This case has been cited 12 times or more.
2015-08-11 |
BRION, J. |
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It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word “conspire,” or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as the nature of the crime charged will admit, to enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.[93] | |||||
2009-07-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[44] In our jurisdiction, conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself.[45] | |||||
2009-04-16 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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Pursuant to our ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[5] said allegation of conspiracy is sufficient, thus:The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. x x x | |||||
2009-03-13 |
TINGA, J. |
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When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. But when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all.[41] | |||||
2009-03-13 |
TINGA, J. |
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In addition, the allegation of conspiracy in the Information should not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A statement of the evidence on the conspiracy is not necessary in the Information.[44] | |||||
2007-08-24 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we categorized two (2) structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.[51] | |||||
2007-08-10 |
GARCIA, J. |
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At bottom, the petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded "benefits" to respondent Jinggoy that were inexistent at the start of that case. But no such benefits were extended, as the Court did not read into the Amended Information, as couched, something not there in the first place. Respondent Jinggoy's participation, if that be the case, in the proceedings involving sub-paragraphs "b," "c" and "d," did not change the legal situation set forth in the aforequoted portion of the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 148965. For when it passed, in G.R. No. 148965, upon the inculpatory acts envisaged and ascribed in the Amended Information against Jinggoy, the Court merely defined what he was indicted and can be penalized for. In legal jargon, the Court informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right guaranteed an accused under the Constitution.[26] In fine, all that the Court contextually did in G.R. No. 148965 was no more than to implement his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation in the light of the filing of the Amended Information as worded. If at all, the Court's holding in G.R. No. 148965 freed individual respondent from the ill effects of a wrong interpretation that might be given to the Amended Information. | |||||
2004-07-29 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.[50] The pertinent provision in the Rules of Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, which we quote: "Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired." The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. [51] The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant by the information.[52] | |||||
2003-01-28 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the accused, including petitioner, connived and conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder "through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or means." And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information, petitioner and his co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et al.,[19] we held that the word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances"; it refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1(d) of the law. We further held that the word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled that "plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended information charges accused therein, including petitioner, with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law" and that:"x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x x."[20] | |||||
2002-12-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed.[30] In addition, it must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.[31] Particularly in rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e., (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is | |||||
2002-05-09 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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It is worthy to note that confederation is not enumerated as an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like conspiracy which must be alleged in and not merely inferred from the information, confederation is but a mode of incurring criminal liability and may not be considered criminal in itself unless specifically provided by law.[29] Neither may confederation be treated as an aggravating circumstance in the absence of any law defining or classifying it as such.[30] Thus, the trial court erred in appreciating it for the purpose of imposing the maximum penalty. |