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CONCHITO J. OCLARIT v. MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	AM NO. RTJ-06-2009 2006-07-27	JOSE B. TIONGCO v. JUDGE EVELYN E. SALAO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As may be gleaned from the above-quoted provision, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory. Squarely applicable is the case of Oclarit v. Paderanga,[5] when we ruled that -
	AM NO. RTJ-06-1972 2006-06-21	JOHN PANALIGAN v. JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is well-settled that the power to declare a person in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the administration of justice. Judges, however, are enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindication.[10] The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because the power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[11] Only occasionally should the court invoke the inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.[12]
	GR No. 136760 2003-07-29	SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE v. JOSE B. MAJADUCON YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
In this connection, it bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.[14] This was aptly expressed in the case of Nazareno v. Barnes:[15]
	GR No. 100633 2001-08-28	SOCORRO ABELLA SORIANO v. CA PARDO, J.
After a perusal of the charges of direct contempt of court, we find that Atty. Padilla's innuendoes are not necessarily disrespectful to the court as to be considered contumacious. A lawyer's remarks explaining his position in a case under consideration do not necessarily assume the level of contempt that justifies the court to exercise the power of contempt.[83] Courts must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be used sparingly in cases of clearly contumacious behavior in facie curiae.[84] The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle,[85] and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.[86] The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[87]