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FRANCISCO MADRID· v. SPS. BONIFACIO MAPOY AND FELICIDAD MARTINEZ

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

2014-06-09
MENDOZA, J.
This rule has been applied in innumerable cases, one of which was Francisco Madrid v. Spouses Mapoy,[19] where it was written: Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack. A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of. To permit a collateral attack on respondents-plaintiffs' title is to water down the integrity and guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title.
2012-10-10
REYES, J.
To begin with, the Court will not resolve or dwell on the petitioner's argument on the doubling of respondents' underpayment of wages and regular holiday pay by the DOLE for the simple reason that this is the first time that the petitioner raised such contention.  From its pleadings filed in the DOLE and all the way up to the CA, the petitioner never questioned nor discussed such issue.  It is only now before the Court that the petitioner belatedly presented such argument.  It is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.[15]  To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.[16]
2012-08-15
BERSAMIN, J.
Thirdly, the core issue in an action for the recovery of possession of realty like this one concerned only the priority right to the possession of the realty.[21] As such, Numeriano's assertion of ownership in his own right could not be finally and substantively determined herein, for it was axiomatic that the adjudication of the question of ownership in an action for the recovery of possession of realty would only be provisional and would not even be a bar to an action between the same parties involving the ownership of the same property.[22]
2011-09-14
MENDOZA, J.
At the outset, the Court would like to highlight the fact that Cataquiz never raised this issue before the CA, despite having had ample time to do so.  The records show that the Ombudsman promulgated its resolution on November 30, 2004, more than three months prior to the filing by the respondent of his petition before the CA on March 2, 2005.[33] Nevertheless, he only chose to mention this after the CA had rendered its decision and after the submission of his comment on the petition at bench. This is evidently a desperate effort on his part to strengthen his position and support the decision of the CA exonerating him from any administrative liability.  The Court has consistently ruled that issues not previously ventilated cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[34] Otherwise, to consider such issues and arguments belatedly raised by a party would be tantamount to a blatant disregard of the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.[35] Therefore, this issue does not merit the attention of the Court.
2011-07-27
BERSAMIN, J.
Moreover, the respondent's suit is exposed as being, in reality, a collateral attack on the title in the name of Laura, and for that reason should not prosper. Registration of land under the Torrens System, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack. [19] A collateral attack occurs when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of. [20]
2011-06-15
SERENO, J.
It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. [27] More important, if these matters had been raised earlier, they could have been seriously examined by the administrative agency concerned. [28]
2011-04-06
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Paragraph 3 of the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer states that petitioner is the registered owner of the property located at No. 49, National Road, Barrio Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[37]  It is in fact by virtue of this alleged ownership that he entered into contracts of lease with respondent and was ejecting the latter by reason of the expiration of said contracts.  However, we note that petitioner, as plaintiff in the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, failed to discharge his burden of showing that he indeed owned the property. "In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.  If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent."[38]  On the other hand, respondent has satisfactorily shown that title to the property has already been conveyed to China Bank.  It submitted the following documents: (1) the Promissory Note[39] executed by petitioner and his spouse in favor of China Bank for a loan of P20 million and the (Real Estate) Mortgage[40] over the subject property; (2) the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of said Real Estate Mortgage;[41] (3) the Notice of Auction Sale By Notary Public, Certificate of Posting, Affidavit of Publication and Certificate of Sale in favor of China Bank,[42] all in connection with the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the leased premises; (4) the Affidavit of Consolidation[43] executed by China Bank's Vice-President to inform the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan that the one-year period of redemption has expired without petitioner redeeming the property and to request said office to issue the corresponding TCT under the bank's name; and (5) TCT No. T-370128 (M)[44] issued on August 21, 2000 in the name of China Bank covering the leased property.  Said documents, particularly TCT No. T-370128 (M), undeniably show that China Bank is the owner of the property and not petitioner.  "As a matter of law, a Torrens Certificate of Title is evidence of indefeasible title of property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears. The title holder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession, subject only to limits imposed by law."[45]  Not being the registered titleholder, we hold that petitioner does not have a better right of possession over the property as against respondent who is in actual possession thereof and who claims to derive its right of possession from the titleholder, China Bank, to whom it pays rents for its use.  Hence, petitioner's action for unlawful detainer must fail. This being settled, it is obvious that petitioner is likewise not entitled to payment of damages for the fair rental value or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
2010-11-17
NACHURA, J.
The argument must be rejected because it was raised for the first time in this petition.  In the trial court and the CA, petitioner's arguments zeroed in on the alleged conjugal nature of the property.  It is well settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.  To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.[41]
2010-03-15
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
It is not the Court's function to evaluate factual questions all over again. A weighing of evidence necessarily involves the consideration of factual issues - an exercise that is not appropriate for the Rule 45 petition filed. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the parties may raise only questions of law in petitions filed under Rule 45, as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. As a rule, we are not duty-bound to again analyze and weigh the evidence introduced and considered in the tribunals below. [30] This is particularly true where the Board and the Court of Appeals agree on the facts. While there are recognized exceptions to this general rule and the Court may be prevailed upon to review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals when the same are manifestly mistaken, or when the appealed judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court overlooked certain undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion, [31] no such circumstances exist in this case.