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JOSELITO R. MENDOZA v. COMELEC

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 207264 2013-10-22	REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMELEC PEREZ, J.
In Mendoza v. Commission on Elections,[38] the Court elaborated on the due process standards that apply to the COMELEC's proceedings: The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below:
	GR Nos. 206844-45 2013-07-23	COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v. Commission on Elections [47] the concept of due process as applied to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein that: The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below:
	GR No. 203302 2013-04-11	MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
Mendoza v. Commission on Elections[9] instructs that notice to the parties and their participation are required during the adversarial aspects of the proceedings. In that case, after the revision of the ballots and after the election protest case was submitted for decision, the ballots and ballot boxes were transferred to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) in connection with a protest case pending in the SET. Mendoza later learned that the COMELEC, with the permission of the SET, had meanwhile conducted proceedings within the SET's premises. Mendoza then claimed that his right to due process was violated because he had not been given notice by the COMELEC that it would be conducting further proceedings within the SET premises. The Court did not sustain his claim, however, and pointed out: After consideration of the respondents' Comments and the petitioner's petition and Reply, we hold that the contested proceedings at the SET ("contested proceedings["]) are no longer part of the adversarial aspects of the election contest that would require notice of hearing and the participation of the parties. As the COMELEC stated in its Comment and without any contrary or disputing claim in the petitioner's Reply:
	GR No. 203766 2013-04-02	ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
Under the present Constitution, the COMELEC is recognized as the sole authority in the enforcement and administration of election laws. This grant of power retraces its history in the 1935 Constitution. From then, the powers and functions of the COMELEC had continuously been expounded to respond to the call of contemporary times. In Mendoza v. Commission on Elections,[144] the Court briefly noted: Historically, the COMELEC has always been an administrative agency whose powers have been increased from the 1935 Constitution to the present one, to reflect the country's awareness of the need to provide greater regulation and protection to our electoral processes to ensure their integrity. In the 1935 Constitution, the powers and functions of the COMEsLEC were defined as follows:
	GR Nos. 187958 2010-04-07	MAYOR ABRAHAM N. TOLENTINO v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
According to Mendoza v. Commission on Elections,[31] the COMELEC does not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election contest by reason of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET, because its jurisdiction over provincial election contest exists side by side with the jurisdiction of the SET, with each tribunal being supreme in its respective areas of concern, with neither being higher than the other in terms of precedence; hence, the jurisdiction of one must yield to the other.
	GR No. 191084 2010-03-25	JOSELITO R. MENDOZA v. COMELEC PEREZ, J.
Indeed, the grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is patent in the fact that despite the existence in its books of the clearly worded Section 6 of Rule 18, which incidentally has been acknowledged by this Court in the recent case of Marcoleta v. COMELEC,[5] it completely ignored and disregarded its very own decree and proceeded with the questioned Resolution of 8 February 2010 and Order of 4 March 2010, in all, annulling the proclamation of petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza as the duly elected governor of Bulacan, declaring respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan as the duly elected governor, and ordering petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza to cease and desist from performing the functions of the Governor of Bulacan and to vacate said office in favor of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan.
	GR No. 191084 2010-03-25	JOSELITO R. MENDOZA v. COMELEC PEREZ, J.
As regards the 7 ballots cast in favor of De Guzman which were rejected as written-by-one in Precinct 27A Mabini, the COMELEC should have considered the data reflected in the Minutes of Voting Precinct 27A Mabini. It shows the existence of 24 illiterate or physically disabled voters which necessitated voting by assistors pursuant to Section 196 of B.P. Blg. 881 which does not allow an assistor to assist more that three times except the non-party members of the board of election inspectors. There is no showing that the 7 rejected ballots is the same as that appearing in the Minutes of Voting. All of the 7 assailed ballots were cast in favor of De Guzman. Consequently, four ballots should be appreciated in his favor it being reasonably presumed that the identically written ballots were prepared by the assistor, not only for three illiterate or physically disabled voters but also for himself. Hence, added to the 38 votes, De Guzman won the election by 42 votes.[7]