This case has been cited 5 times or more.
2013-07-01 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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Moreover, appellant also failed to attribute any improper motive to Valenciano to falsely testify against him. There was no evidence to establish that Valenciano harbored any ill-will against appellant or that he had reasons to fabricate his testimony. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption is that the witness was not moved by any ill-will and was untainted by bias, and thus worthy of belief and credence.[38] Furthermore, appellant's immediate departure from the scene of the crime and successful effort to elude arrest until his apprehension more than five years later are not consistent with his claim of innocence. Flight from the scene of the crime and failure to immediately surrender militate against appellant's contention of innocence "since an innocent person will not hesitate to take prompt and necessary action to exonerate himself of the crime imputed to him."[39] | |||||
2012-04-16 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.[21] The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.[22] These elements were present when accused-appellant stabbed Santiago. We quote with approval the appellate court's finding on the presence of treachery: In the case at bar, the victim was caught off guard when appellant, without warning, stabbed him four times successively leaving the latter no chance at all to evade the knife thrusts and defend himself from appellant's onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that appellant's act of suddenly stabbing the victim leaving the latter no room for defense is a clear case of treachery.[23] x x x | |||||
2011-10-05 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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As previously stated, the RTC imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of death for each count of rape. The Court of Appeals modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346. It should be noted at this point that while Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of death penalty, the presence of a qualifying circumstance which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty would still cause the award of moral damages and civil indemnity to be increased each from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) under prevailing jurisprudence.[35] | |||||
2011-09-14 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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Particularly, in the case of unlawful aggression, People v. Gabrino, following the ruling in People v. Manulit,[35] explained, thus: Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger--not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's life.[36] | |||||
2011-03-09 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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In order that incomplete self-defense could prosper as a privileged mitigating circumstance, unlawful aggression must exist. In People v. Manulit,[27] People v. Mortera,[28] and Mendoza v. People,[29] We reiterated the well-settled rule that unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite in appreciating an incomplete self-defense. It is any one of the two other elements of self-defense that could be wanting in an incomplete self-defense, i.e., reasonable necessity of the means to employed to prevent or repel it; or lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself; but it can never be unlawful aggression.[30] |