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PEOPLE v. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA

This case has been cited 11 times or more.

2014-04-08
MENDOZA, J.
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.[35] The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.[36] The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.[37]
2010-12-07
MENDOZA, J.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President's power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency - is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]
2010-12-07
MENDOZA, J.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.[53] One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,[54] the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled: The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.  Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law.  With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained.  Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
2009-03-02
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
We are not convinced that respondent Dumlao was unfairly discriminated against and his constitutional right to equal protection violated. It must be remembered that the manner in which the prosecution of the case is handled is within the sound discretion of the prosecutor, and the non-inclusion of other guilty persons is irrelevant to the case against the accused.[33] We find that there was no clear and intentional discrimination in charging respondent Dumlao. A discriminatory purpose is never presumed.[34] It must be remembered that it was not solely respondent who was charged, but also five of the seven board members. If, indeed, there were discrimination, respondent Dumlao alone could have been charged. But this was not the case. Further, the fact that the dismissal of the case against his co-accused Canlas and Clave was not appealed is not sufficient to cry discrimination. This is likewise true for the non-inclusion of the two government officials who signed the Lease-Purchase Agreement and the other two board members. Mere speculation, unsupported by convincing evidence, cannot establish discrimination on the part of the prosecution and the denial to respondent of the equal protection of the laws.
2008-07-04
VELASCO JR., J.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elements concur: First, the offender does not have the required license or authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Second, the offender undertook (1) recruitment and placement activity defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code or (2) any prohibited practice under Art. 34 of the same code. Illegal recruitment is qualified into large scale, when three or more persons, individually or as group, are victimized.[11]
2007-01-27
CALLEJO, SR., J.
It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.[17] As the Court held in People v. Sagaydo:[18]
2004-12-15
PUNO, J.
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.[35] (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
2004-12-15
PUNO, J.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.[40]
2004-07-29
PANGANIBAN, J.
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution, petitioner x x x is immune from criminal prosecution. And In light of the foregoing, in denying petitioner['s] x x x right to equal protection of the laws."[12] Simply stated, the issues are as follows:  (1) whether Section 5 of Republic Act 3019 is unconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is vague; (3) whether there was a valid preliminary investigation; (4) whether the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription; and (5) whether petitioner is immune from criminal prosecution under then Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution.
2001-11-19
BELLOSILLO, J.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."[19]