Lawyerly

GR No. 168703

2013-02-26

RAMON G. NAZARENO v. MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING INC.

PERALTA, J.

In the case at bar, the CA relied on the provisions of Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA-SEC[20] and the ruling of this Court in German Marine Agencies, Inc. v NLRC,[21] in concluding that the disability of a seafarer can only be determined by a company-designated physician and not the seafarer's own doctors.

GR No. 165935

2012-02-08

BRIGHT MARITIME CORPORATION /DESIREE P. TENORIO v. RICARDO B. FANTONIAL

PERALTA, J.

Further, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that petitioner BMC is liable to respondent for exemplary damages,[27] which are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in view of petitioner's act of preventing respondent from being deployed on the ground that he was not yet declared fit to work on the date of his departure, despite evidence to the contrary. Such act, if tolerated, would prejudice the employment opportunities of our seafarers who are qualified to be deployed, but prevented to do so by a manning agency for unjustified reasons. Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.[28] In this case, petitioner should be held liable to respondent for exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00,[29] following the recent case of Claudio S. Yap v. Thenamaris Ship's Management, et al.,[30] instead of P10,000.00

GR No. 187032

2010-10-18

EDGARDO M. PANGANIBAN v. TARA TRADING SHIPMANAGEMENT INC.

MENDOZA, J.

Although strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits, the Court cannot just disregard the provisions of the POEA SEC. Significantly, a seaman is a contractual and not a regular employee. His employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. Petitioner and respondents entered into a contract of employment. It was approved by the POEA on October 25, 2005 and, thus, served as the law between the parties. Undisputedly, Section 20-B of the POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA-SEC) provides for compensation and benefits for injury or illness suffered by a seafarer. It says that, in order to claim disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the `company-designated' physician who must proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. In German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC,[31] the Court's discussion on the seafarer's claim for disability benefits is enlightening. Thus: [In] order to claim disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the "company-designated" physician who must proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. There is no provision requiring accreditation by the POEA of such physician. In fact, aside from their own gratuitous allegations, petitioners are unable to cite a single provision in the said contract in support of their assertions or to offer any credible evidence to substantiate their claim. If accreditation of the company-designated physician was contemplated by the POEA, it would have expressly provided for such a qualification, by specifically using the term "accreditation" in the Standard Employment Contract, to denote its intention. For instance, under the Labor Code, it is expressly provided that physicians and hospitals providing medical care to an injured or sick employee covered by the Social Security System or the Government Service Insurance System must be accredited by the Employees Compensation Commission. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. There is no ambiguity in the wording of the Standard Employment Contract - the only qualification prescribed for the physician entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability is that he be `company-designated.' When the language of the contract is explicit, as in the case at bar, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters thereof, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import. [Emphasis supplied]

GR No. 172933

2008-10-06

JESUS E. VERGARA v. HAMMONIA MARITIME SERVICES

BRION, J.

The petitioner laments that the CA accorded much weight to the company-designated physician's declaration that he was fit to work.[15] He considers this a strict and parochial interpretation of the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA. While these documents provide that it is the company doctor who must certify a seafarer as permanently unfit for further sea service, this literal interpretation, to the petitioner, is absurd and contrary to public policy; its effect is to deny and deprive the ailing seaman of his basic right to seek immediate attention from any competent physician. He invokes in this regard our ruling in German Marine Agencies, Inc. et al., v. National Labor Relations Commission.[16]

GR No. 164403

2008-03-04

COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION v. PABLO NAGRAMA

REYES, R.T., J.

This was reiterated in German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission:[57]

GR No. 158073

2007-11-23

ALEX M. CADORNIGARA v. NLRC

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

As provided under Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who must certify that petitioner has suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of his employment.[30] While such certification is not conclusive,[31] to impugn the same, petitioner must indicate facts or evidence of record that contradict such finding[32] or present the contrary opinion of his appointed physician.[33]

GR NO. 165156

2007-04-02

SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. v. JAYCEE DEE

CORONA, J.

(A) THE LATTER STUCK TO THIS HONORABLE COURT'S PRECEDENT-SETTING RULING IN GERMAN MARINE AGENCIES V. NLRC,[14] THAT IT IS THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN WHO MUST ASSESS THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF DISABILITY OF AN INJURED SEAFARER.

GR NO. 166714

2007-02-09

AMELIA S. ROBERTS v. MARTIN B. PAPIO

CALLEJO, SR., J.

As gleaned from the April 13, 1982 deed, the right of respondent to repurchase the property is not incorporated therein. The contract is one of absolute sale and not one with right to repurchase. The law states that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.[56] When the language of the contract is explicit, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import.[57] The clear terms of the contract should never be the subject matter of interpretation. Neither abstract justice nor the rule of liberal interpretation justifies the creation of a contract for the parties which they did not make themselves, or the imposition upon one party to a contract or obligation to assume simply or merely to avoid seeming hardships.[58] Their true meaning must be enforced, as it is to be presumed that the contracting parties know their scope and effects.[59] As the Court held in Villarica, et al. v. Court of Appeals:[60]

GR No. 157493

2007-02-05

OESMER v. PARAISO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

WITNESS: Yes, sir, they violated what we have agreed upon.[17] We also cannot sustain the allegation of the petitioners that assuming the signatures indicate consent, such consent was merely conditional, and that, the effectivity of the alleged Contract to Sell was subject to the suspensive condition that the sale be approved by all the co-owners. The Contract to Sell is clear enough. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control.[18] The terms of the Contract to Sell made no mention of the condition that before it can become valid and binding, a unanimous consent of all the heirs is necessary. Thus, when the language of the contract is explicit, as in the present case, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the parties thereto, the literal meaning of its stipulation is controlling.

GR NO. 154156

2006-08-31

JMA HOUSE INCORPORATED v. STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL

CALLEJO, SR., J.

On the second issue, the law is that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.[59] When the language of the contract is explicit, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import.[60] The clear terms of the contract should never be the subject matter of interpretation. Neither abstract justice nor the rule of liberal interpretation justifies the creation of a contract for the parties which they did not make themselves or the imposition upon one party to a contract or obligation not assumed simply or merely to avoid seeming hardships.[61] Their true meaning must be enforced, as it is to be presumed that the contracting parties know their scope and effects.[62] If the parties execute two or more separate writings covering a common transaction and subject matter, the writings should be read and interpreted together to render the parties' intention effective.[63] On the other hand, if the contract is ambiguous or the contracting parties offer conflicting claims on their intent, the trial court, at the first instance, has to ascertain the true intent of the parties, taking into account the contemporaneous and subsequent conduct, actions and words of the parties material to the case,[64] and pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real intent of the parties and undertaking shall be considered. It is the parties' intention which shall be accorded primordial consideration. The reasonableness of the result obtained, after analysis and construction of the contract/contracts, must also be carefully considered.[65] The ascertained intention of the parties is deemed an integral part of the contract, as though it had been originally expressed in unequivocal terms. The Court will enforce the true agreement of the parties even if the property in question has already been registered and a new transfer certificate of title is issued in the name of the transferee.[66]

GR No. 160315

2005-11-11

LOURDES D. RIVERA v. WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES

CALLEJO, SR., J.

In German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC,[30] the Court resolved the issue of whether the physician, who makes the pronouncement as to the existence and grade of the seafarer's disability, should be POEA accredited. The Court's discussion therein is quite instructive:... In order to claim disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the "company-designated" physician who must proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. There is no provision requiring accreditation by the POEA of such physician. In fact, aside from their own gratuitous allegations, petitioners are unable to cite a single provision in the said contract in support of their assertions or to offer any credible evidence to substantiate their claim. If accreditation of the company-designated physician was contemplated by the POEA, it would have expressly provided for such a qualification, by specifically using the term "accreditation" in the Standard Employment Contract, to denote its intention. For instance, under the Labor Code, it is expressly provided that physicians and hospitals providing medical care to an injured or sick employee covered by the Social Security System or the Government Service Insurance System must be accredited by the Employees Compensation Commission. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. There is no ambiguity in the wording of the Standard Employment Contract the only qualification prescribed for the physician entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability is that he be "company-designated." When the language of the contract is explicit, as in the case at bar, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters thereof, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import.[31]

GR No. 137680

2004-02-06

CONCEPT PLACEMENT RESOURCES v. RICHARD V. FUNK

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Significantly, in German Marine Agencies, Inc. vs. NLRC,[8] we held that there must always be a factual basis for the award of attorney's fees. Here, since petitioner agreed to be represented by respondent as counsel in the labor case and to pay him his attorney's fees, it must abide with its agreement which has the force of law between them.[9]

	GR No. 168703 2013-02-26	RAMON G. NAZARENO v. MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING INC. PERALTA, J.
In the case at bar, the CA relied on the provisions of Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA-SEC[20] and the ruling of this Court in German Marine Agencies, Inc. v NLRC,[21] in concluding that the disability of a seafarer can only be determined by a company-designated physician and not the seafarer's own doctors.
	GR No. 165935 2012-02-08	BRIGHT MARITIME CORPORATION /DESIREE P. TENORIO v. RICARDO B. FANTONIAL PERALTA, J.
Further, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that petitioner BMC is liable to respondent for exemplary damages,[27] which are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in view of petitioner's act of preventing respondent from being deployed on the ground that he was not yet declared fit to work on the date of his departure, despite evidence to the contrary. Such act, if tolerated, would prejudice the employment opportunities of our seafarers who are qualified to be deployed, but prevented to do so by a manning agency for unjustified reasons. Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.[28] In this case, petitioner should be held liable to respondent for exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00,[29] following the recent case of Claudio S. Yap v. Thenamaris Ship's Management, et al.,[30] instead of P10,000.00
	GR No. 187032 2010-10-18	EDGARDO M. PANGANIBAN v. TARA TRADING SHIPMANAGEMENT INC. MENDOZA, J.
Although strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits, the Court cannot just disregard the provisions of the POEA SEC. Significantly, a seaman is a contractual and not a regular employee. His employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. Petitioner and respondents entered into a contract of employment. It was approved by the POEA on October 25, 2005 and, thus, served as the law between the parties. Undisputedly, Section 20-B of the POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA-SEC) provides for compensation and benefits for injury or illness suffered by a seafarer. It says that, in order to claim disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the `company-designated' physician who must proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. In German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC,[31] the Court's discussion on the seafarer's claim for disability benefits is enlightening. Thus: [In] order to claim disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the "company-designated" physician who must proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. There is no provision requiring accreditation by the POEA of such physician. In fact, aside from their own gratuitous allegations, petitioners are unable to cite a single provision in the said contract in support of their assertions or to offer any credible evidence to substantiate their claim. If accreditation of the company-designated physician was contemplated by the POEA, it would have expressly provided for such a qualification, by specifically using the term "accreditation" in the Standard Employment Contract, to denote its intention. For instance, under the Labor Code, it is expressly provided that physicians and hospitals providing medical care to an injured or sick employee covered by the Social Security System or the Government Service Insurance System must be accredited by the Employees Compensation Commission. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. There is no ambiguity in the wording of the Standard Employment Contract - the only qualification prescribed for the physician entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability is that he be `company-designated.' When the language of the contract is explicit, as in the case at bar, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters thereof, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import. [Emphasis supplied]
	GR No. 172933 2008-10-06	JESUS E. VERGARA v. HAMMONIA MARITIME SERVICES BRION, J.
The petitioner laments that the CA accorded much weight to the company-designated physician's declaration that he was fit to work.[15] He considers this a strict and parochial interpretation of the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA. While these documents provide that it is the company doctor who must certify a seafarer as permanently unfit for further sea service, this literal interpretation, to the petitioner, is absurd and contrary to public policy; its effect is to deny and deprive the ailing seaman of his basic right to seek immediate attention from any competent physician. He invokes in this regard our ruling in German Marine Agencies, Inc. et al., v. National Labor Relations Commission.[16]
	GR No. 164403 2008-03-04	COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION v. PABLO NAGRAMA REYES, R.T., J.
This was reiterated in German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission:[57]
	GR No. 158073 2007-11-23	ALEX M. CADORNIGARA v. NLRC AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
As provided under Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who must certify that petitioner has suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of his employment.[30] While such certification is not conclusive,[31] to impugn the same, petitioner must indicate facts or evidence of record that contradict such finding[32] or present the contrary opinion of his appointed physician.[33]
	GR NO. 165156 2007-04-02	SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. v. JAYCEE DEE CORONA, J.
(A) THE LATTER STUCK TO THIS HONORABLE COURT'S PRECEDENT-SETTING RULING IN GERMAN MARINE AGENCIES V. NLRC,[14] THAT IT IS THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN WHO MUST ASSESS THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF DISABILITY OF AN INJURED SEAFARER.
	GR NO. 166714 2007-02-09	AMELIA S. ROBERTS v. MARTIN B. PAPIO CALLEJO, SR., J.
As gleaned from the April 13, 1982 deed, the right of respondent to repurchase the property is not incorporated therein. The contract is one of absolute sale and not one with right to repurchase. The law states that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.[56] When the language of the contract is explicit, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import.[57] The clear terms of the contract should never be the subject matter of interpretation. Neither abstract justice nor the rule of liberal interpretation justifies the creation of a contract for the parties which they did not make themselves, or the imposition upon one party to a contract or obligation to assume simply or merely to avoid seeming hardships.[58] Their true meaning must be enforced, as it is to be presumed that the contracting parties know their scope and effects.[59] As the Court held in Villarica, et al. v. Court of Appeals:[60]
	GR No. 157493 2007-02-05	OESMER v. PARAISO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
WITNESS: Yes, sir, they violated what we have agreed upon.[17] We also cannot sustain the allegation of the petitioners that assuming the signatures indicate consent, such consent was merely conditional, and that, the effectivity of the alleged Contract to Sell was subject to the suspensive condition that the sale be approved by all the co-owners. The Contract to Sell is clear enough. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control.[18] The terms of the Contract to Sell made no mention of the condition that before it can become valid and binding, a unanimous consent of all the heirs is necessary. Thus, when the language of the contract is explicit, as in the present case, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the parties thereto, the literal meaning of its stipulation is controlling.
	GR NO. 154156 2006-08-31	JMA HOUSE INCORPORATED v. STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL CALLEJO, SR., J.
On the second issue, the law is that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.[59] When the language of the contract is explicit, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import.[60] The clear terms of the contract should never be the subject matter of interpretation. Neither abstract justice nor the rule of liberal interpretation justifies the creation of a contract for the parties which they did not make themselves or the imposition upon one party to a contract or obligation not assumed simply or merely to avoid seeming hardships.[61] Their true meaning must be enforced, as it is to be presumed that the contracting parties know their scope and effects.[62] If the parties execute two or more separate writings covering a common transaction and subject matter, the writings should be read and interpreted together to render the parties' intention effective.[63] On the other hand, if the contract is ambiguous or the contracting parties offer conflicting claims on their intent, the trial court, at the first instance, has to ascertain the true intent of the parties, taking into account the contemporaneous and subsequent conduct, actions and words of the parties material to the case,[64] and pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real intent of the parties and undertaking shall be considered. It is the parties' intention which shall be accorded primordial consideration. The reasonableness of the result obtained, after analysis and construction of the contract/contracts, must also be carefully considered.[65] The ascertained intention of the parties is deemed an integral part of the contract, as though it had been originally expressed in unequivocal terms. The Court will enforce the true agreement of the parties even if the property in question has already been registered and a new transfer certificate of title is issued in the name of the transferee.[66]
	GR No. 160315 2005-11-11	LOURDES D. RIVERA v. WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES CALLEJO, SR., J.
In German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC,[30] the Court resolved the issue of whether the physician, who makes the pronouncement as to the existence and grade of the seafarer's disability, should be POEA accredited. The Court's discussion therein is quite instructive:... In order to claim disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the "company-designated" physician who must proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. There is no provision requiring accreditation by the POEA of such physician. In fact, aside from their own gratuitous allegations, petitioners are unable to cite a single provision in the said contract in support of their assertions or to offer any credible evidence to substantiate their claim. If accreditation of the company-designated physician was contemplated by the POEA, it would have expressly provided for such a qualification, by specifically using the term "accreditation" in the Standard Employment Contract, to denote its intention. For instance, under the Labor Code, it is expressly provided that physicians and hospitals providing medical care to an injured or sick employee covered by the Social Security System or the Government Service Insurance System must be accredited by the Employees Compensation Commission. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. There is no ambiguity in the wording of the Standard Employment Contract the only qualification prescribed for the physician entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability is that he be "company-designated." When the language of the contract is explicit, as in the case at bar, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters thereof, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import.[31]
	GR No. 137680 2004-02-06	CONCEPT PLACEMENT RESOURCES v. RICHARD V. FUNK SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Significantly, in German Marine Agencies, Inc. vs. NLRC,[8] we held that there must always be a factual basis for the award of attorney's fees. Here, since petitioner agreed to be represented by respondent as counsel in the labor case and to pay him his attorney's fees, it must abide with its agreement which has the force of law between them.[9]

GERMAN MARINE AGENCIES v. NLRC