This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2010-10-13 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| "A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff's complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred x x x if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other claim is permissive."[40] "[The] Court has already laid down the following tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, to wit: (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court?"[41] The fourth test is the `compelling test of compulsoriness'.[42] | |||||
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2006-07-12 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Unfortunately, they did not question the Conversion Order dated 22 January 1975 in the manner and within the period stated above. Instead, Emiliano Berboso (acting as successor-in-interest of his deceased father, Macario Berboso, and in representation of his siblings petitioners Berbosos), together with private respondents Carloses, chose to file with the DARAB a Joint Motion to Determine Amount of the Disturbance Compensation on 7 October 1989. When the DARAB rendered a Decision on 18 December 1989 fixing the amount of disturbance compensation due to Emiliano Berboso at P112,644.00, Emiliano Berboso and petitioners Berbosos contested the lawfulness of the said amount by filing a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. It was only on 9 December 1992, or after 17 years from the issuance of the 22 January 1975 Conversion Order that they questioned the validity of the said Conversion Order when they filed a Petition[46] with the Office of the DAR Secretary for the cancellation of the same. By then, the period for petitioners Berbosos to question the Conversion Order had long since expired. Hence, they are now barred from assailing the said Order under the doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[47] Once final and executory, the Conversion Order can no longer be questioned.[48] | |||||
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2005-04-12 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| After Bertuldo vigorously participated in all stages of the case before the trial court and even invoked the trial court's authority in order to ask for affirmative relief, petitioners, considering that they merely stepped into the shoes of their predecessor, are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. Although the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel.[52] | |||||
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2005-03-28 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB were bereft of jurisdiction to rule on the complaint filed by Catolico, petitioner, at the earliest opportunity, neither raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction before the PNP Inspectorate Division nor with the NAB but only before the appellate court.[43] Despite the existence of a jurisprudential rule[44] that jurisdictional question may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, an equitable exceptional rule has also been laid down by this Court bars a party from raising jurisdictional question on ground of laches or estoppel.[45] Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the action, a party may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court's jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.[46] | |||||
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2004-06-08 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Finally, petitioner argues private respondents' counterclaims are merely permissive, which require payment of docket fees. Indeed, before the trial court may acquire jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims, docket fees thereon must first be paid.[15] However, we find that the counterclaims herein are not permissive, but compulsory. [16] On this point, Section 7, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent:SEC. 7. Compulsory counterclaim. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount. | |||||