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GR No. 188995

2011-08-24

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. JOSE PULIDO

BERSAMIN, J.

On January 16, 2001,[6] the Court promulgated its decision in G.R. No. 137285, disposing:

GR No. 164195

2009-12-04

APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA

BERSAMIN, J.

The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.[40] Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.[41] It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.[42] The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.[43] (Emphases supplied.)

GR No. 164195

2009-12-04

APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA

BERSAMIN, J.

Just compensation, thus, must embrace not only the correct (real, substantial, full and ample) determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land but also its payment within a reasonable time from the taking of the land to enable the landowners to cope with the loss; otherwise, interest in the nature of damages from the time of the taking of the property up to the actual payment of just compensation, is in order.[45]

GR No. 169914

2008-04-18

ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone ,[137] we ruled that the establishment of an export processing zone is a legitimate public purpose notwithstanding that portion of the land was leased to private commercial banks:... The expropriation of Lot 1406-B for the purpose of being leased to [commercial] banks and for the construction of a [transportation] terminal has the purpose of making banking and transportation facilities easily accessible to the persons working at the industries located in [the Philippine Export Processing Zone].[138]

GR NO. 150640

2007-03-22

BARANGAY SINDALAN v. CA

Another vital requisite for a valid condemnation is the payment of just compensation to the property owner. In the recent case of APO Fruits Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,[18] just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator," and that the gauge for computation is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. In order for the payment to be "just," it must be real, substantial, full, and ample. Not only must the payment be fair and correctly determined, but also, the Court in Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone stressed that the payment should be made within a "reasonable time" from the taking of the property.[19] It succinctly explained that without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of the land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. Thus, once just compensation is finally determined, the expropriator must immediately pay the amount to the lot owner. In Reyes v. National Housing Authority, it was ruled that 12% interest per annum shall be imposed on the final compensation until paid.[20] Thus, any further delay in the payment will result in the imposition of 12% interest per annum. However, in the recent case of Republic v. Lim, the Court enunciated the rule that "where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property."[21]

GR NO. 164195

2007-02-06

APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.[62] Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.[63] It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.[64] The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.[65]

GR NO. 161957

2007-01-22

JORGE GONZALES v. CLIMAX MINING LTD.

TINGA, J.

The situation in B.F. Corporation is not availing in the present petition. The disquisition in B.F. Corporation led to the conclusion that in order that the question of jurisdiction may be resolved, the appellate court had to deal first with a question of law which could be addressed in a certiorari proceeding. In the present case, Gonzales's petition raises a question of law, but not a question of jurisdiction. Judge Pimentel acted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in R.A. No. 876 when he ordered Gonzales to proceed with arbitration and appointed a sole arbitrator after making the determination that there was indeed an arbitration agreement. It has been held that as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a special civil action of certiorari.[32] Even if we overlook the employment of the wrong remedy in the broader interests of justice, the petition would nevertheless be dismissed for failure of Gonzalez to show grave abuse of discretion.

GR NO. 166429

2005-12-19

REPUBLIC v. HENRICK F. GINGOYON

TINGA, J.

In Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA),[113] we allowed the lease by the PEZA of the property under expropriation to third parties even before payment of just compensation. PEZA's charter provided it "substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the expropriated property would be utilized."[114] Thus, the Court declared that it would not question the lease because it was in furtherance of the public purpose of the expropriation.[115]

GR NO. 162814-17

2005-08-25

JOSE F. MANACOP v. EQUITABLE PCIBANK

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Equitable Bank's reliance on Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone[46] is misplaced. In that case, resort by the respondent to a special civil action was justified, even as the reglementary period for the proper remedy of appeal had already lapsed, because the assailed order of the trial court set aside an expropriation order that had long become final and executory. The Court declared therein that the trial court clearly acted beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final and executory order. The questioned order of the trial court in that case was a patent nullity.

GR No. 144440

2004-09-01

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION

TINGA, J.

Consideration of the general philosophy and thrust of the EPZA Law cannot be evaded. The export processing zone is intended to be a viable commercial, industrial and investment area.[12] The enunciated policy of the EPZA Law is to encourage and promote foreign commerce as a means of making the Philippines a center of international trade; strengthening our export trade and foreign exchange position; hastening industrialization; reducing domestic unemployment; and accelerating the development of the country, by establishing export processing zones in strategic locations in the Philippines.[13]

GR No. 154411

2003-06-19

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.[29] The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable.[30] An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.[31] Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.[32]

GR No. 132358

2002-04-12

MILA YAP SUMNDAD v. JOHN WILLIAM HARRIGAN

QUISUMBING, J.

Given our disquisition that the complaint for sum of money was instituted with the proper court, petitioner's remedy before the appellate court should have been a timely appeal and not certiorari. Therefore, the appellate court was correct in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari for being time-barred. Indeed, certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, especially if such loss was occasioned by one's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.[35] As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari.[36]

GR No. 143781

2002-02-27

JOSE CLAVANO v. HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD AND SPS. ENRIQUE AND VENUS TENAZAS

BELLOSILLO, J.

We rule for petitioner. Firstly, it must be stressed that the assailed rulings of the HLURB and the Court of Appeals pertain to proceedings which have for their purpose the execution of the 14 November 1995 HLURB Decision. Obviously the Decision has long become final and, as petitioner alleges, has also been completely satisfied. Under these facts, the HLURB is thus left with no other authority but to enforce the dispositive part of its Decision which it can no longer amend, modify or alter in a manner affecting the merits of the judgment.[20] Since the instant petition alleges the amendment or modification of the HLURB Decision which was beyond the authority of the HLURB and the Court of Appeals to do, the proper remedy clearly is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone,[21] we said -

	GR No. 188995 2011-08-24	EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. JOSE PULIDO BERSAMIN, J.
On January 16, 2001,[6] the Court promulgated its decision in G.R. No. 137285, disposing:
	GR No. 164195 2009-12-04	APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA BERSAMIN, J.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.[40] Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.[41] It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.[42] The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.[43] (Emphases supplied.)
	GR No. 164195 2009-12-04	APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA BERSAMIN, J.
Just compensation, thus, must embrace not only the correct (real, substantial, full and ample) determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land but also its payment within a reasonable time from the taking of the land to enable the landowners to cope with the loss; otherwise, interest in the nature of damages from the time of the taking of the property up to the actual payment of just compensation, is in order.[45]
	GR No. 169914 2008-04-18	ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone ,[137] we ruled that the establishment of an export processing zone is a legitimate public purpose notwithstanding that portion of the land was leased to private commercial banks:... The expropriation of Lot 1406-B for the purpose of being leased to [commercial] banks and for the construction of a [transportation] terminal has the purpose of making banking and transportation facilities easily accessible to the persons working at the industries located in [the Philippine Export Processing Zone].[138]
	GR NO. 150640 2007-03-22	BARANGAY SINDALAN v. CA
Another vital requisite for a valid condemnation is the payment of just compensation to the property owner. In the recent case of APO Fruits Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,[18] just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator," and that the gauge for computation is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. In order for the payment to be "just," it must be real, substantial, full, and ample. Not only must the payment be fair and correctly determined, but also, the Court in Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone stressed that the payment should be made within a "reasonable time" from the taking of the property.[19] It succinctly explained that without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of the land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. Thus, once just compensation is finally determined, the expropriator must immediately pay the amount to the lot owner. In Reyes v. National Housing Authority, it was ruled that 12% interest per annum shall be imposed on the final compensation until paid.[20] Thus, any further delay in the payment will result in the imposition of 12% interest per annum. However, in the recent case of Republic v. Lim, the Court enunciated the rule that "where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property."[21]
	GR NO. 164195 2007-02-06	APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.[62] Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.[63] It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.[64] The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.[65]
	GR NO. 161957 2007-01-22	JORGE GONZALES v. CLIMAX MINING LTD. TINGA, J.
The situation in B.F. Corporation is not availing in the present petition. The disquisition in B.F. Corporation led to the conclusion that in order that the question of jurisdiction may be resolved, the appellate court had to deal first with a question of law which could be addressed in a certiorari proceeding. In the present case, Gonzales's petition raises a question of law, but not a question of jurisdiction. Judge Pimentel acted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in R.A. No. 876 when he ordered Gonzales to proceed with arbitration and appointed a sole arbitrator after making the determination that there was indeed an arbitration agreement. It has been held that as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a special civil action of certiorari.[32] Even if we overlook the employment of the wrong remedy in the broader interests of justice, the petition would nevertheless be dismissed for failure of Gonzalez to show grave abuse of discretion.
	GR NO. 166429 2005-12-19	REPUBLIC v. HENRICK F. GINGOYON TINGA, J.
In Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA),[113] we allowed the lease by the PEZA of the property under expropriation to third parties even before payment of just compensation. PEZA's charter provided it "substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the expropriated property would be utilized."[114] Thus, the Court declared that it would not question the lease because it was in furtherance of the public purpose of the expropriation.[115]
	GR NO. 162814-17 2005-08-25	JOSE F. MANACOP v. EQUITABLE PCIBANK YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Equitable Bank's reliance on Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone[46] is misplaced. In that case, resort by the respondent to a special civil action was justified, even as the reglementary period for the proper remedy of appeal had already lapsed, because the assailed order of the trial court set aside an expropriation order that had long become final and executory. The Court declared therein that the trial court clearly acted beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final and executory order. The questioned order of the trial court in that case was a patent nullity.
	GR No. 144440 2004-09-01	COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION TINGA, J.
Consideration of the general philosophy and thrust of the EPZA Law cannot be evaded. The export processing zone is intended to be a viable commercial, industrial and investment area.[12] The enunciated policy of the EPZA Law is to encourage and promote foreign commerce as a means of making the Philippines a center of international trade; strengthening our export trade and foreign exchange position; hastening industrialization; reducing domestic unemployment; and accelerating the development of the country, by establishing export processing zones in strategic locations in the Philippines.[13]
	GR No. 154411 2003-06-19	NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.[29] The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable.[30] An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.[31] Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.[32]
	GR No. 132358 2002-04-12	MILA YAP SUMNDAD v. JOHN WILLIAM HARRIGAN QUISUMBING, J.
Given our disquisition that the complaint for sum of money was instituted with the proper court, petitioner's remedy before the appellate court should have been a timely appeal and not certiorari. Therefore, the appellate court was correct in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari for being time-barred. Indeed, certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, especially if such loss was occasioned by one's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.[35] As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari.[36]
	GR No. 143781 2002-02-27	JOSE CLAVANO v. HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD AND SPS. ENRIQUE AND VENUS TENAZAS BELLOSILLO, J.
We rule for petitioner. Firstly, it must be stressed that the assailed rulings of the HLURB and the Court of Appeals pertain to proceedings which have for their purpose the execution of the 14 November 1995 HLURB Decision. Obviously the Decision has long become final and, as petitioner alleges, has also been completely satisfied. Under these facts, the HLURB is thus left with no other authority but to enforce the dispositive part of its Decision which it can no longer amend, modify or alter in a manner affecting the merits of the judgment.[20] Since the instant petition alleges the amendment or modification of the HLURB Decision which was beyond the authority of the HLURB and the Court of Appeals to do, the proper remedy clearly is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone,[21] we said -

ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ v. PHILIPPINE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE