This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2007-02-27 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Moreover, where, as in the case at bar, there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive for a prosecution witness to bear false testimony against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, his or her testimony should be given full faith and credit.[44] | |||||
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2007-02-06 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Case law has established that in invoking self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of justifying circumstance, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[30] | |||||
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2007-02-06 |
TINGA, J. |
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| the offender was not actually arrested; (b) he surrendered to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (c) his surrender was voluntary.[48] There must be showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare them the trouble and expense concomitant to his capture.[49] The records show that appellant did not surrender but was arrested in his residence by SPO4 Cuison. This arresting officer even had to go twice to appellant's home to effect the arrest, because during the first attempt, appellant would not come out of his house and his mother refused to turn him over to the arresting officer.[50] | |||||
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2006-10-23 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for William, the Court gives more weight to those of the former. The Court also gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals.[34] Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and weight having had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.[35] | |||||
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2006-09-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The fact that appellant sustained an injury on his head, allegedly caused by Norman's ice-pick, does not signify that he was a victim of unlawful aggression or that he acted in self-defense.[38] The physician who treated appellant testified that the latter was diagnosed on 26 October 1999, the day after the hacking incident; that appellant was discharged on the same day he was treated in the hospital since he was only an out-patient; and that at the time he examined the head injury of appellant, it was already on its healing stage.[39] It is clear from the foregoing that appellant's head injury was not serious or severe. The cause of the same is likewise doubtful. Thus, the superficiality of the injury sustained by appellant is no indication that his life and limb were in actual peril.[40] | |||||
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2006-05-02 |
TINGA, J. |
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| We find no reason to disturb the evaluation of the trial court and the Court of Appeals of the credibility of the testimonies of private respondents' witnesses. It is a settled rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals. And when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.[11] | |||||
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2003-12-08 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| As to his relationship with private respondents, this Court has repeatedly held that a witness' relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.[30] While this principle is often applied in criminal cases, we deem that the same principle may apply in this case, albeit civil in nature. If a witness' relationship with a party does not ipso facto render him a biased witness in criminal cases where the quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason why the same principle should not apply in civil cases where the quantum of evidence is only preponderance of evidence. | |||||
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2001-09-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, accused-appellant must prove that: (1) he had not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare them the trouble and expense concomitant to his capture.[20] | |||||