This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2014-11-17 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| The search made was not among the enumerated instances. Certainly, it was not of a moving vehicle, a customs search, or a search incidental to a lawful arrest. There could not have been a seizure in plain view as the seized item was allegedly found inside the left pocket of accused-appellant's pants. Neither was it a stop-and-frisk situation. While this type may seemingly fall under the consented search exception, we reiterate that "[c]onsent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.[20] | |||||
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2012-08-29 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| On the other hand, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of the following exceptions, namely: (a) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;[19] (b) seizure of evidence under plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry search); and (g) exigent and emergency circumstances.[20] In these exceptional situations, the necessity for a search warrant is dispensed with. | |||||
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2012-02-29 |
SERENO, J. |
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| Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.[17] It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.[18] | |||||
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2012-02-29 |
SERENO, J. |
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| Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.[19] In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search. | |||||
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2009-11-27 |
ABAD, J. |
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| It would have been impractical for the police to apply with the appropriate court for a search warrant since their suspicion found factual support only at the moment accused Eusebio Quebral, Fernando Lopez, and Zenaida Quebral rendezvoused with Michael Salvador at the Petron gas station for the hand over of the drugs.An immediate search was warranted since they would have gone away by the time the police could apply for a search warrant.[8] The drugs could be easily transported and concealed with impunity.[9] | |||||
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2008-11-19 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is provided for under Section 2, Article III thereof.[43] The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution also bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.[44] The fact that the present case is administrative in nature does not render the above principle inoperative. As expounded in Zulueta v. Court of Appeals,[45] any violation of the aforestated constitutional right renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. | |||||
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2007-09-03 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust which could amount to outright harassment. Surely, the policy consideration behind the exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of the police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle.[33] | |||||
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2007-02-22 |
TINGA, J. |
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| In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.[37] | |||||