This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2012-11-28 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The violation of an alleged requirement for the conduct of bidding in the sale of an SSS-acquired asset merely referred to "standard operating procedure." The Republic failed to point to a specific law, rule or public policy that has been violated by the resale to the previous owner of a property acquired by foreclosure. In view of such failure on the part of the Republic, the execution of the deed of conditional sale enjoys the presumptions that the ordinary course of business has been followed and that the law has been obeyed.[34] More importantly, the transaction between the parties involves the redemption by MMGHI of the property covered by TCT No. T-379 mortgaged to and foreclosed by the SSS. The policy of the law is to aid rather than defeat the right of redemption;[35] thus, public bidding is not a condition for redemption. | |||||
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2007-06-08 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| We also maintained in Cometa v. Court of Appeals that this Court allowed parties in several cases to perfect their right of redemption even beyond the prescribed period.[40] In the light of the established policy to aid rather than to defeat the right of redemption the redemption made by UNICOM is hereby upheld. | |||||
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2007-01-30 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Petitioners argue that the application of the law on prescription would perpetrate fraud and spawn injustice, they citing Cometa v. Court of Appeals;[9] and that at any rate, prescription does not lie against a co-owner. Cometa involves a different factual milieu concerning the right of redemption, however. And petitioners' contention that prescription does not lie against a co-owner fails because only the title covering the questioned property, which petitioners claim to solely own, is being assailed. | |||||
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2004-10-13 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Procedural rules are not to be disregarded or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules they are to be followed, except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[21] Here, the petitioner has not shown any persuasive reason why he should be exempt from abiding by the rules. Accordingly, the order declaring the petitioner in default and the denial of the motion to lift the order of default are juridically unassailable. | |||||
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2004-09-03 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| While Felomina sought to recover the litigated lot on the ground of implied trust and not on the invalidity of donation, the Court is clothed with ample authority to address the latter issue in order to arrive at a just decision that completely disposes of the controversy.[46] Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, they must be applied in a way that equitably and completely resolve the rights and obligations of the parties.[47] | |||||
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2003-12-05 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| In any event, not all the essential elements of laches are present. In Vergara vs. Vergara,[24] we held that the second element of laches namely, "delay in asserting plaintiff's rights, he having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit" is absent where the plaintiff has no knowledge of the doing of the act complained of; hence, the delay in asserting such right, occasioned by such lack of knowledge, cannot give rise to the defense of laches. As pointed out by Justice Melo in his Dissent, this element is not present in the case at bar, because | |||||
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2003-09-23 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Indeed, well-known is the rule that departures from procedure may be forgiven where they do not appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the parties.[27] Apropos in this regard is Cometa v. CA,[28] where we said that | |||||