This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2013-06-19 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| It is well settled that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause, and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and, therefore, illegal.[30] In this case, petitioners claim that respondent was validly dismissed as he abandoned his work as shown by the following circumstances, to wit: He did not go back to work on May 6, 2001, i.e, after his preventive suspension expired on May 5, 2001; he did not report to work despite receipt of the telegram on May 25, 2001 stating that "he was absent without official leave since May 5, 2001, and to notify CSI as soon as possible," but instead , through his lawyer, sent a letter asking for a copy of the result of the investigation; despite not being given the result of the investigation, respondent still did not bother to report back to work; and the complaint he filed with the LA did not pray for reinstatement. | |||||
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2011-05-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In New Pacific Timber,[14] which petitioner cited, we ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, using Article 218(c) as part basis, when it entertained the petition for relief filed by a party and treated it as an appeal, even if it was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing an appeal. Before that case, we invoked the same Labor Code provision in City Fair Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission[15] and Judy Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission[16] to justify our ruling that the NLRC did not abuse its discretion when it allowed in both cases the appeal of a party even if it was filed a day, or even a few days, late. Similarly, we held in Industrial Timber Corporation v. Ababon,[17] that substantial justice is best served by permitting the NLRC to allow a petition for relief filed by a party despite the earlier commission of a procedural defect of filing the motion for reconsideration three days late on the strength of Article 218(c) and other pertinent labor law provisions. In Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[18] we held that procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed in NLRC proceedings owing to the relaxation of technical rules of procedure in labor cases as well as to Article 218(c). We likewise held in Aguanza v. Asian Terminal, Inc.,[19] that the insufficiency of a supersedeas bond is a defect in form which the NLRC may waive. Furthermore, in Independent Sagay-Escalante Planters, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[20] we ruled that the NLRC had ample authority, under Article 218(c), to disregard the circumstance that the appeal fee had been tardily paid by one party and to order both parties to present evidence before the Labor Arbiter in support of their claims. Lastly, in Faeldonia v. Tong Yak Groceries[21] and Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena,[22] we used Article 218(c) to justify the NLRC's reversal of the Labor Arbiter's factual conclusions. However, in both cases, there was no objection that the NLRC passed upon issues that were not raised on appeal. | |||||
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2011-01-12 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| However, equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[14] But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts.[15] The CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence.[16] It is within the jurisdiction of the CA, whose jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to review the findings of the NLRC.[17] | |||||
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2010-12-08 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| "[T]he quantum of proof required in determining the legality of an employee's dismissal is only substantial evidence."[39] In a similar case involving PLDT and another installer/repairman, this Court held that "[T]the standard of substantial evidence is met where the employer, as in this case, has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation in such misconduct makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position." [40] | |||||
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2009-12-21 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| However, the doctrine in the said case has already been abandoned. The prevailing rule now is enunciated in the leading case Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,[22] wherein it was held that if the dismissal was for a just cause but procedural due process was not observed, the dismissal should be upheld; however, in lieu of payment of backwages, the employer shall be made liable to pay indemnity in the form of nominal damages, the amount of which is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account relevant circumstances. Prevailing jurisprudence sets the amount of nominal damages at P30,000.00, which the Court finds proper and sufficient in the present case.[23] Petitioners further contend that since Facto's dismissal was found by the CA to be legal, the appellate court should not have awarded service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and attorney's fees. | |||||