This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2012-03-06 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In our December 18, 2008 Resolution, we set aside the December 12, 2005 Decision rendered by the First Division and recalled the entry of judgment. We ruled that neither the CA nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, a relief sought by the Barques in the administrative reconstitution proceedings. The Court En Banc proceeded with the reevaluation of the cases on a pro hac vice basis. During the oral arguments, there were controversial factual matters which emerged as the parties fully ventilated their respective claims, in the course of which the Barques' claim of ownership was found to be exceedingly weak. Indeed, both the LRA and CA erred in ruling that the Barques had the right to seek reconstitution of their purported title. Reevaluation of the evidence on record likewise indicated that the Manotoks' claim to title is just as flawed as that of the Barques. Following the approach in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.[1] also involving a Friar Land, Republic v. Court of Appeals[2] and Manotok Realty Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation,[3] the majority resolved to remand this case for reception of evidence on the parties' competing claims of ownership over Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate. Given the contentious factual issues, it was necessary for this Court to resolve the same for the complete determination of the present controversy involving a huge tract of friar land. It was thus not the first time the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the CA. | |||||
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2011-12-07 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Although the Bascon case involved the very same illegal strike in MCCHI which led to the termination of herein petitioners, its clearly erroneous application of the law insofar only as the award of back wages warrants setting aside the doctrine. Indeed, the doctrine of stare decisis notwithstanding, the Court has abandoned or overruled precedents whenever it realized that the Court erred in the prior decisions. "Afterall, more important than anything else is that this Court should be right." [58] | |||||
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2011-06-06 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. [44] | |||||
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2009-09-03 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action.[39] The Court may deem Engracia's heirs as private respondent's successors-in-interest, having acquired title to the subject property through private respondent after the commencement of petitioners' action for reconveyance of the same property. | |||||
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2009-03-31 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Comparing these titles to those of the ARANETA, it is apparent that no identity of the land could be found. The Supreme Court, in the case of Alonso v. Cebu City Country Club, Inc.[[72]] agreeing with the Court of Appeals' dissertation in said case, ruled that there is nothing fraudulent for a certificate of title to bear the same number as another title to another land. On this score, the Supreme Court elucidated as follows:"On the question that TCT No. RT-1310 (T-1151) bears the same number as another title to another land, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is nothing fraudulent with the fact that Cebu Country Club, Inc.'s reconstituted title bears the same number as the title of another parcel of land. This came about because under General Land Registration Office (GLRO) Circular No. 17, dated February 19, 1947, and Republic Act No. 26 and Circular No. 6, RD 3, dated August 5, 1946, which were in force at the time the title was reconstituted on July 26, 1946, the titles issued before the inauguration of the Philippine Republic were numbered consecutively and the titles issued after the inauguration were numbered also consecutively starting with No. 1, so that eventually, the titles issued before the inauguration were duplicated by titles issued after the inauguration of the Philippine Republic x x x." Parenthetically, in their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated 30 October 2008, DIMSON objected to the admissibility of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A on the ground that ARANETA failed to submit the original copies of these certificates of title and contended that the "originals" contain different "contents" from their own Exhibits M, N and Q.[[73]] The fact that the entries contained in ARANETA's pieces of evidence are different from that of DIMSON's do not automatically make ARANETA's exhibits inferior replications or a confirmation of their falsity. Interestingly, the objection regarding the non-submission of the "original copy" had not been raised by DIMSON in their Comments/Objections to Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence (Of Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.).[[74]] In any case, we find the objections unwarranted considering that certified true copies or certified microfilm copies of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A had been submitted by ARANETA in these proceedings. | |||||
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2008-08-29 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. "Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties." In this case, the action below is basically one for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance. "An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing." "Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded."[39] | |||||
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2008-06-17 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Finally, although the trial court was not convinced with respondent's claim of ownership over the subject property, this Court has held that reconstitution of a title "does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title."[24] As such, the ownership and possession of the subject property could still be litigated in a proper case. Also, respondent's possessory right cannot simply be defeated by petitioners' reconstituted title because "a reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby."[25] On the other hand, the nullity of petitioners' reconstitution proceedings does not necessarily divest them of their proprietary rights, if any, over the subject property; nor does it deprive them of any cause of action as they are not precluded from establishing by other evidence the requisite proof of their ownership of Lot No. 4829. | |||||
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2006-06-26 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| An award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses is proper when the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and litigation expenses should be recovered, and when the civil action or proceeding is clearly unfounded and where defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith. The award of attorney's fees as damages is the exception rather than the rule. It is not to be given to the defendant every time the latter prevails. The right to litigate is of great consequence that a penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it mistakenly unless, of course such party acted in bad faith. In this case, we could not award attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in the absence of showing of gross and evident bad faith in filing the action.[17] | |||||