This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2015-09-02 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Moreover, appellant failed to establish the alleged ill-motive of Emelina in implicating him in the present case. No evidence was presented to show that the business of Emelina incurred losses that needed to be concealed from her business partners. Absent any improper motive to falsely testify against the appellant, Emelina's declarations are worthy of full faith and credence.[35] In like manner, Imee's employment as the domestic servant of Emelina is not a ground to disregard her testimony. Relationship alone is not enough reason to discredit and label Imee's testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. It is settled that the witness' relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.[36] | |||||
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2010-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Accused-appellant's attempt to mitigate his culpability by claiming that he voluntarily surrendered to the police immediately after being informed of the charges against him is futile. Jurisprudence requires that a surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous and must clearly indicate the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities[26] either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense incidental to his search and capture.[27] The following requisites should likewise be present: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed.[28] In this case, the accused-appellant surrendered only after having been informed of the charge of rape against him or about two months from the commission of the alleged crime.[29] He even denied the said charge upon his purported surrender. The alleged surrender, therefore, does not qualify as a mitigating circumstance.[30] | |||||
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2010-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Accused-appellant's attempt to mitigate his culpability by claiming that he voluntarily surrendered to the police immediately after being informed of the charges against him is futile. Jurisprudence requires that a surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous and must clearly indicate the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities[26] either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense incidental to his search and capture.[27] The following requisites should likewise be present: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed.[28] In this case, the accused-appellant surrendered only after having been informed of the charge of rape against him or about two months from the commission of the alleged crime.[29] He even denied the said charge upon his purported surrender. The alleged surrender, therefore, does not qualify as a mitigating circumstance.[30] | |||||
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2008-09-29 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly gave credence to Helen's explanation on the two-week delay in reporting the identity of the assailants in the killing of Eduardo. It is understandable that she was still reeling from extreme shock and grief due to the unexpected and gruesome death of Eduardo. In People v. Lapay,[50] we held that "delay in revealing the names of the malefactors does not, by itself, impair the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies." Time and again, this Court has ruled that "the nondisclosure by the witness to the police officers of [accused-appellant's] identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience."[51] It is already of judicial notice that family members of victims of violent crimes react to an unnatural occurrence in diverse ways. Some, if they have any information about the incident, would waste no time in telling the police everything they know. Others would rather choose, or are forced, to clam up and refuse to divulge any information they may possess. And then, there are the majority of family members who would first hesitate before they reveal what they know.[52] | |||||
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2007-11-28 |
TINGA, J, |
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| As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.[37] It is thus admissible to provide the identity of the accused and the deceased, to show the cause of death of the deceased, and the circumstances under which the assault was made upon him. The reasons for its admissibility is necessity and | |||||
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2004-05-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Considering the evidence at hand, an amount representing loss of the victim's earning capacity should be awarded to the victim's heirs. The victim's mother testified that her son was 25 years old and earning P180 a day, at the time of his premature death. The formula consistently used by the Court in determining life expectancy is, 2/3 x [80 - age of the victim at the time of death] x [reasonable portion of the victim's annual income].[44] The net earning is also ordinarily pegged at half of the gross earnings,[45] which in this case is P90 or half of P180 a day. Thus the annual net earning is P90 x 365 days = P32,850 as reasonable portion of the victim's annual income. Applying the formula, 2/3 (80 - 25) x P32,850 = P1,204,499.80, which is the amount representing damages due the heirs for victim's loss of earning capacity. | |||||