for] these properties in cash which I already told the bank when I went there.[32] Besides, we have already ruled that an offer to repurchase should not be construed as a waiver of the right to question the sale.[33] Instead, it must be taken as an intention to avoid further litigation and thus is in the nature of an offer to compromise.[34] By offering to redeem the properties, respondents can attain their ultimate objective: to pay off their debt and regain ownership of their lands.[35]
	GR NO. 159806 2006-01-20	BANGKOK BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED v. THELMA U. LEE QUISUMBING, J.
Clearly, the assailed Order of the trial court, which granted the motion for execution pending appeal, fell short of the requirements of Section 2, Rule 39. Where the order of execution is not in conformity with the rules, the same is null and void.[22] Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring the said Order nullified.
	GR NO. 152658 2005-08-29	LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO v. EDWARD P. BRAVO CARPIO, J.
More pertinent are Tax Declarations No. 15812[38] and No. 15813,[39] both issued in 1967, presented by petitioners. These tax declarations placed the assessed value of both Properties at P16,160. Compared to this, the price of P16,000 cannot be considered grossly inadequate, much less so shocking to the conscience[40] as to justify the setting aside of the Deed of Sale.
	GR No. 152658 2005-07-29	LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO v. EDWARD P. BRAVO CARPIO, J.
More pertinent are Tax Declarations No. 15812[38] and No. 15813,[39] both issued in 1967, presented by petitioners. These tax declarations placed the assessed value of both Properties at P16,160. Compared to this, the price of P16,000 cannot be considered grossly inadequate, much less so shocking to the conscience[40] as to justify the setting aside of the Deed of Sale.
	GR No. 130876 2003-12-05	FRANCISCO ALONSO v. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Finally, petitioners' right of action is barred neither by prescription nor by laches. This action seeks a declaration of nullity of private respondent's reconstituted title on the ground, among others, of lack of jurisdiction. Such action does not prescribe.[21] As for laches, we must not lose sight of the basic postulate that it is a doctrine of equity which should never be used as a shield for fraud or wrongdoing by the very party responsible therefor.[22] The private respondent, operating under its previous name, was an active participant in the wrongful use and subsequent disappearance of the source document used in the reconstitution. Under such circumstances, private respondent cannot invoke laches to defeat petitioners' right to assail the validity of the reconstituted title because laches cannot be applied when manifest wrong or injustice will result.[23]
	GR No. 156273 2003-10-15	HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO v. MACTAN - CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY BELLOSILLO, J.
While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation." Verily, these meaningful statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer "in operation." This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis-à-vis the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between the State and their former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and, (b) the foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic part of the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in accord with the findings as contained in the body thereof.[31]
	GR No. 148582 2002-01-16	FAR EAST BANK v. ESTRELLA O. QUERIMIT MENDOZA, J.
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Courts will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.[37]
	GR No. 109648 2001-11-22	PH CREDIT CORPORATION v. CA PANGANIBAN, J.
The only exception when the body of a decision prevails over the fallo is when the inevitable conclusion from the former is that there was a glaring error in the latter, in which case the body of the decision will prevail.[29] In this instance, there was no clear declaration in the body of the January 31, 1984 Decision to warrant a conclusion that there was an error in the fallo. Nowhere in the former can we find a definite declaration of the trial court that, indeed, respondent's liability was solidary. If petitioner had doubted this point, it should have filed a motion for reconsideration before the finality of the Decision of the trial court.

ROBERTO G. ROSALES v. CA