This case has been cited 1 times or more.
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2006-11-30 |
CALLEJO. SR., J. |
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| Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a virtual defiance of the court.[27] The power of contempt, being a drastic and extraordinary remedy, should not be exercised unless clearly necessary in the interest of justice.[28] In another case,[29] counsel likewise filed a motion for voluntary inhibition of the judge alleging, inter alia, that he feels that he has no chance of winning the case against the plaintiff in whose favor respondent has previously rendered a favorable judgment, and that respondent may no longer possess the cold neutrality of a judge to be able to render an impartial judgment. In the said case, the Court held: xxx The mere fact that respondent did not see any validity in the grounds given in the motion for his voluntary inhibition does not render the movants liable for direct contempt. It may be true that the contents of the motion were critical of respondent's prior actuations and expressed concern regarding his impartiality. Ang and Atty. Lapak may have insulted respondent. This, however, cannot be considered derogatory, offensive, or malicious as to undermine the integrity and dignity of the court and hamper the administration of justice.[30] A judge may not hold a party in contempt for expressing concern on his impartiality even if the judge may have been insulted therein.[31] Moreover, a judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.[32] The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[33] | |||||