This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2003-10-06 |
PER CURIAM |
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| In People v. Perez,[19] the word "instrument or object" was construed to include a human finger. The Court reiterated its ruling in People v. Soriano[20] and People v. Bun.[21] The Anti-Rape Law transformed and reclassified rape as a felony against persons, under Title Eight, Chapter Two, Book II of the same Code.[22] The criminalization of the penetration of a person's sex organ or anal orifice and the insertion of a person's penis into the mouth or anal orifice of another, whether man or woman, and the classification thereof as rape (sexual assault) were designed to prevent not only the physical injuries inflicted on the victim but also his subjection to personal indignity and degradation and affront to the psychological integrity associated with an unwanted violation.[23] An unconsented intrusion by whatever object or instrumentality chosen by the perpetrator, whether animate or inanimate, is prohibited by the law.[24] The fact that only digital penetration occurred did not lessen the victim's fear and humiliation or the violation of her bodily integrity.[25] The public prosecutor should thus have filed two separate Informations against the appellant, one for rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 for the insertion by him of his penis into the vagina of the victim, and rape (sexual assault) under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the law for inserting his finger into the victim's vagina. However, only one information was filed against the appellant, for rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Code. The appellant cannot thus be convicted of rape (sexual assault) under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, since he was not charged with the said crime. | |||||
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2002-10-28 |
Mendoza, J. |
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| nature of the crime of rape where generally only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[11] Applying these principles, we find that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant is charged with rape committed through threat and intimidation.[12] The question is whether accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of complainant as a result of the threat or intimidation employed by him. | |||||